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Summary 
Many people think that it is possible to undennine belief in God by arguing that the 
evidence for this belief is insufficient. The aim of this thesis is to develop a new 
objection to this claim (which claim I call EBG). In chapter one, I describe an 
objection to EBG which I call the anti-sceptical objection, or the ASO. The ASO 
faces a number of serious problems~ but, in later chapters, I show that it can be made 
invulnerable to these problems. 
The ASO can be divided into two stages. Its first stage argues that EBG is true only 
if there is aform ofevidentialism that discredits belie/in God, and its second stage 
argues that there is no form of evidentialism that discredits belief in God. In chapter 
two, I argue that the ASO faces a serious problem. This problem is generated by a 
non-standard fonn of evidential ism, which I call explanatory evidentialism. 
In chapter three, I rectify the problem described in chapter two. I do so by 
constructing a new version of the ASO, which I call the second ASO. Unlike the 
original ASO, the second ASO does not aim to show that EBG is false. Instead, it 
aims to undermine belief in EBG, by showing that, under ordinary standards for 
knowledge, EBG is not known to be true. 
The second ASO can be divided into four stages. Its second stage argues that 
explanatory evidentialism is the only fonn of evidentialism which stands a chance of 
discrediting belief in God. In chapter four, I argue that another fonn of evidentialism 
- which I call epistemic evidentialism - may discredit belief in God even if 
explanatory evidentialism fails to do so. Chapter five then constructs a third version 
ofthe ASO which is invulnerable to the problem described in chapter four. 
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Chapter One 
The anti-sceptical objection 
Many people think that it is possible to undermine belief in God by arguing that the 
evidence for this belief is insufficient. 1 The main aim of this thesis is to develop a 
new objection to this claim. In this chapter, I will outline an objection to this claim 
which is motivated by reflection on sceptical hypotheses. The objection that I will 
outline faces a number of serious problems~ but, in later chapters, I will show that 
the objection can be made invulnerable to these problems. 
1. Clarifying EBG 
Before we can describe the objection with which this chapter is concerned, we must 
clarify the claim on which this objection is focused (which I will call EBG). In what 
follows, I will make a number of clarifications to the following rough statement of 
EBG: 
(EBG) It is possible to undermine belief in God by arguing that the evidence 
for this belief is insufficient. 
The clarifications that I will make are motivated by a number of questions and 
problems that are generated by this rough statement. In the next eight subsections, I 
will state these questions and problems, and will describe the clarifications that they 
motivate. 
1.1 First clarification 
One question that we should ask advocates of(EBG) is the following: 
1 For philosophical defences of this claim, see Clitford 1879, Russell 1957, Blanshard 1974, Flew 
1976, and Mackie 1982. For objections to some of these defences, see James 1896, Swinbume 1979, 
Plantinga 1983 and 2000, and van Inwagen 1997. 
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(Ql) What do you mean by 'belief in God'? 
Different advocates of (EBG) will answer this question in different ways; but, it 
seems likely that most advocates of the doctrine will want to give an answer which 
is broad. Any belief which says, or entails that there is a deity, or deities will be 
taken, by most advocates of EBG, to be a belief that can be undermined in the way 
that EBG describes. For this reason, it is natural to clarify EBG in the following 
way: 
(EBG2)It is possible to undermine any deity belief by arguing that the 
evidence for this belief is insufficient. 
where a deity belief is defined as a belief which says, or entails, that there is a deity, 
or deities. 
1.2 Second clarification 
Another question that we could ask an advocate ofEBG is the following: 
(Q2) What do you mean by 'undermine'? 
Most advocates of EBG will want to adopt an epistemic interpretation of this term. 
On one natural interpretation of this kind, one undermines S's belief that p iff one 
gives S a conclusive epistemic reason to stop believing that p. The best way to 
clarify the concept of a conclusive epistemic reason is to appeal to examples. 
If I make you aware of the fact that your belief that p is false, then I give you a 
conclusive epistemic reason to stop believing that p. And, if! make you aware of the 
fact that this belief is epistemically irrational or unreasonable, then I also give you a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon it. There are other ways of giving people 
conclusive epistemic reasons to abandon their beliefs; but, for the moment, we will 
not go into the details of these. For now, it is sufficient to say that one gives subject 
S a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon beliefB iffthe reason for abandoning B 
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that one gives to S is the same kind of reason as one would give to S by making S 
aware of the fact that B is epistemically irrational, or false. 
On this definition of a conclusive epistemic reason, it seems fair to rewrite (EBG2) 
in the following way: 
(EBG3)It is possible to give those who have deity beliefs a conclusive 
epistemic reason to abandon these beliefs by arguing that the 
evidence for these beliefs is insufficient. 
For, it seems clear, on this definition, that (EBG3) states a doctrine that most 
advocates ofEBG would be prepared to endorse. 
1.3 Third clarification 
A third question that we could ask advocates of EBG is the following: 
(Q3) What, exactly, do you mean by belief? 
We can motivate this question by focusing on the following example, which is due 
to Alvin Plantinga: 
'Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing 
certain crucial Christian claims - perhaps the teaching that God was in 
Christ, reconciling the world to himself. Upon calling that belief to 
mind, he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness. 
Nonetheless, he is committed to this belief; it is his position; if you 
ask him what he thinks about it, he will unhesitatingly endorse it. He 
has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it.' 
(Plantinga 1983:37). 
Some may be tempted to say that Plantinga's Christian no longer believes the 
doctrine that Plantinga mentions. But, it seems wrong to make this claim without 
qualification. For, as Plantinga says, the Christian does still endorse this doctrine - it 
is still his position. Because of this, we should say that the doctrine is, in one sense, a 
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doctrine that the Christian believes. 
Although the doctrine that Plantinga mentions is, in one sense, a doctrine that the 
Christian believes, it is not a doctrine in which the Christian has much confidence. 
Upon calling the doctrine to mind, he finds it cold and lifeless. He is by no means 
sure that it is true. Because of this, we should say that the doctrine is, in one sense, a 
doctrine that the Christian does not believe. By saying this, we commit ourselves to 
the existence of two different senses of 'believes'. 
In what follows, we will say that a subject, S, actively believes a proposition, P, iff S 
believes P in the first of our two senses, and that he passively believes it iff he 
believes it in the second. On this usage, Plantinga's Christian actively believes that 
God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, but does not passively believe 
that this is so. This use of 'active' and 'passive' is motivated by the fact that, on the 
first sense of 'believes', belief seems to be a state that can be actively formed - i.e. a 
state that can be formed at will, by performing a certain kind of action. On the 
second sense of 'believes', active formation of belief does not seem possible, and 
consequently, it is natural to use the term 'active' for the first sense, and the term 
'passive' for the second.2 
Now that we have distinguished between active and passive belief, we can 
distinguish between two readings of EBG. On the first reading, EBG says that it is 
possible to undermine any active deity belief by arguing that the evidence for this 
belief is insufficient, and on the second, it says that it is possible to undermine any 
passive deity belief in this way. On both of these readings, EBG can seem plausible. 
But, there is reason to think that the first reading gives EBG a better chance of being 
true than the second. 
To see this, let's suppose (a) that I believe, both actively and passively, that my 
numbers will not come up in this week's National Lottery draw, and (b) that my only 
reason for actively and passively believing this is that the chance of my numbers 
2 The distinction between active and passive belief is similar to the distinction that a number of 
authors have made between belief and acceptance. For some descriptions of this distinction, see de 
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coming up is extremely small. In these circumstances, you can give me a conclusive 
epistemic reason to abandon my active belief about the lottery by arguing that my 
evidence for this belief is insufficient. But, it is not clear that you can give me a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon my passive belief about the lottery in this 
way. To see this, recall that passive belief is a matter of confidence. To passively 
believe a proposition is, roughly, to be very confident that that proposition is true. It 
seems clear that it is reasonable, in this situation, for me to be very confident that my 
numbers will not come up. And, consequently, it seems clear that you cannot give 
me a conclusive epistemic reason to stop passively believing that my numbers will 
not come up by arguing that the evidence for this belief is insufficient. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to develop and defend a certain objection to EBG. 
Because of this, we should interpret EBG as charitably as possible. The above 
comments suggest that the most charitable way of interpreting EBG is as a claim 
about active, rather than passive belief. So, in what follows, we will interpret EBG in 
this way. 
To save words, I will refrain from explicitly restating EBG as a claim about active 
deity beliefs. But, in what follows, it should be read as a claim of this kind. More 
generally: any claim that I make about belief Simpliciter should be read as a claim 
about active belief Claims that I make about passive belief will be explicitly stated 
as such. 
1.4 Fourth clarification 
Many people who have deity beliefs are aware of the apparent lack of evidence for 
these beliefs. Advocates ofEBG may want to say that some or all of these people are 
already aware of the fact that the evidence for their deity beliefs is insufficient. If a 
subject, S, is already aware of the fact that the evidence for his deity beliefs is 
insufficient, then it will not be possible to give S a reason to abandon his deity 
beliefs by arguing for this fact. Because of this, section 1.2's statement ofEBG needs 
to be amended, in something like the following way: 
Sousa 1971, Cohen 1992 and Frankish 1998. 
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(EBG4)If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not aware of 
the fact that the evidence for these beliefs is insufficient, then we can 
give these people a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon their 
deity beliefs, by arguing that the evidence for these beliefs is 
insufficient. 
1.5 Fifth clarification 
Some advocates of EBG may not want to commit themselves to saying that the 
evidence for people's deity beliefs is in fact insufficient. They may want to restrict 
themselves to endorsing the weaker claim that this evidence is not known by us to be 
sufficient, or that is cannot reasonably be believed by us to be so. To accommodate 
these people, we should amend (EBG4) in something like the following way: 
(EBGs)If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not aware of 
the fact that the following claim (or some suitable variant of this 
claim) is true with respect to them: 
(-'E) The evidence for my deity beliefs is insufficient. 
then we can give these people a conclusive epistemic reason to 
abandon their deity beliefs by arguing that (-'E) (or some suitable 
variant of (-'E)) is true with respect to them. 
Once we have amended it in this way, we can say that claims like the following are 
suitable variants of C-,E): 
I do not know that the evidence for my deity beliefs is 
sufficient. 
It is not reasonable for me to believe that the evidence for my 
deity beliefs is sufficient. 
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We can also classify claims like the following as suitable variants of (-'E): 
I do not have sufficient evidence for my deity beliefs. 
My deity beliefs are not based on sufficient evidence. 
I do not know whether my deity beliefs are based on sufficient 
evidence. 
However: we should not classify claims like the following as suitable variants of 
(-'E): 
(EA) 
(EAF) 
There is evidence against my deity beliefs. 
The evidence against my deity beliefs outweighs the evidence 
for them. 
For, the core idea of EBG is that we can undermine deity beliefs by arguing that 
there is insufficient evidence for them. Advocates of EBG may believe that there is 
evidence against the existence of deities, and they may believe that this evidence can 
be used to undermine deity beliefs. But, they do not take themselves to be appealing 
to evidence of this kind when they endorse EBG~ so, evidence of this kind should 
not be mentioned in our statement ofEBG. 
1.6 Sixth clarification 
A belief, B, is a deity belief iff B says, or entails, that there is a deity, or deities. It is 
useful to distinguish between two kinds of deity belief. On the one hand, there are 
epistemic deity beliefs, which say, or entail that we know something about a deity, or 
deities. And, on the other, there are metaphysical deity beliefs, which do not say or 
entail anything of this kind. 
Many advocates ofEBG hold that all metaphysical deity beliefs (henceforth: MDBs) 
are untrue. But, no-one endorses EBG because they believe that all MOBs are 
untrue. Those who endorse EBG would endorse it even if they were agnostic about 
the truth-value of MOBs. Because of this, they should be prepared to endorse the 
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following strengthened formulation ofEBG: 
If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E)) 
is true with respect to them then we can give these people a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon their deity beliefs by 
arguing that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E)) is true 
with respect to them. We can this regardless of whether the 
MDBs of these people are untrue. 
It is important that the italicised clause of this formulation refers only to 
metaphysical deity beliefs. For, advocates ofEBG would not endorse this doctrine if 
they were agnostic about the truth-value of epistemic deity beliefs. To see this, we 
need to think about the reasons that advocates of EBG have for endorsing this 
doctrine. It seems clear that those who endorse (EBG6) do so because they believe 
something like the following claim: 
If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E)) 
is true with respect to them, then we can make these people 
aware of the fact that their deity beliefs have some epistemic 
defect, D, by arguing that (-E) (or some suitable variant of 
(-'E)) is true with respect to them. We can do this regardless 
of whether the MDBs of these people are untrue. 
There may be some disagreement among advocates of EBG as to the nature of 
epistemic defect D. Some may take it to be the defect of irrationality, while others 
take it to be some less serious defect. But, all of them are likely to agree that beliefs 
which have defect D do not constitute knowledge. So, it is likely that they will all 
endorse the following claim: 
If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E)) 
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is true with respect to them then we can make these people 
aware of the fact that their deity beliefs do not constitute 
knowledge by arguing that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of 
(-'E)) is true with respect to them. We can do this regardless 
of whether the MDBs of these people are untrue. 
Anyone who endorses this claim will think that there are no deity beliefs that 
constitute knowledge. Consequently, they will think that no epistemic deity beliefs 
(henceforth: EDBs) are true. From this, it follows that, if advocates of EBG were 
agnostic about the truth-value of some EDBs, then they would not endorse (EBG6"). 
And, if advocates of EBG did not endorse (EBG6"), then they would not endorse 
(EBG6)~ so, we can conclude that advocates ofEBG would not endorse EBG if they 
were agnostic about the truth-value of some epistemic deity beliefs. 
1.7 Seventh clarification 
Because advocates of EBG endorse (EBG6"), they are committed to endorsing the 
following claim: 
If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who believe 
that these deity beliefs constitute knowledge, then we can 
make these people aware of the fact that their deity beliefs do 
not constitute knowledge, by arguing that (-'E) (or some 
suitable variant of (-'E)) is true with respect to them. 
Some advocates of EBG may think that there are other ways of making people 
aware of the fact that their deity beliefs do not constitute knowledge. E.g. they may 
hold that we can make people aware of this fact by arguing that their deity beliefs 
were caused in the wrong way, or by arguing that these beliefs were produced by a 
cognitive malfunction. If they do hold this, then they hold that certain epistemic 
deity beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
Even if some advocates of EBG do believe that certain EDBs can be rebutted in a 
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non-evidential way, it seems clear that they do not endorse EBG because they 
believe this to be so. Those who endorse EBG would endorse it even if they were 
agnostic about whether there is a non-evidential way of rebutting EDBs. Because of 
this, they should be prepared to endorse the following, strengthened formulation of 
EBG: 
(EBG7) If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (--.E» 
is true with respect to them, then we can give these people a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon their deity beliefs by 
arguing that (--.E) (or some suitable variant of (--.E» is true 
with respect to them. We can do this regardless of whether the 
MDBs of these people are untrue, and regardless of whether 
their EDBs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
The objection to EBG that we will state in this chapter trades on the fact that 
advocates ofEBG are committed to the italicised clause of the above formulation. 
1.8 Eighth clarification 
Some people think that we can undermine just about any belief by arguing that the 
evidence for that belief is insufficient. These people endorse a strong form of 
scepticism. Others think that, although scepticism of this kind is not ordinarily true, 
there are certain unusual contexts in which the standards for epistemic appraisal are 
raised in such a way as to make it true. 3 These people endorse a form of epistemic 
contextual ism. 
Most advocates of EBG do not endorse it for sceptical, or contextualist reasons. 
They do not endorse EBG because they think that similar claims hold for just about 
any belief, and they do not endorse it because they think that we can raise the 
standards of epistemic appraisal in such a way as to make EBG true. According to 
them, EBG holds under ordinary standards of epistemic appraisal, and holds even if 
10 
global scepticism is false. Because of this, they should be prepared to endorse the 
following strengthened formulation ofEBG: 
CEBG8)If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not aware of 
the fact that C--.E) Cor some suitable variant of C--.E)) is true with 
respect to them, then we can give these people a conclusive epistemic 
reason to abandon their deity beliefs by arguing that C--'E) Cor some 
suitable variant of C--'E)) is true with respect to them. We can do this 
regardless of whether the MDBs of these people are untrue, and 
regardless of whether their EDBs can be rebutted in a non-evidential 
way. We can also do it regardless of whether global scepticism is 
true, and regardless of whether the standard'i for epistemic appraisal 
have been raised. 
In what follows, references to EBG should be interpreted as references to CEBG8). 
2. The anti-sceptical objection 
Now that we have clarified EBG, we can start to describe the objection to EBG with 
which this chapter is concemed.4 Because this objection is motivated by reflection 
on certain sceptical hypotheses, we will call it the anti-sceptical objection, or ASO. 
The first stage of the ASO is an argument for the following claim: 
(1) EBG is true only if there is a form of evidentialism that discredits all 
deity beliefs. 
And, the second stage is an argument for this claim: 
(2) There is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
Before we can start to state these arguments, we need to explain what is meant by 'a 
3 See e.g. Cohen 1988 and 1999. 
4 The objection that we wiU describe is inspired by the arguments in Plantinga 1983 and Plantinga 
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form of evidential ism', and what it is for a form of evidentialism to discredit all deity 
beliefs. Section 3 will explain what is meant by these terms, and sections 4 and 5 
will give the arguments for claims (1) and (2) from which the anti-sceptical 
objection is composed. 
3. Forms of evidentialism 
By a form of evidentialism, I mean a doctrine that is sufficiently similar to the 
following:5 
(El) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
A doctrine is sufficiently similar to (El) iff it is either identical to (El), or can be 
generated by making an admissible amendment to (El). There are four kinds of 
admissible amendment that can be made to (El). In the next four subsections, I will 
say something about each kind of amendment, and in section 3.5, I will explain what 
it is for a form of evidential ism to discredit all deity beliefs. 
3.1 Amending the doxastic defect 
One way of amending (El) is to amend the doxastic defect to which it refers. The 
following doctrines can both be generated by an amendment of this kind: 
(E2) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P isfalse. 
(E3) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
1985. It also owes something to the arguments in van Inwagen 1997 and DeRose 2000. 
S My use of this term is similar to the use adopted in Feldman and Conee 1985. 
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S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
Amendments of this kind are admissible iff the defect to which they appeal is 
suitable, where a doxastic defect, D, is said to be suitable iffit satisfies the following 
constraint: 
(SDD) For any subject, S, and proposition P: if S believes P, and S's belief in 
P has defect D, then the fact that this belief has D is a conclusive 
epistemic reason for S to stop believing P. 
The amendments which generate (E2) and (E3) both seem to be admissible; but it is 
not clear that there are any other admissible amendments of this kind. For, it seems 
clear that a doxastic defect will be suitable iff it is epistemic. And, it is not clear that 
there are any epistemic defects that differ significantly from the defects to which 
(Ed - (E3) appeal. 
3.2 Amending the evidential requirement 
Another way of amending (El) is to make changes to the evidential requirement that 
it imposes. We can generate the following doctrines by making amendments of this 
kind: 
(E4) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and there is not enough evidence for P, then S's 
belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
(E5) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on sufficient 
evidence, then S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
(E6) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not know that his bel ief in P is based on 
sufficient evidence, then S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
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Amendments of this kind are admissible iffthey do not depart from the key idea that 
many of our beliefs require the presence of positive evidence, in order to be free 
from epistemic defects. The amendments that generate (E4) - (E6) all adhere to this 
key idea. But, the amendments that generate the following doctrines do not: 
(E7) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
s: if S believes P, and there is evidence against P, then S's belief in P 
is epistemically irrational. 
(Es) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S has evidence against P, then S's belief in P is 
epistemically irrational. 
(E9) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S knows that she has evidence against P, then 
S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
These doctrines are all motivated by the idea that many beliefs require the absence 
of negative evidence, in order to be free from epistemic defect. And, this idea is very 
different from the evidentialist idea encapsulated in doctrines like (E4) -(E6). 
3.3 Substituting alleged synonyms 
A third way of amending (El) is to replace its constituent terms with terms that are, 
at least allegedly, its synonyms. All of the following doctrines can be generated by 
making amendments of this kind: 
(EIO) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have rational perceptual beliefs that 
confirm P to a suffiCient degree, then S's belief in P is epistemically 
irrational. 
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(Ell) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have some rational beliefs that 
confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in P is epistemically 
irrational. 
(E I2) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does have any knowledge-constituting beliefs 
that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in P is 
epistemically irrational. 
The above amendments are all generated by replacing 'has sufficient evidence for P' 
with alleged synonyms~ but, similar amendments could be generated by doing the 
same with respect to 'is epistemically irrational', or with respect to other terms in 
(El). Amendments of this kind are admissible iff they replace terms in (El) with 
terms that can reasonably be believed to be their synonyms. There are many 
admissible amendments of this kind. 
3.4 Making complex amendments 
A fourth way of amending (El) is to make an admissible amendment to a doctrine 
that has itself been generated by making an admissible amendment to (El). The 
following doctrines can all be generated by making amendments of this kind: 
(E\3) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on rational 
perceptual beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief 
in P is epistemically irrational. 
(EI4) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on knowledge-
constituting beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's 
belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
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(EIS) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not ultimately based on 
perceptual beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief 
in P does not constitute knowledge. 
Every amendment of this kind is an admissible amendment to (El). As before, there 
are many admissible amendments of this kind. 
3.5 Discrediting theistic belief 
The last four subsections explain what it is for an amendment to (El) to be 
admissible. By doing so, they show us what it is for a doctrine to be a form of 
evidential ism. In this section, I will explain what it is for a form of evidentialism to 
discredit all deity beliefs. The next section will argue that EBG is true only ifthere is 
a form of evidential ism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
A form of evidential ism, E, discredits all deity beliefs iff it is the case that, for every 
subject, S, who has deity beliefs, the following three claims are all true: 
(Dl) S is in a position to know E, and is in a position to know that 
her deity beliefs are not exceptions to it. 
(D2) If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that E imposes, then we can make 
S aware of this fact. 
(D3) (Dl) and (D2) are true regardless of whether S's metaphysical 
deity beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic 
deity beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. They are 
also true regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and 
regardless of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation 
have been raised. 
On this definition, it is clear that the claim that there is a form of evidentialism that 
discredits all deity beliefs is very similar to the claim that we are calling EBG. In 
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section 4, I will use the similarities between these two claims to argue for the 
following claim: 
(1) EBG is true only if there is a form of evidential ism that discredits all 
deity beliefs. 
The argument of section 4 is the first stage of the anti-sceptical objection. 
4. Arguing for (1) 
In section 4.1, I will argue that EBG implies the following claim: 
(EBG') If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E» 
is true with respect to them, then we can make these people 
aware of the fact that their deity beliefs have a suitable 
doxastic defect by arguing that (-'E) (or some suitable variant 
of (-'E» is true with respect to them. We can do this 
regardless of whether the MDBs of these people are untrue, 
and regardless of whether their EDBs can be rebutted in a 
non-evidential way. We can also do it regardless of whether 
global scepticism is true, and regardless of whether the 
standards for epistemic appraisal have been raised. 
Section 4.2 will argue that (EBG') itself implies the following claim: 
(EBG") If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E» 
is true with respect to them, then (i) there is an evidentialist 
conditional, Bc, that these people are in a position to know, 
(ii) we can make these people aware of the truth of the 
antecedent ofEc, (iii) claims (i) and (ii) are true regardless of 
whether the MDBs of these people are untrue, and regardless 
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of whether their EDBs can be rebutted in a non-evidential 
way, and (iv) claims (i) and (ii) are true regardless of whether 
global scepticism is true, and regardless of whether the 
standards for epistemic appraisal have been raised. 
And, section 4.3 will argue that, if (EBG") is true, then there is a form of 
evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. If the arguments of sections 4.1 to 4.3 
succeed, then they will show that ERG is true only if there is a form of evident ial ism 
that discredits all deity beliefs. In section 5, we will describe an argument which 
aims to show that there is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
4.1 From EEG to (EEG') 
The best way of arguing that EBG implies (EBG') is to appeal to the following 
claim: 
(C) The only way of giving a subject, S, a conclusive epistemic reason to 
abandon a belief, B, is to make S aware of the fact that B has some 
kind of defect. 
This claim is very plausible. And, it is easy to argue that, if this claim is true, then 
EBG implies (EBG'). The only thing that we need to do, in order to argue for this 
implication, is to point out that (C) entails the following claim (where suitability of 
doxastic defects is defined in the same way as it was in section 3.1): 
(C) The only way of giving a subject, S, a conclusive epistemic reason to 
abandon a belief, B, is to make S aware of the fact that B has a 
suitable defect. 
Given our definition of suitability, it is clear that the defect to which (C) refers must 
be suitable. And, once we see that this defect must be suitable, it is easy to see that, 
if (C) is true, then EBG implies (EBG'). 
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4.2 From (EEG') to (EBG'') 
Before we can argue that (EBG') implies (EBG"), we need to introduce the concept 
of an evidentialist conditional. By an evidentialist conditional, I mean a conditional 
whose antecedent is the following claim (or is some suitable variant of this claim): 
(-,E) The evidence for my deity beliefs is insufficient. 
and whose consequent is a claim of the following form (where defect 0 is a suitable 
doxastic defect): 
(OBO) My deity beliefs have defect O. 
If the term 'evidentialist conditional' is defined in this way, then (EBG') is equivalent 
to the following claim: 
(EBG'*) If there are people who have deity beliefs, and who are not 
aware of the fact that (-'E) (or some suitable variant of (-'E)) 
is true with respect to them, then we can make these people 
aware of the fact that the consequent of a certain evidentialist 
conditional, Ec, is true with respect to them, by arguing that 
the antecedent of Ec is true with respect to them. We can do 
this regardless of whether the MOBs of these people are 
untrue, and regardless of whether their EOBs can be rebutted 
in a non-evidential way. We can also do it regardless of 
whether global scepticism is true, and regardless of whether 
the standards for epistemic appraisal have been raised. 
And, if (EBG') is equivalent to this claim, then it surely implies (EBG"). For, it 
seems generally true that, if we can make some subject, S, aware of the truth of 
conditional C's consequent by arguing for conditional C's antecedent, then S is in a 
position to know C. And, if this is generally true, then (EBG'*) clearly implies 
(EBG"). 
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4.3 (EBG") and evidential discredit 
If (EBG") is true, then there is a form of evidentialism that discredits all deity 
beliefs. To see this, we need to think about the relationship between evidentialist 
conditionals and forms of evidential ism. It seems clear that the only way in which a 
subject, S, can come to know an evidentialist conditional is by inferring it from some 
form of evidentialism that is a conceptual truth. And, it seem equally clear that, if 
there is some form of evidentialism, E, that is a conceptual truth, then we are all in a 
position to know E. From these two points, it follows that, if (EBG") is true, then, 
there is some form of evidentialism, E, which is such that, for every subject, S, who 
has deity beliefs, the following three claims are true: 
(D l) S is in a position to know E, and is in a position to know that 
her deity beliefs are not exceptions to it. 
(D2) If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that E imposes, then we can make 
S aware of this fact. 
(D3) (Dl) and (D2) are true regardless of whether S's metaphysical 
deity beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic 
deity beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. They are 
also true regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and 
regardless of whether the standards for epistemic appraisal 
have been raised. 
And, from this fact, and the definitions of section 3.5, we can infer that, if (EBG") is 
true, then there is a form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
5. Arguing for (2) 
In the last section, we stated the first stage of the anti-sceptical objection, which is 
an argument for the following claim: 
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(l) EBG is true only if there is a form of evidentialism that discredits all 
deity beliefs. 
In this section, we will state the second stage of this objection, which is an argument 
for this claim: 
(2) There is no form of evidential ism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
One good way of stating this argument is to focus on the following form of 
evidential ism, which we introduced at the start of section 3: 
(El) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
In section 5.1, we will argue that (El) does not discredit all deity beliefs. Sections 
5.2 - 5.5 will then argue that there is no admissible amendment to (El) which makes 
it more likely to discredit all deity beliefs. If there is no amendment of this kind, then 
there is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. So, if the arguments 
of sections 5.1 - 5.5 all succeed, then they will show that claim (2), above, is true. 
5.1 Against (EU 
(El) cannot discredit all deity beliefs unless (El) is true.6 In this section, I will give 
an argument which aims to show that (El) is not true.7 The gist of this argument is 
that (El) leads to scepticism. One good way of stating the argument is to focus on 
the sceptical hypothesis that I am a brain in a vat (henceforth: the hypothesis that I 
ama BIV'{ 
6 To see this, recall that a fonn of evidentialism, E, discredits all deity beliefs only if those who have 
deity beliefs are in a position to kllow E. 
7 This argument is inspired by a similar argument in DeRose 2000. 
g By the hypothesis that I am a braill ill a vat, I mean the hypothesis that I am a disembodied brain 
floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have exactly the 
experiences that I am actually having. 
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The negation of the BIV hypothesis is not a self-evident truth, like the proposition 
that everything is self-identical. For this reason, it is plausible to suppose that the 
negation of this hypothesis is not one of the exceptional propositions to which the 
qualification at the start of (El) refers. If the negation of the BIV hypothesis is not 
one of these exceptional propositions, then (El) commits us to endorsing the 
following claim: 
(ElBlV) If I do not have enough evidence for the proposition that I am not a 
EIV, then my belief that I am not a BIV is epistemically irrational. 
There is good reason to think that this claim commits us to an implausible form of 
scepticism. 
To see this, note first of all that, if the proposition that I am not a BIV was false (i.e. 
if I was a BIV), then things would seem to me exactly as they actually do. The fact 
that things would seem this way seems to show that I do not have any evidence for 
the proposition that I am not a BIV. But, if I do not have any evidence for this 
proposition, then (ElBlV) commits us to saying that my belief in this proposition is 
epistemically irrational. And, if my belief that I am not a BIV is epistemically 
irrational, then the same goes for almost all of my other beliefs. 
To see this, consider my belief that I have hands. The proposition that I have hands 
obviously entails that I am not a BIV - so, if it is epistemically rational for me to 
believe the first proposition, then it is surely rational for me to believe the second. 
From this, it follows that, if it is epistemically irrational for me to believe that I am 
not a BIV, then it is similarly irrational for me to believe that I have hands. 
Reasoning of this kind will establish similar conclusions with respect to almost all of 
my perceptual beliefs~ so, if we endorse (El), then we seem committed to endorsing 
a very strong form of scepticism. 
Advocates of (El) might try to avoid this problem by insisting that, contrary to 
appearances, the negation of the BIV hypothesis is one of the exceptional 
propositions to which the qualification in (El) refers. But, this strategy does not 
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seem promising. For, we can restate the argument of the last two paragraphs by 
appealing to other sceptical hypotheses. One way in which we could do this is by 
appealing to other 'global' sceptical hypotheses, like the following: 
(IND) 
(MIND) 
(MEM) 
(TEST) 
My expectations about the future will all be confounded by a 
breakdown in the law-like regularities on which these 
expectations are all based. 
All of the 'people' whom I know are in fact cleverly designed 
automata, which act just as if they have minds, but which are 
in fact completely mindless. 
The world came into existence five minutes ago, complete 
with all of the apparent traces of the past on which my beliefs 
about the past are based. 
Everything that I believe on the basis of testimony is a lie, 
which has been told to me as part of an elaborate conspiracy 
that is designed to prevent me from discovering the true 
nature of the world. 
Another equally effective strategy is to appeal to 'local' sceptical hypotheses, like the 
following: 
(WALL) 
(THERM) 
(NEWS) 
The visual experiences on the basis of which I believe that the 
library walls are blue are not veridical. In fact, the library 
walls are white, but the lighting within the library has been 
cleverly arranged in such a way as to make them look blue. 
The thermometer reading on the basis of which I believe that 
my temperature is normal was inaccurate. In fact, I have a 
high temperature, but my thermometer is not working 
properly, and so it failed to register this. 
The newspaper listings on the basis of which I believe that 
Spurs beat Fulham were inaccurate. In fact, Fulham beat 
Spurs, but a misprint in my newspaper has led me to believe 
that the opposite is true. 
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With regard to each of these hypotheses, it is plausible to say that, if the hypothesis 
was true, then things would - or at least, might - seem to me just as they actually do. 
Consequently, it is plausible to say that I do not have evidence - or at least, not 
sufficient evidence - for the falsity of any of these hypotheses. It is also plausible to 
say that the negations of these hypotheses are not exceptions to the universal 
generalisation that appears in (El). And so, we can use each of these hypotheses to 
argue that (El) commits us to an implausible form ofscepticism.9 
The above comments strongly suggest that there are many sceptical hypotheses that 
can be used to attack (El). If there are many hypotheses of this kind, then we cannot 
save (El) by insisting that the negations of these hypotheses are all among the 
exceptional propositions to which the qualification in (El) refers. For, according to 
this qualification, there are no more than a few exceptions to the generalisation in 
(El). Because of this, we cannot say that every sceptical hypothesis is an exception 
to the generalisation in (El) without conceding that (El) is false. 
If the argument of this subsection succeeds, then it shows that (El) is false. And, if it 
shows that (El) is false, then it shows that (El) does not discredit all deity beliefs. In 
the next five subsections, I will argue that there are no admissible amendments to 
(El) which make it more likely to discredit all deity beliefs. If the arguments of these 
subsections succeed, then they will show that there is no form of evidentialism that 
discredits all deity beliefs. 
5.2 Amending the doxastic defect 
One way of amending (El) is to amend the doxastic defect to which it refers. Such 
amendments are admissible iff they replace this defect with a defect that is suitable -
where a doxastic defect, D, is suitable iff it satisfies the following constraint: 
9 The forms of scepticism to which the local sceptical hypotheses commit us will not be as far-
reaching as those which the global hypotheses seem to support. But, they will nevertheless be 
implausible. It is clearly rational for me to believe that the walls ill the library are bllle, even ifI have 
not checked for the kind of tricks which the hypothesis (WALL) describes. (El) seems to entail that it 
24 
(SDD) For any subject, S, and proposition P: ifS believes P, and S's beliefin 
P has defect D, then the fact that this belief has D is a conclusive 
epistemic reason for S to stop believing P. 
On this definition of suitability, there seem to be just three defects that are suitable. 
The first is the defect of falsity, the second is the defect of epistemic irrationality, 
and the third is the defect of not constituting knowledge. Consequently, there seem 
to be just two admissible ways of amending the defect to which (E,) refers. The first 
is to rewrite (E,) in the following way: 
(E2) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P is/alse. 
and the second is to rewrite it as follows: 
(E3) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
Neither of these amendments turns (E,) into a doctrine that discredits all deity 
beliefs. For, neither turns it into a doctrine that is true. (E2) is obviously untrue; for, 
there are clearly many propositions that can be believed truly without evidence. And, 
although (E3) is not obviously untrue, it can be shown to be untrue by an amended 
version of the argument of section 5.1. To see this, we need only note that the 
argument of section 5.1 says very little about epistemic rationality. The only 
assumptions about epistemic rationality that advocates of this argument need to 
make are (i) that epistemic rationality is preserved by deductive inference, and (ii) 
that many of our beliefs about the external world are epistemically rational. Both of 
these assumptions seem just as plausible when restated in tenns of knowledge. So, 
by restating the argument of section 5.1, we can show that, like (E,), (E3) is false. 
is not rational for me to believe this; and consequently, we seem to have reason to reject (El)' 
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The above considerations seem to show that we cannot generate a form of 
evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs by amending the doxastic defect to 
which (El) refers. In section 5.3, I will argue that amendments to the evidential 
requirement in (El) are no more likely to generate a doctrine that discredits all deity 
beliefs. 
5.3 Amending the evidential requirement 
There are two kinds of admissible amendment that can be made to the evidential 
requirement that is imposed by (El). Amendments of the first kind strengthen this 
requirement, by rewriting (El) in something like the following way: 
(E4) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on sufficient 
evidence, then S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
(Es) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not know that her belief in P is based on 
sufficient evidence, then S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
And, amendments of the second kind weaken it, by rewriting (El) in something like 
this way: 
(E6) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have any evidence for P, then S's 
belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
(E7) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and there is not enough evidence for P, then S's 
belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
Amendments of the first kind cannot turn (El) into a doctrine that discredits all deity 
beliefs. For, every form of evidentialism that is generated by an amendment of this 
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kind will entail (El), and will thus be vulnerable to the argument of section 5.1. The 
only way of saving (El) from this argument is to weaken the evidential requirement 
that it imposes on our beliefs. But, there is reason to think that, even when (El) is 
amended in this way, it will not discredit all deity beliefs. 
To see this, note first of all that, if we want to make (El) invulnerable to the 
argument of section 5.1, then we will have to weaken it in something like the 
following waylO: 
(E7) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and there is not enough evidence for P, then S's 
belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
If (El) is amended in this way, then it may not be vulnerable to the argument of 
section 5.1. For, while it is plausible to suppose that I do not have any evidence 
against the sceptical hypotheses that are mentioned in this section, it is by no means 
clear that there is no evidence against these hypotheses. If the hypotheses are in fact 
false, then there will be plenty of evidence against them: the fact that I have hands 
will be evidence against the BlV hypothesis~ the fact that the sun will rise tomorrow 
will be evidence against the hypothesis that we called (IND), and so on. So, if we 
rewrite (El) as (E7), then we may make it invulnerable to the argument of section 
5.1. 
However: even if (E7) is invulnerable to the argument of section 5.1, there is good 
reason to believe that (E7) does not discredit all deity beliefs. To see this, recall that 
(E7) discredits all deity beliefs only if it is the case that, for every subject, S, who has 
deity beliefs, the following claims are both true: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that (E7) imposes, then we can 
make S aware of this fact. 
(D2E7) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
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beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
The first of these claims may be true with regard to every subject, S, who has deity 
beliefs. But, there is good reason to believe that the second is not. One good way of 
seeing this is to note that many of those who have deity beliefs believe the doctrine 
of theism. By the doctrine of theism, I mean the doctrine that there is an omnipotent, 
omniscient, morally perfect God who created the universe, and who keeps it in 
existence. 
If the doctrine of theism is true, then there is plenty of evidence for its truth. Among 
this evidence is the fact that God believes that theism is true, which, given God's 
omniscience, provides excellent evidence for the truth of theism. Because the truth 
of theism implies that there is plenty of evidence for theism, any subject, S, who 
believes the doctrine of theism is such that, if S's metaphysical deity beliefs are all 
true, then (D2E7) is not true with respect to S. From this, it follows that, for every 
subject, S, who believes the doctrine of theism, (D3E7) is not true. 
The above considerations seem to show that we cannot generate a form of 
evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs by amending the evidential requirement 
that (El) imposes. In section 5.4, I will argue that the substitution of terms in (El) for 
terms that are allegedly their synonyms is no more likely to generate a form of 
evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
5.4 Substitution of alleged synonyms 
There are many kinds of admissible amendment to (Et) that can be made by 
substitution of alleged synonyms. Some of these amendments seem to generate 
forms of evidential ism that are invulnerable to the argument of section 5.1. In what 
follows, I will consider a representative sample of the forms of evidential ism that 
can be generated by amendments of this kind. By focusing on the members of this 
sample, I will argue that no form of evidential ism that is generated by an amendment 
)0 To see this, note that (£6) is as vulnerable as (E) to the argument of section 5.1. 
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of this kind is capable of discrediting all deity beliefs. 
One fonn of evidentialism that can be generated by substitution of alleged synonyms 
is the following: 
(Es) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and the propositions that S knows to be true do not 
confinn P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in P is epistemically 
irrational. 11 
This fonn of evidential ism seems to be invulnerable to the argument of section 5.1. 
For, all of us seem to know propositions which entail - and thus strongly confinn -
the negations of the sceptical hypotheses on which this argument focuses. 12 
Although (Eg) seems invulnerable to the argument of section 5.1, there is good 
reason to believe that (Es) does not discredit all deity beliefs. To see this, recall that 
(Es) discredits all deity beliefs only if it is the case that, for every subject, S, who has 
deity beliefs, the following pair of claims are true: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that (EM) imposes, then we can 
make S aware of this fact. 
(D2ES) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
It seems clear that, to make a subject, S, aware of the fact that her deity beliefs don't 
satisfy the evidential requirement that (Eg) imposes, we must first make S aware of 
the fact that her deity beliefs do not constitute knowledge. But, if we can make S 
aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not constitute knowledge before we have 
\l If the arguments ofWiIliamson 1997 succeed, then they show that (E,) is synonymous with (E8). 
12 To see this, note (a) that I seem to know that I have hands, which proposition entails that I am not a 
BIV; (b) that I seem to know that the sun will rise tomorrow, which proposition entails the negation 
of(IND); and likewise for each of the hypotheses that were described in section 5.1. 
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made aware of the fact that her deity beliefs don't satisfy the evidential requirement 
that (Bs) imposes, then we can rebut some of S's epistemic deity beliefs in a non-
evidential way. Because of this, it seems fair to conclude that there are at least some 
subject for whom (D2ES) and (D3ES) are not both true. 
If there are some subjects for whom these claims are not both true, then (Es) does 
not discredit all deity beliefs. Are there any other forms of evidential ism which can 
be generated by the substitution of alleged synonyms, and which stand a better 
chance of discrediting all deity beliefs? One form of evidentialism which might be 
thought to stand a better chance of discrediting such beliefs is the following: 
(E9) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and the propositions that S knows on the basis of 
perception do not confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in P 
is epistemically irrational. 
Like (Es), this form of evidential ism can be generated by substitution of alleged 
synonyms. And, like (Es), it seems to avoid some of the sceptical consequences of 
(El). (El) commits us to saying that my belief that I am not a BIV is epistemically 
irrational. But, (E9) does not seem to commit us to saying this: for, I seem to have 
perceptual knowledge of many propositions that entail that 1 am not a BlV. 
If (E9) avoids all of the sceptical consequences of (El), then it may discredit all deity 
beliefs. For, deity beliefs are not generally confirmed to any great degree by 
perceptual beliefs; so, it may turn out that, for every subject, S, who has deity 
beliefs, the following pair of claims are true: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that (E9) imposes, then we can 
make S aware of this fact. 
(D2E9) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
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But, there is reason to think that (E9) does not avoid all of the sceptical consequences 
of (El). One good way of seeing this is to focus on one of the other sceptical 
hypotheses that we described in section 5.1. The negation of the following sceptical 
hypothesis is entailed by each of the propositions that I believe on the basis of 
testimony: 
(TEST) Everything that I believe on the basis of testimony is a lie, 
which has been told to me as part of an elaborate conspiracy 
that is designed to prevent me from discovering the true 
nature of the world. 
So, if my belief in the negation of (TEST) is epistemically irrational, then the same 
goes for all of the beliefs that I hold on the basis of testimony. The propositions that 
I know on the basis of perception seem to be propositions that would have been true 
even if (TEST) had been tre~ and, this strongly suggests that these propositions do 
not confirm the negation of (TEST) to a sufficient degree. Consequently, there is 
reason to think that, if (E9) is true, then all of the beliefs that I hold on the basis of 
testimony are epistemically irrational. 
By appealing to our discussion of (E9), we can argue that no evidentialist doctrine 
which has the following form will discredit all deity beliefs: 
(Ex) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and the propositions that S knows on the basis of X 
do not confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in P is 
epistemically irrational. 
We can argue for this by arguing that every evidentialist doctrine, Ex, which has this 
form either leads to scepticism, or is such that, for some subject, S, the following 
pair of claims are not both true: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
31 
the evidential requirement that Ex imposes, then we can make 
S aware of this fact. 
(D2Ex) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
The instance of (Ex) which replaces 'X' with 'perception' leads to scepticism, as we 
have just seen. The instance that replaces 'X' with 'perception and testimony' may not 
lead to scepticism~ but, since there are many people who hold some deity beliefs on 
the basis of testimony, it seems likely that this instance of (Ex) - which we can call 
(ElO) - will be such that, for some subject, S, the relevant instances of (D2EX) and 
(D3EX) are not both true. The only instances of (Ex) which stand a chance of 
avoiding both of these problems are instances in which 'X' is replaced by some 
complex term, like 'perception and uncontroversial testimony', or 'perception and 
testimony which can, in principle, be empirically verified'. But. it does not seem 
possible to generate these instances of (Ex) by replacing terms in (El) with terms that 
can reasonably be believed to be their synonyms~ and, consequently, it seems likely 
that there is no form of evidentialism which is an instance of (Ex), and which 
discredits all deity beliefs. 
Some forms of evidentialism which are generated by substitution of alleged 
synonyms are not instances of (Ex). But, it seems likely that these forms of 
evidentialism will nevertheless be vulnerable to the problems that we have just 
outlined. To see this, consider the following forms of evidentialism, which can all be 
generated by substitution of alleged synonyms: 
(Ell) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and the propositions that S reasonably believes do 
not confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in P is 
epistemically irrational. 
(El2) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and the propositions that S reasonably believes on 
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the basis of perception do not confirm P to a sufficient degree, then 
S's belief in Pis epistemically irrational. 
(El3) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and the propositions that S reasonably believes on 
the basis of perception or testimony do not confirm P to a sufficient 
degree, then S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
Each of these forms of evidential ism seems either to lead to scepticism, or to be such 
that, for some subject, S, the relevant instances of (D2) and (D3) do not hold. 
Let us say that a form of evidentialism, E, is too strong to discredit all deity beliefs 
iff E leads to scepticism. And, let us say that E is too weak to discredit all deity 
beliefs iffE is such that, for some subject, S, the relevant instances of(D2) and (D3) 
don't hold. The arguments of this section strongly suggest that every form of 
evidential ism which is generated by substitution of alleged synonyms is either too 
strong or too weak to discredit all deity beliefs. In section 5.5, I will argue that there 
is reason to endorse a similar conclusion with respect to forms of evidential ism that 
are generated by complex amendments to (El). 
5.5 Making complex amendments 
An amendment to (El) is complex iff it can be generated by making an admissible 
amendment to a doctrine that can itself be generated by making an admissible 
amendment to (El). Some amendments of this kind seem to generate forms of 
evidentialism that are invulnerable to the argument of section 5.1. In what follows, I 
will consider a representative sample of the forms of evidentialism that can be 
generated by complex amendments to (El). By focusing on the members of this 
sample, I will argue that no form of evidentialism that is generated by a complex 
amendment is capable of discrediting all deity beliefs. 
One form of evidentialism that can be generated by making a complex amendment 
to (El) is the following: 
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(E14) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on epistemically 
rational beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in 
Pis epistemically irrational. 
There is good reason to believe that this form of evidentialism leads to scepticism. 
To see this, consider the following claim (where a belief is basic iff it is not based on 
any other beliefs, and non-basic otherwise): 
(UB) Every rational non-basic belief is ultimately based on basic beliefs. 
When (E14) is conjoined with this plausible claim, it commits us to endorsing a very 
strong form of foundationalism. Because of this, there is good reason to believe that 
(E14) leads to scepticism. 
To see that (EI4) and (UB) jointly commit us to endorsing a strong form of 
foundationalism, note, first of all, that (EI4) entails the following claim: 
(F I) With few exceptions: every rational belief, B, is based on other 
rational beliefs that confirm the content of B to a sufficient degree. 13 
Next, note that, when this claim is conjoined with (UB), it entails the following 
claim (where a belief is properly basic iff it is both rational and basic): 
(F2) With few exceptions: every rational belief, B, is ultimately based on 
properly basic beliefs that confirm the content of B to a sufficient 
degree. 
Finally, note that the exceptional propositions to which the qualification at the start 
of (EI4) refers seem all to be self-evident propositions, like the proposition that 
everything is self-identical. From this point, we can infer that (F2) implies the 
34 
following claim: 
(F3) With the exception of self-evident beliefs: every rational belief, B, is 
ultimately based on self-evident beliefs that confirm the content ofB 
to a sufficient degree. 
(F3) states a very strong form of foundationalism. It seems clear that this form of 
foundationalism will lead to scepticism. For, it seems clear that hardly any of our 
beliefs are confirmed to a sufficient degree by beliefs that are self-evidently true. 
Because of this, (F3) commits us to saying that hardly any of our beliefs are rational. 
Some advocates of (El4) may try to argue that (EI4) does not commit us to endorsing 
(F3). One way in which they may try to do this is by arguing that the exceptional 
propositions to which the qualification at the start of(E14) refers include propositions 
that can be known by perception, as well as propositions that are self-evidently true. 
If perceptual propositions are exceptions to the generalisation in (EI4), then (EI4) 
will not commit us to endorsing anything stronger than the following form of 
foundationalism: 
(F4) With the exception of self-evident beliefs and perceptual beliefs: 
every rational belief, B, is ultimately based on self-evident beliefs 
and/or perceptual beliefs that confirm the content of B to a sufficient 
degree. 
But, there is good reason to think that this form of foundationalism also leads to 
scepticism. To see this, recall the following sceptical hypothesis that we introduced 
in section 5.1: 
(TEST) Everything that I believe on the basis of testimony is a lie, 
which has been told to me as part of an elaborate conspiracy 
that is designed to prevent me from discovering the true 
nature of the world. 
13 'Rational belief' should here be read as 'belief that is epistemicaUy rational'. 
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The negation of this sceptical hypothesis is obviously entailed by each of the 
propositions that I believe on the basis of testimony. So, if my belief in the negation 
of (TEST) is epistemically irrational, then the same goes for all of the beliefs that I 
hold on the basis of testimony. The propositions that I believe on the basis of 
perception seem to be propositions that would have been true even if (TEST) had 
been true; and, this strongly suggests that these perceptual propositions do not 
confirm the negation of (TEST) to a sufficient degree. Consequently, there is reason 
to think that, if (F 4) is true, then my belief in the negation of (TEST) is epistemically 
irrational; and, this strongly suggests that (F4) leads to scepticism. 
The above comments strongly suggest that, if we want to turn (F4) into a form of 
foundationalism that does not lead to scepticism, then we will have to weaken it in 
something like the following way: 
(Fs) With the exception of self-evident beliefs, perceptual beliefs, and 
testimony beliefs: every rational belief, B, is ultimately based on self-
evident beliefs, perceptual beliefs and/or testimony beliefs that 
confirm the content ofB to a sufficient degree. 
But, if (E14) commits us to endorsing any form of foundationalism, then it commits 
us to endorsing a form of foundationalism that is stronger than (Fs). For, (E14) tells 
us that there are just a few beliefs that can be both rational and basic; and, (Fs) 
entails that there are many beliefs of this kind. Consequently, it seems clear that, if 
(E14) commits us to endorsing any form of foundationalism, then (E14) will lead to 
scepticism. 
It may turn out that (E14) does not commit us to endorsing any form of 
foundationalism. For, it may turn out that, contrary to appearances, the following 
claim is untrue: 
(UB) Every rational non-basic belief is ultimately based on basic beliefs. 
36 
If (UB) is not true, then it is not likely that (E14) leads to scepticism. But, the falsity 
of (UB) also seems to commit us to saying that (EI4) does not discredit all deity 
beliefs. To see this, recall that (E I4) discredits all deity beliefs only if it is the case 
that, for every subject, S, who has deity beliefs, the following pair of claims are both 
true: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that (E I4) imposes, then we can 
make S aware ofthis fact. 
(D2El4) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
If (UB) is not true, then it is not likely that these claims both hold with respect to 
every subject, S, who has deity beliefs. For, if (UB) is not true, then it will be very 
difficult to make such subjects aware of the fact that their deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that (EI4) imposes. If (UB) is not true, then the most 
promising way of arguing that these beliefs do not satisfy this requirement is to 
argue that none of these beliefs are rational. But, if we can make a subject, S, aware 
of the fact that her deity beliefs are not rational before we have made her aware of 
the fact that her deity beliefs don't satisfy the evidential requirement that (E14) 
imposes, then we can rebut some of S's epistemic deity beliefs in a non-evidential 
way. Because of this, it seems fair to conclude that, if(UB) is not true, then there are 
at least some subject for whom (D2El4) and (D3El4) are not both true. And, from this, 
it follows that, if (UB) is not true, then (E14) does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
If the above arguments succeed, then they show that (E14) is either too strong, or too 
weak to discredit all deity beliefs. By making small alterations to these arguments, 
we can show that the same is true with regard to each of the following forms of 
evidential ism: 
(EIS) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on epistemically 
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rational beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's belief in 
P does not constitute knowledge. 
(EI6) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on knowledge-
constituting beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's 
belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
(El7) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on knowledge-
constituting beliefs that confirm P to a sufficient degree, then S's 
belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
There are other forms of evidentialism that can be generated by complex 
amendments to (El). But, none of these forms of evidential ism seem interestingly 
different from the forms of evidential ism that we have already discussed. All of 
them seem to be either too strong, or too weak to discredit all deity beliefs. Because 
of this, it seems likely that no form of evidential ism that is generated by a complex 
amendment is capable of discrediting all deity beliefs. 
5.6 Summary 
If the arguments of section 5.1 succeed, then they show that (El) does not discredit 
all deity beliefs. And, if the arguments of sections 5.2 - 5.5 succeed, then they show 
that the same holds with regard to all doctrines that can be generated by making an 
admissible amendment to (El). A doctrine, D, is a form of evidentialism iff D is 
either identical with (El), or can be generated by making an admissible amendment 
to (El)' So, if the arguments of sections 5.1 - 5.5. succeed, then they show that there 
is no form of evidential ism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
6. Summary and preview 
In section 1, we introduced and clarified the following claim, which many people 
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believe: 
(EBG) It is possible to undennine belief in God by arguing that the evidence 
for this belief is insufficient. 
Sections 2-5 then outlined an objection to this claim, which we called the anti-
sceptical objection. In the next four chapters, I win outline and solve two serious 
problems which are faced by advocates of the anti-sceptical objection. By solving 
these problems, I hope to show that the objection is worthy of further attention. 
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Chapter Two 
A problem for the anti-sceptical objection 
In the last chapter, we outlined an objection to the following claim: 
(EBG) It is possible to undermine belief in God by arguing that the evidence 
for this belief is insufficient. 
We called this objection the anti-sceptical objection, or the ASO. The aim of this 
chapter is to show that there is a serious problem which is faced by advocates of the 
ASo. In chapter three, we will show that the ASO can be made invulnerable to this 
problem. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 1 describes a situation in which a 
woman, Mary, gives her husband, John, a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon a 
certain belief. It then outlines, and briefly defends a knowledge-based explanation of 
the way in which Mary undermines John's belief. Sections 2-5 improve section 1 's 
defence of this knowledge-based explanation by arguing for two principles about 
knowledge which jointly commit us to saying that this explanation is correct. And 
section 6 uses the explanation to generate a problem for the anti-sceptical objection 
by arguing (a) that, if the explanation is correct, then there is a form of evidentialism 
that discredits many defective beliefs, and (b) that, by appealing to this form of 
evidentialism, we can show that the second stage of the anti-sceptical objection fails. 
1. The job interview 
It is Monday afternoon, and John has just come out of a job interview. The interview 
has gone well, so John's spirits are high. At 4pm, he meets his wife Mary for a cup of 
coffee, and she asks him how the interview went. He responds that it went very well, 
and tells Mary that he is going to get the job. Mary knows from experience that John 
is prone to wishful thinking on this topic, so she asks him why he thinks that he is 
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going to get the job. The following exchange ensues: 
John: Why do I think that I'm going to get the job? Because the interview 
went really well. I got on well with both of the interviewers, and they 
both seemed really pleased with my answers to their questions. 
Mary: Did they actually tell you that you were going to get the job? 
John: Well, no. But, like I said, I got on really well with them. And, I could 
tell that they were impressed with my performance. 
Mary: It's good that you got on well with them. And, it's good that they were 
impressed. But, none of that establishes that you're going to get the 
job. There might be several other candidates who got on just as well 
with them, and who impressed them just as much. And, some of 
those candidates might be better qualified than you are ... 
If the situation here is normal, then Mary's questions and comments will give John a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his belief about the job (henceforth: his job 
belie/). The question that I want to address is: why do these questions and comments 
give John a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his job belief? In section 1.1, I 
will sketch an answer to this question. Sections 1.2-1.6 will refine this answer by 
appealing to other situations like the one just described. 
1.1 The irrationality explanation 
One way of giving a subject, S, a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon a belief, B, 
is to make S aware of the fact that B is epistemically irrational. It is natural to 
suppose that Mary gives John reason to abandon his job belief in this way. For, it 
seems clear that Mary's questions and comments do make John aware of the fact that 
his job belief is epistemically irrational. And, it is hard to see how we can explain the 
undermining effect of Mary's questions and comments without appealing to 
something like this fact. 
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How does Mary make John aware of the fact that his job belief is epistemically 
irrational? Roughly: by asking him why he has this belief. More exactly: by asking 
him for an explanation of this belief, and then arguing that this explanation does not 
establish that his job belief is true. Mary's questions and comments seem to make it 
clear to John that the following claims are both true with respect to him: 
(Bj) I believe that I will get the job because my interview went well. 
(-,Ej ) The fact that my interview went well does not establish that I will get 
the job. 
Consequently, it is natural to give something like the following explanation of the 
effect ofMary's questions and comments: 
Mary's questions and comments give John a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his job 
belief because they make him aware of the fact that (Bj) and (-'Ej) are both true with respect 
to him. John is already aware of the fact that, if (Bj) and (-'Ej) are both true with respect to 
him, then the following claim is also true with respect to him: 
(Ij) My belief that I will get the job is epistemically irrational. 
So, by making John aware of the fact that (Bj) and (-'Ej ) are true with respect to him, Mary 
makes him aware of the fact that his job belief is epistemically irrational. And, by making 
him aware of this fact, she gives him a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his job belief. 
Let us refer to this explanation as the irrationality explanation. In the next two 
subsections, we will argue for a modification to the irrationality explanation. This 
modification will be motivated by reflection on another case in which Mary 
undermines one of John's beliefs. Section 1.2 will describe this case, and section 1.3 
will outline the modification that it prompts. 
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1.2 I The broken thermometer 
It is Tuesday morning, and John and Mary have woken up to discover that their son, 
Joe, is ill. John is worried that Joe might have the 'flu, so he uses Mary's 
thermometer to take Joe's temperature. After leaving the thermometer in Joe's mouth 
for several minutes, John examines it, and is relieved to see that the reading on the 
thermometer is normal- i.e. that it reads 98.6 degrees F. He goes downstairs to ten 
Mary this news, and the following exchange ensues: 
John: Well, it looks like Joe doesn't have the flu. His temperature is normal. 
Mary: Why do you think that his temperature is normal? 
John: Because your thermometer says that it's only 98.6. 
Mary: That doesn't establish that his temperature is normal. My 
thermometer isn't working properly. It's working okay for 
temperatures below 98 degrees, but it isn't registering any 
temperature that is higher than that. .. 
If the situation here is normal, then Mary's questions and comments will give John a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his belief about Joe's temperature 
(henceforth: his temperature belief). Once again, I am interested in why these 
questions and comments have this effect on John. It seems fairly clear that they 
undermine his temperature belief in the same way as Mary's earlier questions and 
comments undermined his job belief. So, if the irrationality explanation is correct, 
then the following, parallel explanation should also be correct: 
Mary's questions and comments give John a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his 
temperature belief because they make him aware of the fact that the following claims are 
true with respect to him: 
1 The example given in this section is derived from an example given by Dretske. See Dretske 1971 :2. 
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(BI) I believe that Joe's temperature is normal because Mary's thennometer says 
that it is nonnal. 
("""'Et) The fact that Mary's thennometer says that Joe's temperature is nonnal does 
not establish that Joe's temperature is nonnal. 
John is already aware of the fact that, if (BI) and ("""'Et) are true with respect to him, then the 
following claim is also true with respect to him: 
(II) My be1iefthat Joe's temperature is normal is epistemica11y irrational. 
So, by making John aware of the fact that (BI ) and ("""'Et) are true with respect to him, Mary 
makes him aware of the fact that his temperature belief is epistemically irrational. And, by 
making him aware of this fact, she gives him a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his 
temperature belief. 
In what follows, we will refer to this explanation as the second irrationality 
explanation. There is good reason to think that the second irrationality explanation is 
false. For, this explanation entails that, in the situation just described, John's 
temperature belief is epistemically irrational. And, it seems clear that, in this 
situation, John's temperature belief is not epistemically irrational. If John had been 
aware of the problems with the thermometer, or ifhe had had good reason to suspect 
that there were such problems, then it might have been irrational for him to believe, 
on the basis of the thermometer reading, that Joe's temperature was normal. But, 
there is nothing in the above description to indicate that John was, or should have 
been aware of these problems. Consequently, we can conclude that the second 
irrationality explanation is false. And, this gives us good reason to believe that the 
original irrationality explanation is also false. 
1.3 The lack-ofknowledge explanation 
The arguments of the last subsection show that we need to modify the irrationality 
explanation. One natural way of modifying it is to rewrite it in the following way: 
Mary's questions and comments give John a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his job 
44 
belief because they make him aware of the fact that the following claims are both true with 
respect to him: 
(Bj) I believe that I will get the job because my interview went well. 
C'-'Ej ) The fact that my interview went well does not establish that I will get the 
job. 
John is already aware of the fact that, if (Bj ) and (-'Ej ) are true with respect to him, then the 
following claim is also true with respect to him: 
(-,Kj ) I do not know that I will get the job. 
So, by making John aware of the fact that (Bj ) and (-'Ej ) are true with respect to him, Mary 
makes him aware of the fact that his job belief does not constitute knowledge. And, by 
making him aware of this fact, she gives him a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his 
job belief. 
Let us refer to this explanation as the lack of knowledge, or LOK explanation. It 
seems clear that, in the case of the broken thermometer, Mary does make John aware 
of the fact that his temperature belief does not constitute knowledge~ so, the LOK 
explanation is not vulnerable to the objection that we outlined in section 1.2. Some 
may think that the explanation is nevertheless vulnerable to other objections. In 
sections 1.4-1.6 , I will try to undermine this thought by rebutting two natural 
objections to the LOK explanation. 
1.4 Irrationality and the LOK explanation 
One immediate problem with the LOK explanation can be generated by focusing on 
one of the most attractive features of the irrationality explanation. It is very natural 
to suppose that, in the case of the job interview, Mary makes John aware of the fact 
that his job belief is epistemically irrational. And, it is equally natural to say that 
Mary makes John aware of this fact by making him aware of the fact that the 
following claims are both true with respect to him: 
45 
(Bj) I believe that I will get the job because my interview went well. 
(--'Ej) The fact that my interview went well does not establish that I will get 
the job. 
The irrationality explanation accommodates both of these intuitions nicely. But, the 
LOK explanation does not appear to accommodate either. Some may think that this 
gives us reason to prefer the irrationality explanation. In what follows, I will attack 
this thought, by showing that the LOK explanation can accommodate both of the 
intuitions just described. 
When John tells Mary that he is going to get the job, he is not aware of the fact that 
(Bj) and (--'Ej) are both true with respect to him. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he 
ought to be aware of this fact. For, he knows that his job belief is explained by the 
fact that his interview went well. And, he knows - or at least, ought to know - that 
this fact does not establish that his job belief is true. 
If the LOK explanation is correct, and John ought to be aware of the fact that (Bj) 
and (--,Ej) are true with respect to him, then John ought to be aware of the fact that his 
job belief does not constitute knowledge. For, the LOK explanation tells us that John 
is already aware of the fact that the following claim is true with respect to him: 
If (Bj) and (--'Ej) are true with respect to me, then (-'Kj) is true 
with respect to me. 
And, if John is aware of this fact, and of the fact that the antecedent of (BEKj) is true 
with respect to him, then he should also be aware of the fact that the consequent of 
(BEKj) is true with respect to him. 
If the LOK explanation is correct, and John ought to be aware of the fact that his job 
belief does not constitute knowledge, then John ought to have a conclusive epistemic 
reason to abandon his job belief. And, if John ought to have a conclusive epistemic 
reason to abandon this belief, then it is surely epistemically irrational for him to have 
this belief (given that the 'ought' that we are using here is the 'ought' of epistemic 
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come up. That ticket wasn't going to win the lottery, so there was no 
point in keeping hold of it. 
Mary: Why do you think that your numbers aren't going to come up? 
John: Because the chances of them commg up are ridiculously small. 
There's more chance that I'll be struck by lightning tomorrow than 
there is of my numbers coming up tonight. 
Mary: That may be true; but, even if it is, it doesn't establish that your 
numbers aren't going to come up tonight. If it did, then similar 
considerations would establish the same thing with respect to every 
set of numbers that could come up. One of those sets of numbers will 
come up tonight, even though the chance of it doing so is extremely 
small. So, you can't conclude that your numbers won't come up just 
because the chance of them doing so is extremely small. 
If the situation here is normal, then Mary's questions and comments will make John 
aware of the fact that the following claims are true with respect to him: 
(Bn) I believe that my numbers will not come up because the chance of 
them coming up is extremely small. 
(-'En) The fact that the chance of my numbers coming up is extremely small 
does not establish that my numbers will not come up. 
But, it is not clear that they will give John a conclusive epistemic reason to stop 
believing that his numbers will not come up. For, it seems clear that John can 
reasonably remain very confident of the claim that his numbers will not come up, 
after being made aware of the fact that (Bn) and (-'En) are true with respect to him. 
And, ifhe can reasonably remain very confident of this claim, then it's natural to say 
that he can also reasonably continue to believe it. 
The LOK explanation commits us to saying that John cannot reasonably continue to 
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believe that his numbers will not come up. So, the above comments threaten to show 
that the LOK explanation is false. In the next subsection, I will defend the LOK 
explanation against this threat. I will then mount a positive defence of the 
explanation, by arguing for two principles about knowledge which jointly commit us 
to saying that the explanation is correct. 
1.6 Active versus passive belief 
To defend the LOK explanation against the objection outlined in the last section, we 
need to return to the distinction between active and passive belief that we made in 
chapter one. As in chapter one, we can make this distinction by focusing on the 
following example, which is due to Alvin Plantinga: 
'Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing 
certain crucial Christian claims - perhaps the teaching that God was in 
Christ, reconciling the world to himself. Upon calling that belief to 
mind, he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness. 
Nonetheless, he is committed to this belief~ it is his position~ if you 
ask him what he thinks about it, he will unhesitatingly endorse it. He 
has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it.' 
(Plantinga 1983:37). 
To actively believe the proposition that p is to be committed to this proposition, in 
the way that Plantinga's Christian is committed to the doctrine that Plantinga 
mentions. And, to passively believe it is to have the kind of confidence in it that 
Plantinga's Christian lacks, with respect to the proposition that Plantinga describes. 
By appealing to the distinction between active and passive belief, we can distinguish 
two readings of the LOK explanation. On the first reading, the explanation is meant 
to describe the way in which Mary undermines John's active job belief, and on the 
second, it is meant to describe the way in which she undermines his passive job 
belief If the explanation is read in the second way, then it may well be vulnerable to 
the lottery objection that we outlined in section l.5. But, if it is read in the first way, 
then it will not be vulnerable to this objection, as we will now show. 
In the lottery case that we described in section 1.5, Mary makes John aware of the 
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fact that the following claims are true with respect to him: 
(Bn) I believe that my numbers will not come up because the chance of 
them coming up is extremely small. 
(-'En) The fact that the chance a/my numbers coming up is extremely small 
does not establish that my numbers will not come up. 
The core claim of the lottery-based objection is that it is reasonable for John to 
believe that his numbers will not come up even after he has been made aware of the 
fact that these claims are true with respect to him. If this core claim is read as a claim 
about passive belief, then it is plausible - for, it seems reasonable for John to be very 
confident that his numbers will not come up, even after he has learned that (BI) and 
(-,EI) are true with respect to him. But, ifit is read as a claim about active belief, then 
it is implausible - for, when John learns that (BI) and (-,EI) are true with respect to 
him, he seems to be given a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from actively 
asserting or endorsing the claim that his numbers will not come up. 
The above comments suggest that the LOK explanation will be vulnerable to the 
lottery-based objection only if it is read as a description of the way in which Mary 
undermines John's passive job belief. In what follows, we will adopt an alternative 
reading, on which the aim is to describe the way in which Mary undermines John's 
active job belief. By adopting this reading, we seem to make the LOK explanation 
invulnerable to the lottery-based objection. In sections 2-5, we will construct a 
positive case for the LOK explanation, by arguing for two principles which jointly 
commit us to saying that the explanation is correct. 
2. Two principles about knowledge 
In the next three sections, I will defend two principles about knowledge. The first of 
these principles says something about the relationship between knowledge and 
establishment, and the second says something about the relationship between 
knowledge and reasons for belief. In this section, I will state the principles, and will 
argue that acceptance of them commits us to accepting the LOK explanation. Later 
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sections will argue for both of the principles, and will thereby generate an argument 
for the LOK explanation. 
The first principle that I will defend says something about the relationship between 
knowledge and establishment. If we appeal to the following schematic sentences: 
(B) (S believes that p) because q. 
(E) The fact that q establishes that p. 
(K) S knows that p. 
then we can state the principle in the following way: 
(BEK) We are all aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) is true, and the 
corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, then the corresponding 
instance of (K) is also untrue. 
The second principle that I will defend says something about the relationship 
between knowledge and active belief. If'S' and 'P' range over all subjects and 
propositions, then the principle can be stated in the following way: 
(KAB) If S actively believes P, and S is aware of the fact that she does not 
know P, then S has a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively 
believing P. 
It should be fairly clear that, if we accept both (BEK) and (KAB), then we will be 
committed to endorsing the LOK explanation. For, it is clear that, if (BEK) is true, 
then the following claim about the job interview example is also true: 
(J 1) John is aware of the fact that, if (Bj ) and (-'Ej ) are both true with 
respect to him, then (-'Kj) is also true with respect to him. 
And, it is equally clear that, if (KAB) is true, then this claim about the job interview 
example is also true: 
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(h) If John is aware of the fact that (-Kj) is true with respect to him, then 
John has a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that 
he will get the job. 
Claims (J1) and (J2) are the only controversial claims that advocates of the LOK 
explanation are committed to making. All of the other claims that they make should 
be accepted without question. So, if (BEK) and (KAB) are true, then we ought to 
endorse the LOK explanation. In the next three sections, I will argue that (BEK) and 
(KAB) are both true. 
3. Arguing for (BEK) 
In this section, I will give an argument for (BEK). This argument will be given in 
three stages. The first stage (sections 3.1-3.3) will outline three puzzles about 
establishment, and will argue that the best way of solving these puzzles is to appeal 
to the following psychological generalisation:2 
(CEj ) When we judge that an instance of the following claim is untrue: 
(C) Ifit was not the case that p, then it wouldn't be the case that q 
we tend also to judge that the corresponding instance of (E) is untrue. 
The second stage (section 3.4) will use the results of the first stage to argue that, if 
(BEK) is true, then the following psychological generalisation should also be true: 
(BCKj) When we judge that an instance of (B) is true, and that the 
corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, we tend also to judge that the 
corresponding instance of (K) is untrue. 
And, the third stage (sections 3.5-3.7) will argue that this psychological 
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generalisation is true. If an three stages of this argument succeed, then they will 
provide us with a strong reason for believing (BEK). In section 4, we will give 
another reason for believing (BEK), and in section 4, we will do likewise with 
respect to (KAB). 
3.1 A pu=='e aboutlolleriel 
In my daily paper, there is a list of football scores which says that, in yesterday'S 
game, Arsenal beat Manchester United. This fact about my paper - which we will 
call the newspaper fact - provides very strong evidence for the claim that Arsenal 
did beat Manchester United. There may be other facts that provide stronger evidence 
for this claim. But, in spite of this, it seems clear that the following instance of (E) is 
true: 
(En) The newspaper fact estahlishes that Arsenal beat United. 
In last Saturday's National Lottery, the chance of my ticket winning the jackpot was 
lower than one in ten million. This fact about the lottery - which we win can the 
chance fact- provides very strong evidence for the claim that my ticket did not win 
the jackpot. The evidence that it provides for this claim seems at least as strong as 
the evidence that the newspaper fact provides for the claim that Arsenal beat United. 
But, in spite of this, it seems clear that the following instance of (E) is not true: 
(El) The chance fact establishes that my ticket did not win the jackpot. 
Why does (El) seem untrue, when the chance fact provides at least as much evidence 
for the claim that my ticket did not win as the newspaper fact provides for the claim 
that Arsenal beat Unitea? One natural way of explaining this is to appeal to (CEj). 
Corresponding to (En) and (El) are the following instances of (C): 
2 The argument of these sections is inspired by a similar argument in DeRose 1995. 
3 This puzzle is based on a similar puzzle described in Harman 1968. The solution is similar to a 
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(Cn) If Arsenal had not beaten United, then my newspaper would not have 
said that Arsenal beat United. 
(Cl) If my ticket had won the jackpot, then the chance of it winning the 
jackpot would not have been lower than one in ten million. 
Although (Cn) seems true, (Cl) seems untrue. (CEj) tells us that, if we judge that an 
instance of (C) is untrue, then we tend also to judge that the corresponding instance 
of (E) is untrue - so, (CEj) can explain why (El) seems untrue even though (En) does 
not. The fact that (CEj) can explain this is a reason to believe (CEj). In the next two 
subsections, we will outline two similar reasons for believing (CEj). 
3.2 Apu=='e about =ebras4 
During a visit to my local zoo, I stop outside the zebra enclosure. Inside the 
enclosure, there are striped animals which look to me like zebras, and a sign which 
says that these animals are zebras. This fact about the contents of the enclosure -
which we will call the contents fact - provides very strong evidence for the claim 
that the animals in the enclosure are zebras. There may be other facts that provide 
stronger evidence for this claim; but, it nevertheless seems clear that the following 
claim is true: 
(Ez) The contents fact establishes that the animals in the enclosure are 
zebras. 
Although (Ez) seems true, the following claim seems untrue: 
(Em) The contents fact establishes that the animals in the enclosure are not 
mules that have been cleverly disguised as zebras by the people who 
own the zoo (henceforth: that the animals in the enclosure are not 
cleverly disgUised mules). 
solution given in DeRose 1996. 
4 This puzzle is based on a similar puzzle described in Dretske 1970. The solution is similar to the 
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Why does this claim seem untrue, when the contents fact seems to establish that the 
animals in the enclosure are zebras, and hence not cleverly disguised mules? Again, 
we can explain this by appealing to (CEj). Corresponding to (Ez) and (Em) are the 
following instances of (C): 
(Cz) If the animals in the enclosure were not zebras, then it would not be 
the case that they look to me like zebras, and are referred to as zebras 
by the sign in their enclosure. 
(Cm) If the animals in the enclosure were cleverly disguised mules, then it 
would not be the case that they look to me like zebras, and are 
referred to as zebras by the sign in their enclosure. 
Although (Cz) seems true, (Cm) seems untrue. 5 So, (CEj ) can explain why (Em) 
seems untrue even though (Ez) seems true. The fact that it can explain this is another 
reason for believing (CEj ). In the next subsection, we will outline a third reason of 
this kind; and, in later sections, we will argue that, if (CEj) is true, then there is good 
reason to believe (BEK). 
3.3 6 A pu==le about contrasts 
My friend Jim has just bought a new suit, and is wearing this suit as he walks down 
the High Street of our local town. As he walks past the window of the coffee shop 
where I am sitting, I see him, and see that he is wearing a suit that looks new. The 
fact that Jim is wearing a suit that looks new - which we will call the suit fact -
strongly supports the claim that Jim has just bought a new suit. There may be other 
facts that support this claim to a higher degree; but, even if there are, it seems right 
to say that the following claim is true: 
(Eb) The suit fact establishes that Jim has just bought a new suit. 
solution given in DeRose 1995. 
S After reflection on (Cm), (Cz) can sometimes seem untrue. But, when it does, (Ez) also seems untrue: 
so this fact supports (CEj), rather than threatening it. 
6 This puzzle is inspired by the discussion of knowledge and contrasts on pp.1021ff. ofDretske 1970. 
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Although (Eb) seems true, the following claim seems untrue: 
(Es) The suit fact establishes that Jim has just bought, rather than stolen, a 
new suit. 
Why does (Es) seem untrue, when the suit fact seems to establish that Jim has just 
bought a new suit? Again, we can explain this by appealing to (CEj). Corresponding 
to (Eb) and (Es) are the following instances of (C): 
(Cb) If Jim had not just bought a new suit, then Jim would not be wearing 
a suit that looks new. 
(Cs) If Jim had just stolen, rather than bought some a new suit, then Jim 
would not be wearing a suit that looks new. 
Although (Cb) seems true, (Cs) seems untrue.7 So, (CEj) can explain why (Es) seems 
untrue even though (Eb) seems true. 
3.4 (CE) and (BEK) 
The last three subsections have provided us with three good reasons for believing 
(CEj). The next four subsections will argue that, if (CEj) is true, then we have good 
reason to believe (BEK). 
According to (BEK), we are all aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) is true, 
and the corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, then the corresponding instance of 
(K) is also untrue. It seems clear that, if we are all aware of this fact, then the 
following psychological generalisation will be true: 
(BEKj) When we judge that an instance of (8) is true, and that the 
corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, we tend to judge that the 
corresponding instance of (K) is also untrue. 
7 After reflection on (Cs), (Cb) can sometimes seem untrue. But, when it does, (Eb) also seems untrue: 
so, this fact supports (CEj ), rather than threatening it. 
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When this generalisation is conjoined with (CEj), it commits us to endorsing another 
generalisation, which can be stated in the following way: 
(BCKj) When we judge that an instance of (B) is true, and that the 
corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, we tend to judge that the 
corresponding instance of (K) is also untrue. 
So, if (BEK) is true, then (BCKj) should also be true. In the next three sections, I 
will argue that (BCKj) is true. I will argue for this by arguing that, by appealing to 
(BCKj), we can solve three puzzles about knowledge that are exactly parallel to the 
puzzles that we outlined in sections 3.1-3.3. Ifmy arguments succeed, then they will 
give us reason to believe (BEK). Sections 4 will describe another reason for 
believing (BEK). 
3.5 Another pu==le about lotteries 
In my daily paper, there is a list of football scores which says that, in yesterday's 
game, Arsenal beat Manchester United. This fact about my paper - which we are 
calling the newspaper fact - provides very strong evidence for the claim that Arsenal 
did beat Manchester United. There may be other facts that provide stronger evidence 
for this claim. But, in spite of this, it seems clear that, ifI believe, on the basis of the 
newspaper fact, that Arsenal beat United, then the following claim is true: 
(Kn) I know that Arsenal beat United. 
In last Saturday'S National Lottery, the chance of my ticket winning the jackpot was 
lower than one in ten million. This fact about the lottery - which we are calling the 
chance fact - provides very strong evidence for the claim that my ticket did not win 
the jackpot. The evidence that it provides for this claim seems at least as strong as 
the evidence that the newspaper fact provides for the claim that Arsenal beat United. 
But, in spite of this, it seems clear that, if I believe, on the basis of the chance fact, 
that my ticket did not win the jackpot, then the following claim is not true: 
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(KI) I know that my ticket did not win the jackpot. 
Why does this seem clear, when the chance fact provides as much evidence for the 
claim that my ticket did not win as the newspaper fact provides for the claim that 
Arsenal beat United? One natural way of explaining this is to appeal to (BCKj). If I 
believe, on the basis of the newspaper fact, that Arsenal beat United, then the 
following claim will be true: 
(Bn) I believe that Arsenal beat United because my newspaper says that 
Arsenal beat United. 
And, if I believe, on the basis of the chance fact, that I did not win the jackpot, then 
this claim will be true: 
(BI) I believe that my ticket did not win the jackpot because the chance of 
my ticket winning the jackpot was lower than one in ten million. 
Corresponding to these two instances of (B) are the following instances of (C): 
(Cn) If Arsenal had not beaten United, then my newspaper would not have 
said that Arsenal beat United. 
(Cl) If my ticket had won the jackpot, then the chance of it winning the 
jackpot would not have been lower than one in ten million. 
Although (Cn) seems true, (Cl) seems untrue. (BCKj ) tells us that, if we judge that an 
instance of (B) is true, and we judge that the corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, 
then we tend also to judge that the corresponding instance of (K) is untrue. So, 
(BCKj) can explain why it is that, in the above-described circumstances, (KI) seems 
untrue even though (Kn) seems true. The fact that (BCKj) can explain this is a reason 
to believe (BCKj). 
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3.6 Another pu==le about zebras 
During a visit to my local zoo, I stop outside the zebra enclosure. Inside the 
enclosure, there are striped animals which look to me like zebras, and a sign which 
says that these animals are zebras. This fact about the contents of the enclosure -
which we are calling the contents fact - provides very strong evidence for the claim 
that the animals in the enclosure are zebras. There may be other facts that provide 
stronger evidence for this claim~ but, it nevertheless seems clear that, if I believe, on 
the basis of the contents fact, that the animals in the enclosure are zebras, then the 
following claim is true: 
(Kz) I know that the animals in the enclosure are zebras. 
Although this seems clear, it also seems clear that, if I believe, on the basis of the 
contents fact, that the animals in the cage are not cleverly disgUised mules, then the 
following claim is not true: 
(Km) I know that the animals in the enclosure are not cleverly disguised 
mules 
Why does this seem clear, when I seem able to know, on the basis of the contents 
fact, that the animals in the enclosure are zebras - and, hence, not cleverly disguised 
mules? Again, we can explain this by appealing to (BCKj). If I believe, on the basis 
of the contents fact, that the animals in the enclosure are zebras, then the following 
claim will be true: 
(Bz) I believe that the animals in the enclosure are zebras because the 
animals in the enclosure look to me like zebras, and are referred to as 
zebras by the sign in the enclosure. 
And, if I believe, on the basis of the contents fact, that the animals in the enclosure 
are not cleverly painted mules, then this claim will be true: 
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(Bm) I believe that the animals in the enclosure are not cleverly disguised 
mules because the animals in the enclosure look to me like zebras, 
and are referred to as zebras by the sign in the enclosure. 
Corresponding to these two instances of (B) are the following instances of (C): 
(Cz) If the animals in the enclosure were not zebras, then it would not be 
the case that they look to me like zebras, and are referred to as zebras 
by the sign in the enclosure. 
(Cm) If the animals in the enclosure were cleverly disguised mules, then it 
would not be the case that they look to me like zebras, and are 
referred to as zebras by the sign in the enclosure. 
Although (Cz) seems true, (Cm) seems untrue.8 So, (BCKj) can explain why it is that, 
in the above-described circumstances, (Km) seems untrue even though (Kz) seems 
true. The fact that (BCKj) can explain this is another reason for believing (BCKj). In 
the next subsection, I will outline a third reason of this kind. 
3.7 Another pu==le about contrasts 
My friend Jim has just bought a new suit, and is wearing this suit as he walks down 
the High Street of our local town. As he walks past the window of the coffee shop 
where I am sitting, I see him, and see that he is wearing a suit that looks new. The 
fact that Jim is wearing a suit that looks new - which we are calling the suit fact -
strongly supports the claim that Jim has just bought a new suit. There may be other 
facts that support this claim to a higher degree~ but, even if there are, it seems right 
to say that, if I believe, on the basis of the suit fact, that Jim has just bought a new 
suit, then the following claim is true: 
(Kb) I know that Jim has just bought a new suit. 
8 After reflection on (Cm), (Cz) can sometimes seem untrue. But, when it does, (Kz) also seems untrue: 
so, this fact supports (CEj ), rather than threatening it. 
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Although this seems clear, it also seems clear that, if I believe, on the basis of the 
suit fact, that Jim has bought, rather than stolen a new suit, then the following claim 
is not true: 
(Ks) I know that Jim has just bought, rather than stolen, a new suit. 
Why does this seem clear, when I seem able to know, on the basis of the suit fact, 
that Jim has just bought a new suit? Again, we can explain this by appealing to 
(BCKj). If I believe, on the basis of the suit fact, that Jim has just bought a new suit, 
then the following claim is true: 
(Bb) I believe that Jim has just bought a new suit because Jim is wearing a 
suit that looks new. 
And, if I believe, on the basis of the suit fact, that Jim has just bought, rather than 
stolen a new suit, then this claim is true: 
(Bs) I believe that Jim has just bought. rather than stolen a new suit 
because Jim is wearing a suit that looks new. 
Corresponding to (Bb) and (Bs) are the following instances of (C): 
(Cb) If Jim had not just bought a new suit, then Jim would not be wearing 
a suit that looks new. 
(Cs) If Jim had just stolen, rather than bought a new suit, then Jim would 
not be wearing a suit that looks new. 
Although (Cb) seems true, (Cs) seems untrue.9 So, (BCKj) can explain why it is that, 
in the above-described circumstances, (Kb) seems untrue even though (Ks) seems 
true. The fact that (BCKj) can explain this provides us with another reason for 
9 After reflection on (Cs), (Cb) can sometimes seem untrue. But, when it does, (Kb) also seems untrue: 
so, this fact supports (CEj ), rather than threatening it. 
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endorsing (BCKj). Consequently, we now have good reason to believe (BCKj). 
4. Another argument for (BEK) 
The arguments of the last section have provided us with good reasons for believing 
both (CEj) and (BCKj). By doing so, they have also given us reason to believe 
(BEK). In this section, I will use the arguments of the last section to generate 
another argument for (BEK). Section 4.1 will argue that the best way of explaining 
the truth of (CEj) is to endorse the following contextualist claim about 
establishmentlO: 
(CCE) When it is asserted (or implied) that an instance of (E) is true (or 
untrue), the standards for establishment tend to be raised in such a 
way as to ensure that, if that instance of (E) is true, then the 
corresponding instance of (C) is also true. 
Section 4.2 will use the results of section 4.1 to argue that, if (BEK) is true, then the 
following contextualist claim about knowledge should also be true: 
(CCK) When it is asserted (or implied) that an instance of (B) is true and that 
the corresponding instance of (K) is true, the standards for knowledge 
tend to be raised in such a way as to ensure that, if those instances of 
(B) and (K) are true then the corresponding instance of (C) is also 
true. 
And, section 4.3 will argue that this contextualist claim about knowledge is true, and 
that there is consequently another reason for endorsing (BEK). 11 
10 I call this a contextualist claim because it entails that the truth-conditions of claims about 
establishment vary with the context in which those claims are made. Both this claim and (CCK) 
resemble contextualist claims defended in DeRose 1995. 
11 The arguments of sections 4.1 and 4.3 are inspired by similar arguments in sections 9-13 of De Rose 
1995. 
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4.1 Explaining (CEj 
If (CEj) is true, then it is natural to ask why it is true. Why do we tend to judge that 
instances of (E) are untrue, when we judge that the corresponding instances of (C) 
are untrue? The most straightforward way of explaining this is to endorse the 
following claim, which closely resembles (CEj): 
(EC) We are all aware of the fact that, ifan instance of (E) is true, then the 
corresponding instance of (C) is true. 
If (EC) is true, then we are presumably also aware of the fact that, if an instance of 
(C) is untrue, then the corresponding instance of (E) is untrue. And, if we are aware 
of this fact, then it is not surprising that we tend to judge that instances of (E) are 
untrue, when we judge that the corresponding instances of (C) are untrue. 
The problem with this explanation is that there are good reasons for thinking that 
(EC) is false. One good way of seeing this is to consider the relationship between 
(EC) and the following plausible principle about establishment: 
(PE) If the fact that p establishes that q, and the claim that q entails that r, 
then the fact that p establishes that r. 
When (EC) is conjoined with this principle, it entails that many of our everyday 
claims about establishment are false. One good way of seeing this is to focus on 
some of the claims about establishment that were made in sections 3.l-3.3. In the 
situation described in section 3.2, it seemed clear that the following claim was true: 
(Ez) The contents fact establishes that the animals in the enclosure are 
zebras. 
But, if (EC) and (PE) are both true, then (Ez) is false. To see this, note first of an 
that, if (PE) is true, then (Ez) implies the following claim: 
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(Em) The contents fact establishes that the animals in the enclosure are not 
cleverly disguised mules. 
Next, note that, if (EC) is true, then (Em) implies the following claim: 
(Cm) If the animals in the enclosure were cleverly disguised mules, then it 
would not be the case that they look to me like zebras, and are 
referred to as zebras by the sign in the enclosure. 
Finally: note that, in the situation described in section 3.2, (Cm) is clearly false. From 
this, it follows that, if (EC) and (PE) are both true, then, in the situation described in 
section 3.2, (Ez) is false. But, it seems clear that, in the situation described in section 
3.2, (Ez) is not false. And, for this reason, it seems clear that, if we endorse (PE), 
then we should reject (EC). 
The most natural way of responding to this attack on (EC) is to try to show that (PE) 
is false. But, it seems unlikely that a response of this kind will succeed. For, by 
responding to the attack in this way, we commit ourselves to endorsing 'abominable 
conjunctions,12like the following: 
(ACE) The contents fact establishes that the animals in the enclosure are 
zebras, but it does not establish that they are not cleverly painted 
mules. 
And, most of us are very strongly inclined to refrain from endorsing conjunctions of 
this kind. 
Consequently, it is natural to say that (EC) is false. But, if we say this, then we need 
another explanation for the truth of (CEj ). One natural way of supplying this 
explanation is to appeal to the following contextualist claim about establishment: 
12 The phrase 'abominable conjunction' is taken from DeRose 1995, where it is used to refer to certain 
conjunctions that are very similar to (ACE)' 
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(CCE) When it is asserted (or implied) that an instance of (E) is true (or 
untrue), the standards for establishment tend to be raised in such a 
way as to ensure that, if that instance of (E) is true, then the 
corresponding instance of (C) is also true. 
This claim entails that, if we assert that an instance of (E) is true when the 
corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, then the standards for establishment will 
tend to be raised in such a way as to make our assertion false. It also entails that, if 
we assert that an instance of (E) is untrue when the corresponding instance of (C) is 
untrue, then the standards for establishment will tend to be raised in such a way as to 
make our assertion true. If the standards for establishment vary in this way, then it is 
not surprising that we tend to judge that instances of (E) are untrue, when we make 
the same judgement about corresponding instances of (C). So, if (CCE) is true, then 
it provides us with an explanation for the truth of (CEj ).13 
Does this contextualist explanation suffer from the same problems as the explanation 
that appealed to (EC)? On reflection, it is clear that it does not. For, unlike the (EC) 
explanation, the contextualist explanation does not commit us to saying that (Ez) is 
false. All that it commits us to saying is that, when it is asserted (or implied) that 
(Em) is true (or not true), the standards for establishment tend to be raised in such a 
way as to make (Ez) false. And, this claim is fairly plausible. In the situation 
described in section 3.2, it seems right to say that, once (Em) (or its negation) has 
been asserted (or implied) we can no longer truly assert (Ez). What seems wrong is 
the claim that we can never truly assert (Ez). The (EC)-explanation commits us to 
making this claim, but the contextualist explanation does not. Consequently, we 
should opt for the contextualist explanation, by endorsing (CCE) rather than (EC). 
4.2 (CCE) and (BEK) 
According to (BEK), we are all aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) is true, 
and the corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, then the corresponding instance of 
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(K) is also untrue. If we are all aware of this fact, then it is plausible to suppose that 
the following claim is true: 
(ABK) When it is asserted, or implied that an instance of (B) is true, and that 
the corresponding instance of (K) is true, it is implied that the 
corresponding instance of (E) is also true. 
When this claim about assertion is conjoined with the contextualist claim, (CCE), 
that we defended in the last section, it entails another contextualist claim about 
establishment: 
(CCE2)When it is asserted, or implied, that an instance of (B) is true, and that 
the corresponding instance of (K) is true, the standards for 
establishment tend to be raised in such a way as to ensure that, if the 
corresponding instance of (E) is true, then the corresponding instance 
of (C) is also true. 
And, when this claim is conjoined with the following conditional, which is entailed 
by (BEK): 
(BKE) If an instance of (B) is true, and the corresponding instance of (K) is 
true, then the corresponding instance of (E) is also true. 
it entails the following contextualist claim about knowledge: 
(CCK) When it is asserted (or implied) that an instance of (B) is true and that 
the corresponding instance of (K) is true, the standards for knowledge 
tend to be raised in such a way as to ensure that, if those instances of 
(B) and (K) are true then the corresponding instance of (C) is true. 
Consequently, we can conclude that, if (BEK) is true, then (CCK) should also be 
true. In the next section, we will argue that (CCK) is true, by arguing that we need to 
13 er. DeRose 1995, section 13. 
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appeal to it in order to explain the truth of (BCKj). If the argument of this section 
succeeds, then it will provide us with another reason for believing (BEK). This 
reason seems at least as strong as the reason for believing (BEK) that we gave in 
section 3. 
-1.3 Explaining (BCK) 
If (BCKj) is true, then it is natural to ask why it is true. Why is it that, when we judge 
that an instance of (B) is true, and that the corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, 
we tend also to judge that the corresponding instance of (K) is untrue? The most 
straightforward way of explaining this is to endorse the following claim, which 
closely resembles (BCKj): 
(BKC) We are all aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) is true, and the 
corresponding instance of (K) is true, then the corresponding 
instance of (C) is true. 
If (BKC) is true, then we are presumably aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) 
is true, and the corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, then the corresponding 
instance of (K) is also untrue. And, if we are aware of this fact, then it is not 
surprising that, when we judge that an instance of (B) is true, and that the 
corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, we tend also to judge that the corresponding 
instance of (K) is untrue. 
The problem with this explanation is that there are good reasons for thinking that 
(BKC) is false. One good way of seeing this is to consider the relationship between 
(BKC) and the following plausible principle about knowledge: 
(PK) If S can know, on the basis of the fact that p, that q, and the 
proposition that q obviously entails that r, then S can know, on the 
basis of the fact that p, that r. 
When (BKC) is conjoined with this principle, it entails that many of our everyday 
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claims about knowledge are false. One good way of seeing this is to focus on some 
of the claims about knowledge that were made in sections 3.5-3.7. In the situation 
described in section 3.6, it seemed clear that the following claim was true: 
(Kzp) I can know, on the basis of the contents fact, that the animals in the 
enclosure are zebras. 
But, if (BKC) and (PK) are both true, then (Kzp) is false. To see this, note first of all 
that, if(PK) is true, then (Kzp) implies the following claim: 
(Krnp) I can know, on the basis of the contents fact, that the animals in the 
enclosure are not cleverly disguised mules. 
Next, note that, if (BKC) is true, then (Kmp) implies the following claim: 
(Cm) If the animals in the enclosure were cleverly disguised mules, then it 
would not be the case that they look to me like zebras, and are 
referred to as zebras by the sign in the enclosure. 
Finally: note that, in the situation described in section 3.6, (Cm) is clearly false. From 
this, it follows that, if (BKC) and (PK) are both true, then, in the situation described 
in section 3.6, (Kzp) is false. But, it seems clear that, in the situation described in 
section 3.6, (Kzp) is not false. And, for this reason, it seems clear that, if we endorse 
(PK), then we should reject (BKC). 
The most natural way of responding to this attack on (BKC) is to try to show that 
(PK) is false. But, it seems unlikely that a response of this kind will succeed. For, by 
responding to the attack in this way, we commit ourselves to endorsing 'abominable 
conjunctions' like the following: 
(ACK) I can know, on the basis of the contents fact, that the animals in the 
enclosure are zebras, but I cannot know, on the basis of this fact, that 
they are not cleverly disguised mules. 
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And, most of us are very strongly inclined to refrain from endorsing conjunctions of 
this kind. 
Consequently, it is natural to say that (BKC) is false. But, if we say this, then we 
need another explanation for the truth of (BCKj). One natural way of supplying this 
explanation is to appeal to the following contextualist claim about knowledge: 14 
(CCK) When it is asserted (or implied) that an instance of (B) is true and that 
the corresponding instance of (K) is true, the standards for knowledge 
tend to be raised in such a way as to ensure that, if those instances of 
(B) and (K) are true then the corresponding instance of (C) is true. 
This claim entails that, if an instance of (C) is untrue, and we assert that 
corresponding instances of (B) and (K) are both true, then the standards for 
knowledge tend to be raised in such a way as to make our assertion false. It also 
entails that, if an instance of (C) is untrue, and we assert that the corresponding 
instances of (B) and (K) are not both true, then the standards for knowledge tend to 
be raised in such a way as to make our assertion true. If the standards for knowledge 
vary in this way, then it is not surprising that, when we judge that an instance of (B) 
is true, and that the corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, we tend also to judge 
that the corresponding instance of(K) is untrue. So, if (CCK) is true, then it provides 
us with an explanation for the truth of (BCKj). 
Does this contextualist explanation suffer from the same problems as the explanation 
that appealed to (BKC)? On reflection, it is clear that it does not. For, unlike the 
(BKC) explanation, the contextualist explanation does not commit us to saying that 
(Kzp) is false. All that it commits us to saying is that, when it is asserted (or implied) 
that (Kmp) is true (or not true), the standards for knowledge tend to be raised in such 
a way as to make (Kzp) false. And, this claim is fairly plausible. In the situation 
14 DeRose 1995 defends a contextualist principle that is very similar to (CCK). In section 4 of chapter 
4, we will say something about this fonn of contextual ism. Some critics of De Rose have suggested 
that his contextualist principle should be replaced with something like (CCK). See for instance 
Williamson 2000, section 7.5. 
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described in section 3.6, it seems right to say that, once (Kmp) (or its negation) has 
been asserted (or implied) we can no longer truly assert (Kzp). What seems wrong is 
the claim that we can never truly assert (Kzp). The (BKC)-explanation commits us to 
making this claim, but the contextualist explanation does not. Consequently, we 
should opt for the contextualist explanation, by endorsing (CCK) rather than (BKC). 
By opting for this explanation, we generate another reason for believing (BEK). 
5. Arguing for (KAB) 
The upshot of the last two sections is that we have good reason to believe the 
following claim: 
(BEK) We are all aware of the fact that, ifan instance of (B) is true, and the 
corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, then the corresponding 
instance of (K) also untrue. 
In this section, I will argue that we also have good reason to believe this claim: 
(KAB) If S actively believes P, and S is aware of the fact that she does not 
know P, then S has a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively 
believing P. 
My argument for (KAB) will be divided into three stages. The first stage (sections 
5.1 and 5.2) will describe three puzzles about knowledge and assertion, and will 
defend a solution to these puzzles that is due to Peter Unger. The second stage 
(section 5.3) will argue that, if we endorse Unger's solution, then we should also 
endorse a certain claim about knowledge and assertion; and, the third stage (section 
5.4) will argue that, if we endorse this claim about knowledge and assertion, then we 
should also endorse (KAB). 
70 
5.1 Three pu::=les ahout knowledge and assertion 
5.1.1 The assertions of sceptics 
When advocates of global scepticism assert that there is absolutely nothing that we 
know, or that we cannot he sure of anything at all, their assertions seem, somehow, 
to be inconsistent. But, when we look closely at these assertions, it seems perfectly 
clear that the assertions could have been true. There are possible worlds in which 
there is absolutely nothing that we know, and in which there is nothing of which we 
can be sure. So, why does it seem as if there are no such worlds? Why do the 
assertions of sceptics sound inconsistent?!5 
5.1.2 Moore's paradox 
Consider the following sentences, which are often used to generate Moore's 
paradox:!6 
(M!) It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining. 
(M2) It is raining, but I do not know that it is raining. 
(M3) It is raining, but I am not certain that it is raining. 
When sentences of this kind are used to make assertions, the assertions sound 
inconsistent. But, when we look closely at the sentences, it seems perfectly clear that 
they could have been true. There are possible worlds in which it is raining, and in 
which I do not believe, do not know, and am not certain that it is raining. So, why 
does it seem as though there are no such worlds? Why do assertions of sentences 
like (M!), (M2) and (M3) sound inconsistent?!7 
IS Cf. Unger 1975:250-252. 
16 Normally, the paradox is generated by appeal to sentences about belief; but a number of authors -
e.g. Moore 1962:277, Unger 1975:256-60 and Sorensen 1988: 15-56 - have noted that similar 
paradoxes be generated by appeal to sentences about knowledge and certainty. 
71 
5.1.3 Challenges to assertion 
When a subject, S, asserts that p, it often seems appropriate to attack their assertion 
by arguing that they do not know that p, or that they cannot be certain that p. This 
seems appropriate in spite of the fact that S has said nothing at all about knowing, or 
being certain that p. Generally speaking, it is not appropriate to attack an assertion 
by attacking some proposition other than the one that was asserted. So, why does it 
seem appropriate to attack S's assertion that p by attacking the proposition that S 
knows, or can be certain that p? Why can't S respond to such attacks by just pointing 
out that he only asserted that p, and did not say anything about knowing, or being 
certain ofthis proposition?18 
5.2 Unger's solution 
One very natural way of solving the above puzzles is to claim that, when we assert 
that p, we invariably imply that we know that p. The most prominent advocate of this 
solution is Peter Unger. 19 According to Unger, the apparent inconsistency of the 
assertion that there is absolutely nothing that we know is to be understood in terms 
of the actual inconsistency of the proposition that I know that there is absolutely 
nothing that we know. Similarly: the apparent inconsistency of the sentences CM,), 
CM2) and CM3), above, is to be understood in terms of the actual inconsistency of the 
following sentences: 
CMlk) I know that it is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining. 
(M2k) I know that it is raining, but I do not know that it is raining. 
(M3k) I know that it is raining, but I am not certain that it is raining. 
And, the fact that it is appropriate to attack S's assertion that p by attacking the 
proposition that S knows that p is to be understood in terms of the more general fact 
that an assertion can be attacked by attacking the propositions that the asserter 
implies, by making that assertion. 
17 CfUnger 1975:256-60. 
18 cr. Unger 1975:260-65 
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Unger's solution is very attractive, and seems to extend very naturally to a number of 
related puzzles.2o Because of this, the solution has been widely endorsed.21 In the 
next section, I will argue that the solution commits us to endorsing the following 
claim about knowledge and assertion: 
(KA) If S is aware of the fact that she does not know that p, then S has a 
conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from asserting that p. 
And, in section 5.4, I will argue that, by endorsing (KA), we commit ourselves to 
endorsing (KAB). 
5.3 Defending (KA) 
It is very plausible to suppose that, if it is not epistemically reasonable to believe that 
a certain proposition, P, is true, then it also is not epistemically reasonable to assert, 
or to imply that P is true. Because of this, it is natural to endorse the following claim 
about conclusive epistemic reasons: 
If the fact that q is a conclusive epistemic reason for S to 
refrain from believing that p, then the fact that q is a 
conclusive epistemic reason for S to refrain from asserting, or 
implying that p. 
It is fairly clear that, if it is not the case that p, then the fact that not-p is a conclusive 
epistemic reason for any subject, S, to refrain from believing that p. For this reason, 
(CERI) commits us to endorsing the following claim: 
If it is not the case that p, then the fact that it is not the case 
that p is a conclusive epistemic reason for any subject, S, to 
19 See Unger 1975, chp VI. 
20 For descriptions of some of these puzzles, see Unger 1975:260-65. See also DeRose 1991, where 
Vnger's solution is applied to some puzzles about epistemic possibility. 
21 See e.g. Slote 1979, DeRose 1991 and Williamson 1996. Solutions to Moore's paradox which 
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refrain from asserting, or implying that p. 
It is also clear that, if one has a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from implying 
a proposition, and one would imply that proposition by asserting that p, then one has 
a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from asserting that p. For this reason, 
(CER2) commits us to endorsing the following claim: 
If S would imply that q by asserting that p, and it is not the 
case that q, then the fact that it is not the case that q is a 
conclusive epistemic reason for S to refrain from asserting 
that p. 
When this claim is conjoined with Unger's plausible claim that, by asserting that p, 
one invariably implies that one knows that p, it entails the following claim about 
knowledge and assertion: 
(KA) If S is aware of the fact that she does not know that p, then S has a 
conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from asserting that p. 
This claim about knowledge and assertion is obviously very similar to the principle 
(KAB) which we are trying to defend. In order to move from (KA) to (KAB), we 
should presumably appeal to something like the following claim about reasons for 
assertion and belief: 
CRAB) If S has a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from asserting that p, 
then S has a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from actively 
believing that p. 
It is very plausible to suppose that something like (RAB) is true. But, as it stands, 
(RAB) is open to a certain objection. In section 5.4, we will argue that, by modifying 
(RAB), we can save it from this objection. The modified principle that we will 
defend is weaker than (RAB), but is still strong enough to take us from (KA) to 
resemble Unger's are endorsed in Moore 1962:277 and Sorensen 1988: 15-56. 
74 
(KAB). 
5.4 Modifying (RAB) 
One good way of seeing that (RAB) is in need of modification is to focus on cases in 
which people conversationally imply things that they know to be false. 22 Suppose 
that Professor X has just been asked to write a letter of recommendation for student 
Y, who is applying for an academic job. Although X knows that Y is an intelligent 
student, he wants to imply that this is not the case; so, in his letter, X asserts, 
pointedly, that Y is not the most intelligent student he has ever taught. If the 
circumstances here are normal, then, by asserting this, X will imply that Y is not an 
intelligent student. So, since Y is an intelligent student, and X is aware of this, the 
following principle, which was defended in section 5.3: commits us to saying that, in 
these circumstances, X has a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from asserting 
that Y is not the most intelligent student he has ever taught: 
If S would imply that q by asserting that p, and it is not the 
case that q, then the fact that it is not the case that q is a 
conclusive epistemic reason for S to refrain from asserting 
that p. 
However: it seems clear that, in these circumstances, X does not - or at least, need 
not - have a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from believing that Y is not the 
most intelligent student he has ever taught. And consequently, it seems clear that, in 
its current form, (RAB) is false. 
The way to save (RAB) from this kind of counterexample is to focus on the fact that 
there are circumstances in which Professor X's assertion would not imply that Y is 
not an intelligent student. Because there are such circumstances, we can save (RAB) 
by rewriting it in the following way: 
22 I am here using the term 'conversationally imply' in the technical sense that was introduced in Grice 
1975. 
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If S is aware of some fact which would in any circumstances 
be a conclusive epistemic reason for her to refrain from 
asserting that p, then S has a conclusive epistemic reason to 
refrain from actively believing that p. 
When (RAB) is rewritten in this way, it still licenses the move from (KA) to (KAB). 
For, (KA) can be read as saying that any circumstances in which S is aware of the 
fact that she does not know that p are circumstances in which she has a conclusive 
reason to refrain from asserting that p. If knowledge was a cancellable implication 
of assertion, then it would not be legitimate to read (KA) in this way. But, as Slote 
has noted, knowledge is not a cancellable implication of assertion.23 If it was, then 
there would be some circumstances in which Moorean assertions like p hut I do not 
know that p lose their apparent inconsistency. But, on reflection, it seems clear that 
there are no circumstances of this kind. 
5.5 Summary 
The upshot of the last four subsections is that we have good reason to believe both of 
the following claims: 
(KA) If S is aware of the fact that she does not know that p, then S 
has a conclusive epistemic reason to refrain from asserting 
that p. 
If S is aware of some fact which would in any circumstances 
be a conclusive epistemic reason for her to refrain from 
asserting that p, then S has a conclusive epistemic reason to 
refrain from actively believing that p. 
When these two claims are conjoined, they entail the following claim: 
(KAB) If S actively believes P, and S is aware of the fact that she 
does not know P, then S has a conclusive epistemic reason to 
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stop actively believing P. 
So, we can now conclude that there is good reason to believe this claim. In sections 
3 and 4, we showed that there is also good reason to believe the following claim 
(where (B), (E) and (K) refer to the schematic sentences described in section 8): 
(BEK) We are all aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) is true, 
and the corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, then the 
corresponding instance of (K) is also untrue. 
And, in section 2, we showed that acceptance of (BEK) and (KAB) commits us to 
endorsing the LOK explanation. So, we can now conclude that the LOK explanation 
ought to be endorsed. In section 6, we will use the LOK explanation to generate a 
problem for the anti-sceptical objection that we described in chapter one. 
6. The LOK explanation and the anti-sceptical objection 
Before we can show that the LOK explanation generates a problem for the anti-
sceptical objection, we must trace out some of the consequences of this explanation. 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 will argue that, if the LOK explanation is correct, then there is a 
form of evidentialism that discredits many beliefs, and section 6.3 will argue that, by 
appealing to this form of evidentialism, we can generate a problem for the anti-
sceptical objection. 
6.1 GeneraliSing the LOK explanation 
There are many everyday cases in which someone challenges a certain belief by 
asking the believer why he or she has that belief. In section 1 of this chapter, we 
described three cases of this kind. Each of these cases conforms to the following 
pattern (which we will call the alpha pattern): 
(i) First, person A tells person B that p. 
23 SIote 1979: 179. 
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(ii) Then, B asks A why he believes that p. 
(iii) A responds by saying, sincerely, that he believes that p because q. 
(iv) B then makes it clear to A that the fact that q does not show, or 
establish that p. 
And, in each of these cases, it seems right to say that B's questions and comments 
give A a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that p. 
It is easy to imagine other cases that conform to the alpha pattern. And, it is 
interesting to note that, in virtually all of these cases, B's questions and comments 
seem to provide A with a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that 
p. This fact about alpha-pattern cases stands in need of explanation. If the LOK 
explanation is correct, then we should surely explain it in the following way: 
In virtually every case that confonns to the alpha-pattern, B's questions and comments make 
A aware of the fact that the following claims are both true with respect to him: 
(Bp) (I believe that p) because q. 
(-.Ep) The fact that q does not establish that p. 
And, in virtually every case of this kind, A is already aware of the fact that, if (Bp) and (-'EI') 
are true with respect to him, then the following claim is also true with respect to him: 
(-Kp) I do not know that p. 
So, in virtually every alpha-pattern case, B makes A aware of the fact that he does not know 
that p. Because of this, virtually every alpha-pattern case is a case in which B gives A a 
conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that p. 
In what follows, we will refer to this as the generalised LOK explanation. The 
arguments of sections 2-5 make it clear that this explanation is one that we ought to 
endorse. In section 6.2, we will argue that, if the generalised LOK explanation is 
true, then there is a form of evidentialism that discredits many beliefs. Section 6.3 
will use this form of evidentialism to generate a problem for the anti-sceptical 
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objection that we discussed in chapter one. 
6.2 Explanatory evidentialism 
In section 6.2.1, I will argue that, if the generalised LOK explanation is true, then we 
are all in a position to know the following doctrine: 
(EE) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not explained by establishing 
evidence, then S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
Section 6.2.2 will argue that this doctrine is a form of evidentialism, and section 
6.2.3 will argue that it discredits many beliefs. 
6.2.1 (EFJ and the generalised LOK explanation 
If the generalised LOK explanation is true, then the following claim about alpha-
pattern cases is also true: 
(APC) In virtually every alpha-pattern case, A is aware of the fact 
that, if (Bp) and (-'Ep) are both true with respect to him, then 
(-'Kp) is also true with respect to him. 
The fact about alpha-pattern cases itself stands in need of explanation. For, there are 
many different kinds of alpha-pattern case, involving subjects with very different 
kinds of background knowledge. How is it that, in virtually all of these cases, person 
A is aware of the truth of the conditional to which (APC) refers? 
One natural way of explaining this fact is to endorse the following claim: 
In virtually every alpha-pattern case, it is a conceptual truth 
that, if (Bp) and (-.Ep) are both true with respect to A, then 
(-Kp) is also true with respect to A. 
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It is hard to see how one could explain the truth of (APC) without endorsing 
something like this claim. Because of this, we have good reason to believe (APC2). 
But, the truth of (APC2) is itself something that stands in need of explanation. 
The most natural way of explaining the truth of (APC2) is to say that there is a broad 
conceptual truth that entails all of the conceptual truths to which (APC2) refers. One 
simple claim which entails all of the conceptual truths to which (APC2) refers is the 
following (where S's belief that p is explained by establishing evidence iff there is 
some q such that (i) (S believes that p) because q, and (ii) the fact that q establishes 
that p): 
(E) For any subject, S, and proposition P: if S believes P, and S's belief in 
P is not explained by establishing evidence, then S does not know P. 
There are a few propositions for which (E) may not hold. These propositions are all 
simple necessary truths, like the proposition that everything is self-identical, and the 
proposition that 2 + 2 = -I. Although it is clear that we know these propositions, it is 
by no means clear that we believe them in the way that (E) requires. Because of this, 
it seems best to explain the truth of (APC2) by appealing to the following qualified 
version of (E): 
(EE) With few exceptions: every proposition P, is such that, for any 
subject, S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not explained by 
establishing evidence, then S does not know P. 
It is hard to see how we could explain the truth of (APC2) without saying that (EE) is 
a conceptual truth. Because of this, we have good reason to believe that (EE) is a 
conceptual truth. But, if (EE) is a conceptual truth, then, surely, we are all in a 
position to know (EE). In the next subsection, I will argue that (EE) is a form of 
evidentialism. 
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6.2.2 From (EI) to (EFJ 
A doctrine, 0, is a form of evidentialism iff 0 is either identical to the following 
doctrine, or can be generated by making an admissible amendment to this doctrine: 
(Ed With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
In what follows, we will show that there is an admissible amendment to (El) which 
generates (EE). By showing this, we will show that (EE) is a form of evidentialism. 
One way of amending (El) is to amend the doxastic defect to which it refers. 
Amendments of this kind are admissible iff the defect to which they appeal is 
suitable - where a doxastic defect is said to be suitable iff it satisfies the following 
constraint: 
(SOD) For any subject, S, and proposition P: if S believes P, and S's belief in 
P has defect 0, then the fact that this belief has 0 is a conclusive 
epistemic reason for S to stop believing P. 
The arguments of section 5 show that the defect of not constituting knowledge 
satisfies (SOD). So, we can now conclude that the following doctrine is a form of 
evidential ism: 
(E2) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
Another way of amending (El) is to amend the evidential requirement that it imposes 
on our beliefs. One admissible amendment of this kind is the amendment which 
generates the following doctrine: 
81 
(El') With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S 's belief in P is not based on sufficient 
evidence, then S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
Any amendment to (El) which can be brought about by making a series of 
admissible amendments to this doctrine is itself admissible. So, by combining the 
amendment which generates (E2) with the amendment that generates (El'), we can 
generate the following form of evidentialism: 
(E3) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not based on sufficient 
evidence, then S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
A third admissible way of amending (El) is to replace its constituent terms with 
terms that can reasonably be believed to be their synonyms. Any amendment to (El) 
which can be brought about by making a series of admissible amendments to this 
doctrine is itself admissible; so, any amendment to (El) which can be brought about 
by first of all replacing (El) with (El'), and then replacing terms in (El') with terms 
that can reasonably be believed to be their synonyms, is an admissible amendment to 
(El)' It is reasonable to believe that the following schematic sentence: 
(--'BE) S's belief in P is not based on sufficient evidence. 
is synonymous with this sentence: 
S's belief in P is not explained by establishing evidence. 
Because it is reasonable to believe this, it is possible to generate the following 
doctrine by making an admissible amendment to (El): 
(EE) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not explained by establishing 
evidence, then S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
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Consequently, we can conclude that (EE) is a form of evidentiaIism. In what follows, 
we will refer to it as explanatory evidentialism. 
6.2.3 Explanatory evidentialism discredits many belief., 
In the last two subsections, we have argued that we are all in a position to know a 
certain form of evidentialism, which we are calling explanatory evidential ism. In this 
section, we will use the results of these sections to argue that explanatory 
evidential ism discredits many defective beliefs. We will do this by focusing on the 
job interview case that we described in section l. In what follows, we will argue that 
explanatory evidentialism discredits John's job belief, and will thereby argue that 
there are many defective beliefs that are discredited by this form of evidential ism. 
When I say that a form of evidentialism, E, discredits S's belief that p, what I mean 
is that the following claims are all true: 
(DI') S is in a position to know E, and is in a position to know that 
her belief that p is not an exception to it. 
(D2') If S is not aware of the fact that her belief that p does not 
satisfy the evidential requirement that E imposes, then we can 
make S aware of this fact. 
(D3') (D 1 ') and (D2') are true regardless of whether S's belief that p 
is true, and regardless of S's belief that she knows that p can 
be rebutted in a non-evidential way. They are also true 
regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and regardless 
of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation have been 
raised. 
The arguments of section 6.2.1 show that we are all in a position to know 
explanatory evidential ism; and, it seems clear that John is in a position to know that 
his job belief is not an exception to this form of evidential ism. Consequently, it 
seems clear that, in the job interview case, the following claim is true: 
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(DIj') John is in a position to know explanatory evidentialism, and is 
in a position to know that his job belief is not an exception to 
it. 
It also seems clear that, in the job interview case, the following pair of claims are 
true: 
(D2j') If John is not aware of the fact that his job belief does not 
satisfy the evidential requirement that is imposed by 
explanatory evidential ism, then we can make John aware of 
this fact 
(D3j') (DIj') and (D2j') are true regardless of whether John's job 
belief is true, and regardless of whether John's belief that his 
job belief constitutes knowledge can be rebutted in a non-
evidential way. They are also true regardless of whether global 
scepticism is true, and regardless of whether the standards for 
epistemic evaluation have been raised. 
Consequently, it seems clear that, in the job interview case, explanatory 
evidentialism discredits John's job belief. And, since there are many actual cases that 
closely resemble the job interview case, it seems clear that there are many other 
beliefs that are discredited by this form of evidential ism. By appealing to these facts 
about explanatory evidential ism, we can generate a problem for the anti-sceptical 
objection that we described in chapter one. In section 6.3, I will describe this 
problem. Chapter three will then describe a way in which the problem can be 
resolved. 
6.3 A problem for the anti-sceptical objection 
There are two stages of the anti-sceptical objection. The first stage is an argument for 
the following claim: 
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(1) EBG is true only if there is a form of evidential ism that discredits all 
deity beliefs. 
and the second stage is an argument for this claim: 
(2) There is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity bel iefs. 
To see that the results of section 6.2 generate a problem for the anti-sceptical 
objection, we need to focus on the second stage of this objection. The most important 
part of this stage of the objection is an argument for the claim that the following 
form of evidentialism leads to scepticism: 
(El) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then S's 
belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
According to the anti-sceptical objector, (El) leads to scepticism because we do not 
have evidence for the negations of sceptical hypotheses, like the hypothesis that I am 
a brain in a vat. Ifthe objector's argument succeeds, then it shows that most forms of 
evidential ism lead to scepticism, and thus do not discredit all deity beliefs. The only 
forms of evidentialism that seem likely to escape the objector's argument are those 
which impose a fairly weak evidential requirement on our beliefs. And, it is difficult 
to argue that deity beliefs fail to satisfy these weak requirements without appealing 
to arguments for the falsity of certain metaphysical deity beliefs, or to non-evidential 
attacks on certain epistemic deity beliefs: so, even these forms of evidential ism seem 
unlikely to discredit all deity beliefs. 
One form of evidentialism which seems vulnerable to the second stage of the anti-
sceptical objection is the following doctrine, which we are calling explanatory 
evidential ism: 
(Ed With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S's belief in P is not explained by establishing 
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evidence, then S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
This form of evidentialism seems vulnerable to the objection because the evidential 
requirement that it imposes seems not to be satisfied by our beliefs in the negations 
of sceptical hypotheses. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat (henceforth: that I 
am not a BIV) seems to be explained by the fact that I believe lots of propositions 
that entail that I am not a BIV. And, it seems clear that this fact does not establish 
that I am not a BIV. For, if! was a BIV, then I would believe all of the things that I 
actually believe. And, this seems to show that no fact about the things that I believe 
can establish that I am not a BIV. 
To see that explanatory evidentialism is not in fact vulnerable to the anti-sceptical 
objection, we need to recap on some of the things that we said about establishment in 
section 4.1. In this section, we discussed the fact that instances of the following 
claim: 
(E) The fact that q establishes that p. 
seem always to imply corresponding instances of this claim: 
(C) If it hadn't been the case that p, then it would not have been the case 
that q. 
The upshot of this section was that this implication does not always hold. In 
particular: we concluded that the implication does not hold in cases where the 
proposition that p is the negation of a sceptical hypothesis. So, for instance, we 
concluded that, in ordinary contexts, the following instance of (E) is true: 
(Em) The fact that the animals in the =ebra enclosure look like =ebras 
establishes that these animals are not cleverly disguised mules. 
in spite of the fact that, in such contexts, the corresponding instance of (C) seems 
false. Similarly, we concluded that, in ordinary contexts, the following instance of 
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(E) is true: 
(Es) The fact that Jim is wearing a suit that looks new establishes that Jim 
has just bought, rather than stolen, a new suit. 
in spite of the fact that, in such contexts, the corresponding instance of (C) seems 
false. If the argument of section 4.1 succeeds, then it allows us to say that, in 
ordinary contexts, the following instance of (E) is true: 
(Eb) The fact that I believe lots of p rop os it ions that entail that I am not a 
BIVestablishes that I am not a BIV. 
even though it seems clear that, in such contexts, the corresponding instance of (C) is 
false. Because of this, it allows us to say that, in ordinary contexts, my belief in the 
negation of the BIV hypothesis does satisfy the evidential requirement that 
explanatory evidentialism imposes. And, consequently, it provides us with a way of 
responding to the anti-sceptical objector's argument for the claim that (EE) leads to 
scepticism. 
Advocates of the anti-sceptical objection may respond to this problem by changing 
tack. Instead of trying to argue that explanatory evidentialism leads to scepticism, 
they may try to argue that the evidential requirement that it imposes is too weak. If 
my belief in the negation of the BIV hypothesis satisfies the evidential requirement 
that explanatory evidentialism imposes, then this requirement is, at least sometimes, 
much easier to satisfy than it seems. By appealing to this fact, the anti-sceptical 
objector may try to show that the following pair of claims do not hold with respect to 
every subject, S, who has deity beliefs: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that explanatory evidentialism 
imposes, then we can make S aware of this fact. 
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(D2EE) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. 
If the objector can show this, then she will show that explanatory evidentialism is too 
weak to discredit all deity beliefs. 
The problem with this strategy is that there are many beliefs that are discredited by 
explanatory evidentialism in spite of the fact that the evidential requirement imposed 
by this form of evidentialism is sometimes much easier to satisfy than it seems. One 
belief of this kind is John's job belief. To show that explanatory evidential ism is too 
weak to discredit all deity beliefs, the anti-sceptical objector must appeal to features 
of deity beliefs which are not shared by John's job belief. At present, the anti-
sceptical objection does not appeal to features of this kind - so, at present, this 
objection does not show that explanatory evidentialism is too weak to discredit all 
deity beliefs. 
The upshot of this chapter is that, in its current form, the anti-sceptical objection 
does not show that explanatory evidentialism discredits all deity beliefs. If this 
problem with the objection cannot be rectified, then the objection will fail. In chapter 
three, I will rectify the problem by constructing a new version of the anti-sceptical 
objection. Chapter four will then show that this new objection is itself vulnerable to 
a certain problem, which will be rectified in chapter five. 
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Chapter Three 
The second anti-sceptical objection 
In chapter two, I argued that advocates of the anti-sceptical objection (ASO) face a 
serious problem. In this chapter, I will construct a new version of the ASO, which is 
invulnerable to this problem. Before I can start to construct this new objection, I 
need to argue for the following claim: 
(M) If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that some of his deity beliefs are explained by sensitive evidence, 
then explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
Section 1 clarifies this claim, sections 2 and 3 argue for it, and section 4 uses it to 
construct an improved version of the ASO, which I call the second ASO. 
1. Clarifying (M) 
Before we can defend (M), we must clarify the terminology that it employs. In 
particular: we need to say something about what it is for a belief to explained by 
sensitive evidence. When I say that S's belief that p is explained by sensitive 
evidence, I mean that an instance ofthe following claim is true: 
(ESE) (S believes that p) because q, and if it hadn't been the case that p, then 
it wouldn't have been the case that q. 
Because of this, we can clarify (M) by rewriting it in the following way: 
(M') If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that there is some sentence, Id', which states the content of one of S's 
deity beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
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(ESE) (S believes that d) because q, and if it hadn't been the case that 
d, then it wouldn't have been the case that q. 
then explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity bel iefs. 
In the next two sections, I will give a two-step argument for (M'). Section 2 will 
argue that, if the antecedent of (M') is true, then, under ordinary standards for 
establishment, the following claim is also true: 
(Mae') There is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply that 
there is some sentence, 'd', which states the content of one of S's deity 
beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
(EEE) (S believes that d) because q, and the fact that q establishes 
that d. 
And, section 3 will argue that, if (Mae') is true under ordinary standards for 
establishment, then the consequent of (M') is true. 
2. From (M') to (Mae') 
Chapter 2 argued that, when people judge that an instance of the fol1owing claim is 
true: 
(E) The fact that p establishes that q 
they tend also to judge that the corresponding instance of this claim is true: 
(C) If it had not been the case that q, then it would not have been the case 
that p.l 
It is interesting to note that the reverse tendency also seems to hold. When people 
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judge that an instance of (C) is true, they tend also to judge that the corresponding 
instance of (E) is true. One good way of seeing this is to appeal to examples. 
Last night, it snowed, and this morning, there is a layer of snow on my garden. 
Earlier this morning, a bird landed on the garden, and left some footprints in the 
snow. It seems clear that the following instance of (C) is true: 
(Cb) If a bird hadn't landed on my garden, then there would not have been 
bird footprints in the snow. 
And, it seems equally clear that this instance of (E) is true: 
(Eb) The fact that there are bird footprints in the snow establishes that a 
bird landed on my garden. 
If there was a trickster in the area who was in the habit of leaving fake bird 
footprints on people's gardens, then it would be less clear that (Eb) is true. But, it 
would also be less clear that (Cb) is true, which supports the hypothesis that the 
plausibility of (Eb) depends on the plausibility of (Cb). 
Last night, I left a saucer of milk in the kitchen. During the night, my cat came into 
the house and drank the milk. It seems clear that the following instance of (C) is 
true: 
(Cc) If the cat hadn't drunk the milk, then the saucer wouldn't have been 
empty this morning. 
And, it seems equally clear that this instance of (E) is true: 
(Ec) The fact that the saucer was empty this morning establishes that the 
cat drank the milk. 
1 See sections 3.1-3.3 of chapter two. 
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If the kitchen was accessible to other animals - e.g. to hedgehogs - then it would be 
less clear that (Ec) is true. But, it would also be less clear that (Cc) was true, which 
supports the hypothesis that the plausibility of (Ec) depends upon that of (Cc). 
This morning, I parked my car in a multi-storey car park. Later in the day, the car 
was stolen; so, when I returned, the car was not in the car park. Since no-one but me 
has keys to the car, the following instance of (C) is true: 
(Cp) If the car hadn't been stolen, then the car would have been in the car 
park when I returned. 
The corresponding instance of (E) also seems to be true: 
(Ep) The fact that the car was not in the car park when I returned 
establishes that the car had been stolen. 
If someone else - e.g. my father - had keys to the car, then it would be less clear that 
(Ep) is true. But, it would also be less clear that (Cp) is true, which supports that 
hypothesis that (Ep) owes its plausibility to (Ep). 
It is natural to conclude, on the basis of the above examples, that, when people judge 
that an instance of (C) is true, they tend also to judge that the corresponding instance 
of (E) is true. It is also natural to conclude, on the basis of these examples, that 
instances of (C) obviously imply the corresponding instances of (E). But, there are 
good reasons to refrain from endorsing this second conclusion. One good way of 
appreciating these reasons is to return to the following instances of (C) and (E), 
which we discussed above: 
(Cc) If the cat hadn't drunk the milk, then the saucer wouldn't have been 
empty this morning. 
(Ec) The fact that the saucer was empty this morning establishes that the 
cat drank the milk. 
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It is natural to say that (Cc) obviously implies (Ec). But, there is also reason to think 
that this implication does not hold. To see this, note that (Cc) seems not to imply the 
following claim: 
(Ec *) The fact that the saucer was empty this morning establishes that the 
milk was not drunk by a hedgehog that somehow managed to sneak 
into the house. 
Although this claim is not implied by (Cc), it does seem to be implied by (Ec). For, 
the proposition that the cat drank the milk entails that the milk was not drunk by a 
hedgehog that somehow managed to sneak into the hose~ and, establishment seems 
to be closed under entailment. If (Ec *) is implied by (Ec), but not (Cc), then (Ec) is 
not implied by (Cc).2 Because of this, there are problems for those who wish to say 
that instances of (C) obviously imply corresponding instances of (E). 
The best way of resolving these problems is to qualify the claim that instances of (C) 
obviously imply corresponding instances of (E). The contextualist arguments of 
chapter tw03 suggest that we should qualify this claim in the following way: 
(CEc) Under ordinary standards for establishment, instances of (C) 
obviously imply corresponding instances of (E). 
If we do qualify it in this way, then we can respond to the above problems by saying 
that, under ordinary standards for establishment, (Cc) does imply (Ec *). The apparent 
failure of this implication can be explained by saying that, when (Ec *) is mentioned, 
the standards for establishment are raised. 
Since we have already accepted, in chapter two, that the standards for establishment 
vary with context, we have good reason to accept (CEc). From (CEc), it follows that, 
under ordinary standards for establishment, the following claim: 
2 Here, I assume that the relevant kind of implication is transitive. We can stipulate that this is so by 
stipulating that the relevant kind of implication is material implication. This stipulation does not make 
the claims of this section any less plausible. 
3 These arguments are given in section 4.1 of chapter two. 
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(Ma') There is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply that 
there is some sentence, 'd', which states the content of one of S's deity 
beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
(ESE) (S believes that d) because q, and if it hadn't been the case that 
d, then it wouldn't have been the case that q. 
implies this claim: 
(Mae') There is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply that 
there is some sentence, 'd', which states the content of one of S's deity 
beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
(EEE) (S believes that d) because q, and the fact that q establ ishes 
that d. 
In section 3, I will show that, if (Mae') is true under ordinary standards for 
establishment, then the following claim is also true: 
(Mc') Explanatory evidential ism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
By showing this, I will show that the following claim is true (since (Ma') and (Mc') 
are the antecedent and consequent of this claim): 
(M') If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that there is some sentence, 'd', which states the content of one of S's 
deity beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
(ESE) (S believes that d) because q, and if it hadn't been the case that 
d, then it wouldn't have been the case that q. 
then explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
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3. From (Mae') to (Mc') 
If, under ordinary standards for establishment, the following claim is true: 
(Mae') There is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply that 
there is some sentence, 'd', which states the content of one of S's deity 
beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
(EEE) (S believes that d) because q, and the fact that q establishes 
that d. 
then this claim is also true: 
(Mc') Explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
To see this, we need to recap, briefly, on the definition of discrediting that we gave 
in chapter one. According to this definition, a form of evidential ism, E, discredits all 
deity beliefs iff it is the case that, for every subject, S, who has deity beliefs, the 
following three claims are all true: 
(D 1) S is in a position to know E, and is in a position to know that 
her deity beliefs are not exceptions to it. 
(D2) If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that E imposes, then we can make 
S aware of this fact. 
(D3) (DI) and (D2) are true regardless of whether S's metaphysical 
deity beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic 
deity beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. They are 
also true regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and 
regardless of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation 
have been raised. 
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From this definition, we can infer that, if explanatory evidential ism discredits all 
deity beliefs, then, for every subject, S, who has deity beliefs, the following pair of 
claims are true: 
(Cl) If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs are not explained by 
establishing evidence, then we can make S aware of this fact. 
(C2) (Cl) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity beliefs are 
true, and regardless of whether the standards for establishment have 
been raised. 
If (Cl) and (C2) are true for every subject, S, then, under ordinary standards for 
establishment, there is no subject, S, for whom the fol1owing claim is true: 
(C3) If S's metaphysical deity beliefs are all true, then some of S's deity 
beliefs are explained by establishing evidence. 
But, if the following claim is true, under ordinary standards for establishment: 
(Mae) There is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply that 
some of his deity beliefs are explained by establishing evidence. 
then there is some subject, S, for whom (C3) is true. Consequently, we can conclude 
that, if (Mae) is true, under ordinary standards for establishment, then explanatory 
evidentiaIism does not discredit all deity beliefs. And, since (Mile) can be rewritten in 
the following way: 
(Mae') There is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply that 
there is some sentence, 'd', which states the content of one of S's deity 
beliefs, and for which an instance of the following claim is true: 
(EEE) (S believes that d) because q, and the fact that q establishes 
that d. 
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we can conclude that, if (Mae') is true under ordinary standards for establishment, 
then the following claim is true: 
(Mc') Explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
When the conclusion of this section is conjoined with the conclusion of the last 
section, it entails that the following claim is true: 
(M) If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that some of his deity beliefs are explained by sensitive evidence, 
then explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
In the next section, I will show that, by appealing to this claim, we can construct an 
improved version of the anti-sceptical objection. 
4. The second anti-sceptical objection 
In this section, I will describe an improved version of the anti-sceptical objection 
(henceforth: the ASO). To distinguish it from the objection that we described in 
chapter one, I will refer to it as the second ASO; or, for short, as AS02• The second 
ASO is a four-stage argument which aims to give advocates of EBG a conclusive 
epistemic reason to stop actively believing this claim. In what follows, I will 
describe this argument by describing the four arguments from which it is composed. 
The first stage of AS02 is the argument that we gave in chapter one for the following 
claim: 
(1) IfEBG is true, then there is a form of evidential ism that discredits all 
deity beliefs. 
Nothing that we said in chapter two threatens the argument that we gave for (I); so, 
we can safely retain this argument as a part of AS02. 
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The second stage of AS02 is an argument for a qualified version of this claim: 
(2) There is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
We can generate this argument by focusing on the second stage of the original ASo. 
According to this stage of the objection, virtually every form of evidential ism either 
leads to scepticism, or is too weak to discredit deity beliefs. In chapter two, we 
showed that explanatory evidential ism does not lead to scepticism, and may not be 
too weak to discredit all deity beliefs; but, it is hard to think of any other form of 
evidentialism which shares these features. Because of this, the second stage of the 
original ASO gives us reason to believe the following, qualified version of claim (2): 
(2') If explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then 
there is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
The second stage of AS02 is the argument that we have just given for this c1aim. 
The third stage of AS02 is a three-part argument for the following claim: 
(3') If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that some of his deity beliefs are explained by sensitive evidence, 
then EBG is not true. 
The first part of this argument points out that claims (1) and (2') jointly entail the 
following claim: 
(3a') If explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then 
EBG is not true. 
The second part uses the arguments of sections 1-3 to defend this claim: 
(M) If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that some of his deity beliefs are explained by sensitive evidence, 
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then explanatory evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
And, the third part points out that (3a') and (M) jointly entail (3'). 
The fourth, and final stage of AS02 is an argument for this claim: 
(4') Under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG is not known to be 
true. 
To state this argument, we need to focus on the following claim: 
(D) There is a community of people who an believe in a certain deity 
(who we will call D). Many of the things that the members of this 
community believe about D are believed by them because they are 
written in a certain book (which we will can the D-book). According 
to this community of D-believers, the D-book is, in a certain sense, a 
book that was written by D himself. The D-believers also think that D 
would never write a book which said something untrue (and they 
think this for the sense of 'write' which they use when they say that 
the D-book was written by D). 
The fourth stage of AS02 argues for (4') by arguing for the following pair of claims: 
(4a') If (D) is true, then EBG is not true. 
(4b') If (D) is not true, then, under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG 
is not known to be true. 
In the next five subsections, I will state the fourth stage of AS02, by stating the 
arguments from which it is composed. 
4.1 Arguingfor (4aJ 
If (D) is true, then there are many true instances of the fonowing claim in which'S' 
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is substituted for the name of a D-believer, and 'd' is substituted for a sentence which 
states the content of one of S's beliefs about D: 
(Bd) (S believes that d) because the D-book says that d. 
All of these instances of (Bd) are such that the subject, S, to whom they refer, 
believes (i) that the D-book was, in a certain sense, written by D himself, and (ii) 
that D would never write a book which said something untrue. Because of this, all of 
them are such that the subject, S, to whom they refer, has metaphysical deity beliefs 
which imply that the following claim is true: 
(Cd) If it hadn't been the case that d, then the D-book would not have said 
that d. 
And, consequently, it seems clear that, if (D) is true, then there are subjects who 
make the antecedent of the following claim true: 
(3') If there is some subject, S, whose metaphysical deity beliefs imply 
that some of his deity beliefs are explained by sensitive evidence, 
then EBG is not true. 
The third stage of AS02 shows that claim (3') is tre~ so we can now conclude that, 
if (D) is true, then the consequent of (3') is also tre~ or, equivalently, that the 
following claim is true: 
(4a') If(D) is true, then EBG is not true. 
-1.2 Arguingfor (-Ib') 
Before we can argue for (4b'), we need to argue for two other claims. The first of 
these claims can be stated in the following way: 
(EP1) If (D) is not true, then it could easily have been true. 
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And, the second can be stated as follows: 
(EP2) If it could easily have been the case that p, then, under ordinary 
standards for establishment, instances of the following claim: 
(-C) If it had not been the case that p, then it would still have been 
the case that q. 
imply corresponding instances of this claim: 
(-'E) The fact that q does not establish that p. 
In the next two subsections, I will argue for these claims. Section 4.5 will then use 
these claims to argue for (4b'). 
-1.3 Arguingfor (EPl) 
There are certain actual communities which closely resemble the community 
described in claim (D). One such is the community of Christians. Many of the things 
that Christians believe about God are such that Christians believe them because (or 
at least: partly because) the Bible says that they are true. And, many Christians seem 
to think (a) that the Bible was, in a certain sense, written by God, and (b) that God 
would never write a book which said something untrue. 
It may turn out that the community of Christians does not conform exactly to our 
description ofthe D-believers. And, it may turn out that there is no other community 
which conforms exactly to this description. But, it seems clear that there are a 
number of communities that come close to conforming to this description. And, for 
this reason, it is natural to endorse the following claim: 
(EP}) If (D) is not true, then it could easily have been true. 
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4..1 Arguingfor (EP;) 
In chapter two, we saw that, under ordinary standards for establishment, instances of 
the following claim: 
(-C) If it hadn't been the case that p, then it would still have been the case 
that q. 
do not always imply instances of this claim: 
(-'E) The fact that q doesn't establish that p.4 
In spite of this, it seems clear that instances of (-'C) do sometimes imply instances of 
(-,E), under ordinary standards for establishment. To see this, recall the case of the 
broken thermometer that we discussed in section 1.2 of chapter 2. In this case, it 
seems clear that the following claim: 
(-Ct) If Joe's temperature had not been normal, then the thermometer 
would still have said that it was normal. 
implies this claim: 
(-,Et ) The fact that the thermometer says that Joe's temperature is normal 
does not establish that Joe's is normal. 
and that it does so under ordinary standards for establishment. Because of this, we 
should accept that instances of (-C) do sometimes imply instances of (-'E), under 
such standards. 
What is the difference between the cases in which instances of (-C) imply instances 
of (-'E), under ordinary standards for establishment, and the cases in which they 
don't? One good way of isolating this difference is to return to the zebra example 
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that we discussed in section 3.2 of chapter two. In this example, I am visiting my 
local zoo, and am looking into the zebra enclosure. Inside the enclosure, there are 
striped animals which look to me like zebras, and a sign which says that these 
animals are zebras. Under ordinary standards for establishment, this fact about the 
contents of the enclosure - which we called the contents fact - establishes that the 
animals in the enclosure are zebras. It also establishes that these animals are not 
cleverly disguised mules, since the claim that they are zebras entails that they are not 
cleverly disguised mules. Because it establishes that these animals are not cleverly 
disguised mules, we can conclude that, in this case, the following instance of (-C): 
(-Cm) If the animals in the enclosure had been cleverly disguised mules, 
then they would still have looked to me like zebras, and would still 
have been referred to as zebras by the sign in their enclosure. 
does not imply the corresponding instance of (-'E). What is the difference between 
this case and the thermometer case, in which an instance of (-'C) d()es imply the 
corresponding instance of (-.E)? 
The most striking difference between these two cases is that in the first case, but not 
the second, the antecedent of the relevant instance of (-'C) could easily have heen 
true. In the thermometer case, it could easily have been the case that the patient's 
temperature was not normal; but, in the zebra case, it could not easily have been the 
case that the animals in the enclosure were cleverly painted mules.s This fact about 
the two examples suggests that, under ordinary standards for establishment, 
instances of (-'C) imply corresponding instances of (-.E) iff the antecedent of (-C) 
could easily have been true. If this suggestion is right, then the following claim is 
true: 
(EP2) If it could easily have been the case that not-p, then, under ordinary 
standards for establishment, instances of the following claim: 
4 See section 4.1 of chapter 2. 
~ Ifwe restate the zebra case so that this could easily have been the case, then it's no longer clear that 
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(--C) If it had not been the case that p, then it would still have been 
the case that q. 
imply corresponding instances of this claim: 
(-.E) The fact that q does not establish that p 
And, there is good reason to think that this suggestion is right. For, the cases in 
which instances of (-C) fail to imply instances of (-.E) all seem to be cases in which 
the antecedent of (--C) is a sceptical hypothesis. Sceptical hypotheses are almost 
always outlandish claims, which could not easily have been true. Consequently, it's 
natural to say that (EP2) is true. 
4.5 From (EP l) and (EP4J to (.Jb') 
Now that we have defended (EP1) and (EP2), we can start to argue for (4b'). The first 
step in our argument is to point out that, if (D) is not true, then the following, 
counterfactual claim will surely hold: 
(i) Even if (D) was true, advocates of EBG would believe EBG, and 
their reasons for believing it would be exactly the same as they 
actually are. 
This counterfactual claim is equivalent to the following claim (where 'R' refers to the 
reason for which advocates ofEBG believe EBG, whatever that reason is): 
(i') If (D) was true, then advocates of EBG would still bclicve EBG, and 
would believe it because R. 
The next step in our argument is to point out that (i') entails this claim: 
(ii) If(D) was true, then it would be the case that R. 
the zebra case is different from the thennometer case in the way that we are describing. 
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And, the third step is to point out that, when (ii) is conjoined with (EP)) and (EP2), it 
entails the following claim: 
(iii) Under ordinary standards for establishment, the fact that R does not 
establish that (D) is not true. 
The fourth step in our argument points out that, since (as section 4.1 showed) we can 
infer the falsity of (D) from the truth ofEBG, the following claim is true: 
(iv) If R doesn't establish that (D) is not true, then R does not establish 
that EBG is true. 
From (iii) and (iv), it follows that, under ordinary standards for establishment, R 
does not establish that EBG is true. So, when (iii) and (iv) are conjoined with 
explanatory evidentialism, they entail that, under ordinary standards for knowledge, 
EBG is not known to be true. Because of this, we can conclude that the following 
claim is true: 
(4b') If (D) is not true, then, under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG 
is not known to be true. 
4.6 Summary 
If the arguments of the last five subsections succeed, then they show that the 
following claims are both true: 
(4a') If (D) is true, then EBG is not true. 
(4b') If (D) is not true, then, under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG 
is not known to be true. 
From these claims, we can infer this claim, which AS02 aims to establish: 
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(4') Under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG is not known to be 
true. 
If AS02 does establish this claim, then all of us have, or can be given, a conclusive 
epistemic reason to refrain from endorsing EBG. In the next chapter, we will discuss 
whether it does establish this claim. The upshot of this chapter will be that AS02 
faces a serious problem. But, in chapter five, we will see that there is a way of 
resolving this problem. 
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Chapter Four 
A problem for the second anti-sceptical objection 
In the last chapter, we introduced a new version of the anti-sceptical objection, 
which we called the second anti-sceptical objection, or AS(h The aim of this 
chapter is to show that there is a serious problem that is faced by advocates of AS02. 
The problem that we will outline is a problem for the second stage of AS02, which is 
an argument for the following claim: 
(2') If explanatory evidential ism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then 
there is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
In what follows, we will argue that claim (2') is false. We will argue for this by 
arguing that there is a form of evidentialism that may discredit all deity beliefs even 
if explanatory evidentialism fails to do so. 
The best way of introducing the form of evidentialism which shows claim (2') to be 
false is to focus on a situation which resembles the job interview case that we 
described in chapter two. In section 1, we will describe this situation, and will give a 
knowledge-based explanation of the belief-undermining that takes place in this 
situation. The explanation that we will give in section I is an extended version of the 
LOK explanation that we defended in chapter two. In sections 2-5, we will defend 
this extended LOK explanation. Section 6 will then use this explanation to argue that 
there is a form of evidentialism which may discredit all deity beliefs even if 
explanatory evidentialism fails to do so. 
1. The film director 
Two friends, Sarah and Tom, are discussing the politics of film directors. Some way 
into the discussion, Sarah claims that there aren't any really famous film directors 
who are left wing. Tom responds to this by claiming that George Lucas is left wing, 
and the following exchange ensues: 
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Sarah: I've never heard that George Lucas is left wing. What makes you 
think that he's left wing? 
Tom: Hmm ... I can't rea11y remember. I think I read it somewhere. 
Sarah: Where did you read it? Was it in one of those socialist newspapers 
that you're always reading? 
Tom: I'm not sure .. .I suppose it might have been. 
Sarah: If it was, then it may we11 be wrong. The articles in those papers 
aren't very well researched, and they often misrepresent people's 
Views ... 
Tom: Yes, I know - but, I'm not sure that I read it in one of those papers. 
Still, I suppose I may have read it there. I can't be sure that I didn't. 
And, those papers are pretty unreliable. So, I guess I can't be sure that 
Lucas really is left wing ... 
If the situation here is normal, then Sarah's questions and comments will give Torn a 
conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his active belief that George /,ucas is left 
wing. The question that I want to address is: why do these questions and comments 
give Tom a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon this active belief(which we will 
call his political belief>? In the next subsection, I will sketch an answer to this 
question. Sections 2-5 will then defend this answer, by defending two controversial 
principles about knowledge. 
1.1 The extended LOK explanation 
In chapter two, we focused on a case which closely resembles the case of the film 
director. In this case, a woman, Mary, gives her husband, John, a conclusive 
epistemic reason to abandon a certain belief by asking him why he has this belief. 
The events of the case can be summarised in the fo11owing way: 
108 
(i) First, John tells Mary that he is going to get a certain job. 
(ii) Then, Mary asks John why he believes that he is going to get this job. 
(iii) John responds by saying that he believes this because his interview 
for the job went very well. 
(iv) Mary then argues that this fact about his interview does not estahlish 
that he will get the job, and, by doing so, gives John a conclusive 
epistemic reason to stop actively believing that he will get the job. 
One of the aims of chapter two was to explain why Mary's questions and comments 
undermine John's belief about his job (which we called hisjoh belief). In sections 1-
5 of this chapter, we argued for the following explanation of this fact (which wc 
called the lack a/knowledge, or LOK explanation): 
Mary's questions and comments give John a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his job 
belief because they make him aware of the fact that the following claims are both true with 
respect to him: 
(Bj ) I believe that I will get the job because my interview went well. 
(~Ej) The fact that my interview went well does not establish that I will get the 
job. 
John is already aware of the fact that, if (Bj) and (~Ej) are true with respect to him, then the 
following claim is also true with respect to him: 
(~Kj) I do not know that I will get the job. 
So, by making John aware of the fact that (B) and ("'Ej ) are true with respect to him, Mary 
makes him aware of the fact that he does not know that he will get the job. And. by making 
him aware of this fact, she gives him a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing 
that he will get the job. 
It seems clear that, in the case of the film director, Sarah undermines Tom's political 
belief in roughly the same way as Mary undermines John's job belief. But, it also 
seems clear that the LOK explanation cannot be applied directly to the case of the 
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film director. For, a direct application would be possible only if Sarah made Tom 
aware of the fact that corresponding instances of the following claims were true with 
respect to him: 
(Blp) I believe that George Lucas is left wing because p. 
(-Elp) The fact that p does not establish that George Lucas is left wing. 
And, it seems clear that, in the case of the film director, Sarah does not make Tom 
aware of the fact that corresponding instances of these claims are true with respect to 
him. 
Although Sarah does not make Tom aware of the fact that corresponding instances 
of (Blp) and (-,Elp) are true with respect to him, she does make him aware of the fact 
that the following instances of these claims might be true with respect to him: 
(Bls) I believe that George Lucas is left wing because one of my socialist 
newspapers said that he was left wing. 
(-,Els) The fact that one of my socialist newspapers said that Lucas is hft 
wing does not establish that Lucas is left wing. 
More exactly: she seems to make him aware of the fact that he does not know - and 
is not in a position to know - that (Bls) and (-,EIs) are not both true with respect to 
him. By appealing to this fact about the effect of Sarah's questions and comments, 
we can construct an explanation of the way in which these questions and comments 
undermine Tom's political belief One way of stating this explanation is as follows: 
Sarah's questions and comments give Tom a conclusive epistemic reason to abandon his 
political belief because they make him aware of the fact that he is not in a position to know 
that (BIJ and (-'EIJ are not both true with respect to him. Tom is already aware of the fact 
that, if he is not in a position to know that (Bls) and (-,Els) are not both true with respect to 
him, then the following claim is true with respect to him: 
(-'Kls) I do not know that George Lucas is left wing. 
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So, by making Tom aware of the fact that he is not in a position to know that (BI,) and (-'EI,) 
are not both true with respect to him, Sarah makes him aware of the fact that he does not 
know that George Lucas is left wing. And, by making him aware of this fact, she gives him a 
conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that George Lucas is left wing - i.e. to 
abandon his political belief. 
In what follows, we will refer to this as the extended IDK explanation. The aim of 
sections 2-5 is to defend this explanation. In section 2, I will outline a strategy for 
accomplishing this aim. Sections 3-5 will carry out this strategy by defending two 
principles about knowledge. 
2. Defending the extended LOK explanation 
One good way of defending the extended LOK explanation IS to defend the 
following claim: 
(FD) In the case of the film director, Tom is in a position to know that, if 
he is not in a position to know that (Bls) and (-,Els) are not both true 
with respect to him, then (-Kls) is true with respect to him. 
If (FD) and the original LOK explanation are both true, then we have good reason to 
believe the extended LOK explanation. So, since we have already argued that the 
original LOK explanation is true, we can now defend the extended LOK explanation 
by defending (FD). 
One good way of defending (FD) is to appeal to the following three principles: 
(BEK) We are all aware of the fact that, if an instance of (B) is true, and the 
corresponding instance of (E) is untrue, then the corresponding 
instance of (K) is also untrue. I 
1 As in chapter two, (B),(E) and (K) refer to the following schematic sentences: 
(B) (S believes that p) because q. 
(E) The fact that q establishes that p. 
(K) S knows that p. 
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We all know that, if a subject, S, knows that p, then S is in a 
position to know that S knows that p. 
We all know that, if a subject, S, is in a position to know that 
p, and S is also in a position to know that (ifp, then q), then S 
is in a position to know that q. 
The first of these is a principle that we defended in chapter two~ the second says that 
we all know a version of the KK principle, and the third says that wc all know that 
knowledge is closed under known implication. By appealing to these three 
principles, we can make a strong case for (FO). To sec this, note first of all that 
(BEK) seems to imply the following claim: 
(FDl) In the case of the film director, Tom knows that, if(Bls) and (-"Els) arc 
both true with respect to him, then (-..K ls) is also true with respect to 
him. 
Next, note that, if (FDI) is true, then the following claim is very likely also to be 
true: 
(FD2) In the case of the film director, Tom knows that, if (-"Kls) is not true 
with respect to him, then (Bls) and (-..Els) are not both true with 
respect to him. 
Thirdly, note that, when (FD2) is conjoined with (KKPK), it entails the following 
claim: 
(FD3) In the case of the film director, Tom is in a position to know that he 
knows that, if (-..Kls) is not true with respect to him, then (B ls) and 
(-..Els) are not both true with respect to him. 
Fourthly: note that, if (FD3) and (CPK) are both true, then the following claim is also 
true: 
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(FD4) In the case of the film director, Tom is in a position to know that, if 
he is in a position to know that (-Kls) is not true with respect to him, 
then he is also in a position to know that (Ols) and (-,Els) are not both 
true with respect to him. 
Fifthly: note that, if (FD4) and (CPK) are both true, then the following claim is also 
true: 
(FDs) In the case of the film director, Tom is in a position to know that, if 
he is not in a position to know that (IllS) and (-EiS) are not both true 
with respect to him, then he is not in a position to know that (-,Kls) is 
not true with respect to him. 
Finally: note that, if (FDs) and (KKPK) are both true, then the following claim is also 
true: 
(FD) In the case of the film director, Tom is in a position to know that, if 
he is not in a position to know that (IllS) and (-,Els) are not both true 
with respect to him, then (-,Kls) is true with respect to him. 
The above reasoning shows that, if (BEK), (KKPK) and (CPK) are all true, then (FD) 
is also likely to be true. We have already defended (BEK); so, by defending (KKPK) 
and (CPK), we can now defend (FD). In sections 3-5, we will defend (KKPd and 
(CPK). If our defence succeeds, then it will give us good reason to believe both (FD) 
and the extended LOK explanation. 
3. Defending (KKPK) and (CPK) 
In this section, I will defend (KKPK) and (CPK). I wilt do so by focusing on a number 
of puzzles about assertion. Section 3.1 wi1\ outline three puzzles of this kind, and 
section 3.2 will defend a certain solution to these puzzles, which I call the 
implication solution. Section 3.3 will then outline three puzzles which closely 
resemble the puzzles of section 3.1; and sections 3.4 and 3.5 will argue that the best 
way of applying the implication solution to these puzzles is to endorse (KKPK) and 
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(CPK). If the arguments of sections 3.1-3.5 succeed, then they will give us a strong 
reason to believe (KKPK) and (CPK). In sections 4 and 5, I will argue that this reason 
is not outweighed by objections to (KKPK) and (CPK). 
3.1 Three pu=:les ahout assert ion 
In this section, I will describe three puzzles about asscrtion. Section 3.2 will then 
defend a certain solution to these puzzles, which I call the implicatiol1 solution. The 
puzzles that I will describe are very similar to the pU7.zles posed by Moorcan 
sentences, like p but I don't know that p. The implication solution is inspired by a 
solution to these Moorean puzzles which is due to Petcr Ungcr. and which was 
endorsed in chapter two.2 
3.1.1 The climhing trip 
Two friends, A and B are discussing whcther to go climbing. B tells A that it would 
be a bad idea to go climbing, because it is going to snow. A asks B the following 
question: 
(QI) How do you know that it is going to snow? 
and B gives the following answer: 
(AI) I don't know that it is going to snow. 
B's answer seems to contradict his earlier assertion that it is going to snow. But, 
when we look closely at his answer, we can see that it does not in fact contradict this 
assertion. B's assertion that it will snow is perfectly consistent with his assertion that 
he doesn't know that it will snow. So, why does the second assertion seem to 
contradict the first? 
2 See chapter VI ofUnger 1975, esp. pp256-60. 
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3.1.2 711ecancelledparty 
After postponing their climbing trip, A and B discuss their plans for the evening. A 
suggests going to a party that is being held by their friend C~ but, B tells him that C's 
party has been cancelled. A asks B the following question: 
(Q2) What makes you think that C's party has been cancelled? 
and B gives the following answer: 
(A2) I don', think that C's party has been cancelled. 
Again, B's answer seems to contradict his earlier assertion about the party. And, 
again, it seems clear, on reflection, that this answer does not contradict this 
assertion. Because of this, we should once again ask why B's answer seems to 
contradict this assertion. Our answer to this question should resemble our answer to 
the question asked at the end of section 3.1.1. 
3.1.3 The petrol gauge 
Instead of going to C's party, A and B decide to go for a drive. The petrol gauge in 
A's car is not working, but B assures A that the tank is full. A asks B the following 
question: 
(Q3) How can you be certain that the tank is full? 
and B gives the following answer: 
(A3) I'm not certain that the tank is full. 
Once again, his answer seems to contradict his earlier assertion~ and once again, it 
seems clear that this apparent contradiction is illusory. To resolve the puzzle posed 
by this example, we need to explain why B's answer seems to contradict his earlier 
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assertion. Our explanation of this fact should resemble our explanation of the 
apparent contradictions described in sections 3. t. t and 3. t .2. 
3.2 The implication solution 
One natural way of solving the puzzle about the climbing trip is to endorse the 
following principle about assertion and knowledge: 
(AK) When one asserts that p, one thereby implies that one knows that p. 
In the climbing trip example, B asserts, first of all, that it is going to snow, and then, 
that he does not know that it is going to snow. If (AK) is true, then, by making the 
first of these assertions, B implies the negation of the second. So, if (AK) is true, 
than it is not surprising that 8 's second assertion seems to contradict his first. 
The above solution - which we will call the implication solution - is supported by 
the fact that (AK) is independently plausible. In section 5.2 of chapter two, we 
defended (AK) by arguing that it can explain a range of pU7zling facts about 
knowledge and assertion. Some of the facts that we mentioned in section 5.2 are 
quite similar to the fact that we are now using (AK) to explain. But, in spite of this, 
it seems clear that the discussion of section 5.2 provides us with an independent 
reason for believing (AK). 
Another thing that supports the implication solution is the fact that it generates 
attractive solutions to both of the other puzzles that we outlined in section 3. t. To 
see that it generates such solutions, note, first of all, that it is very natural to endorse 
the following principle about assertion and implication: 
(AI) If, by asserting that p, one implies that q, and it is common 
knowledge that if q then r, then, by asserting that p, one implies that 
r. 
Next, note that the following principles are also very plausible: 
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(KTK) It is common knowledge that, if one knows that p, then one thinks 
that p. 
(KCK) It is common knowledge that, if one knows that p, then one is certain 
that p. 
When (AK) is conjoined with these plausible principles, and with (AI), it entails the 
following principles: 
(AT) When one asserts that p, one implies that one thinks that p. 
(AC) When one asserts that p, one implies that one is certain that p. 
By appealing to these principles, we can solve the puzzle about the cancelled party, 
and the puzzle about the petrol gauge in exactly the same way as we just solved the 
puzzle about the climbing trip. 
3.3 Three more puzzles about assertion 
In this section, I will describe three more puzzles about assertion.3 The puzzles that I 
will describe are very similar to the puzzles that were outlined in section 3.1. The 
similarity between the two sets of puzzles strongly suggests that the implication 
solution should be applied to both. In sections 3.4 and 3.5, I will argue that the best 
way of applying the implication solution to the puzzles that are outlined in this 
section is to endorse (KKPK) and (CPK). 
3.3.1 Another climbing trip 
Two friends, A and B are discussing whether to go climbing. B tells A that it would 
be a bad idea to go climbing, because it is going to snow. A asks B the following 
question: 
3 The puzzles that I will describe correspond to the puzzles posed by iterated Moorean sentences, like 
'p, but I don't know whether I know that p', 'p, but I don't know whether I think that p' and so on. For 
discussion of such sentences, see Hambourger 1987:252 and Sorensen 2000. 
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(Ql) How do you know that it is going to snow? 
and B gives the following answer: 
(AlK) I don't know whether I do know that it is going to snow. 
B's answer seems to contradict his earlier assertion that it is going to snow. But, 
when we look closely at his answer, we can see that it does not in fact contradict this 
assertion. B's assertion that it will snow is perfectly consistent with his assertion that 
he doesn't know whether he knows that it will snow. So, why does the second 
assertion seem to contradict the first? 
3.3.2 Another cancelled party 
After postponing their climbing trip, A and B discuss their plans for the evening. A 
suggests going to a party that is being held by their friend C~ but, B tells him that C's 
party has been cancelled. A asks B the following question: 
(Q2) What makes you think that C's party has been cancelled? 
and B gives the following answer: 
(A2K) I don't know whether I do think that C's party has been cancelled. 
Again, B's answer seems to contradict his earlier assertion about the party. And, 
again, it seems clear, on reflection, that this answer does not contradict this 
assertion. Because of this, we should again ask why B's answer seems to contradict 
this assertion. Our answer to this question should resemble our answer to the 
question asked at the end of section 3.3.2. 
3.3.3 Another petrol gauge 
Instead of going to C's party, A and B decide to go for a drive. The petrol gauge in 
A's car is not working, but B assures A that the tank is full. A asks B the following 
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question: 
(Q3) How can you be certain that the tank is full? 
and B gives the following answer: 
(A3K) I don't know whether I am certain that the tank is full. 
Again, his answer seems to contradict his earlier assertion; and again, it seems clear 
that this apparent contradiction is illusory. To resolve the puzzle posed by this 
example, we need to explain why B's answer seems to contradict his earlier 
assertion. Our explanation of this fact should resemble our explanation of the 
apparent contradictions described in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 
3.4 Extending the implication solution 
The three puzzles just outlined are very similar to the three puzzles outlined in 
section 3.1. So, there is reason to think that the implication solution can be applied to 
the puzzles that we have just outlined. In this section, I will argue that the best way 
of applying this solution to the new climbing trip puzzle is to endorse (KKPK). The 
next section will argue that the best way of applying the solution to the other puzzles 
that we have just outlined is to endorse (KKPK) and (CPK). 
The most straightforward way of applying the implication solution to the new 
climbing trip puzzle is to claim that the following principle is true: 
(KKK) It is common knowledge that, if one knows that p, then one also 
knows that one knows that p. 
When this principle is conjoined with the following pair of principles, which are at 
the heart of the implication solution, it generates a solution to the new climbing trip 
puzzle: 
(AK) When one asserts that p, one thereby implies that one knows that p. 
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(AI) If, by asserting that p, one implies that q, and it is common 
knowledge that if q then r, then, by asserting that p, one implies that 
r. 
For, when it is conjoined with (AK) and (AI), (KKK) entails that the following 
principle is true: 
(AKK) When one asserts that p, one thereby implies that one knows that one 
knows that p. 
And, if this principle is true, then it is not surprising that, when B asserts that he 
does not know whether he knows that it is going to snow, his assertion seems to 
contradict his earlier assertion that it is going to snow. 
The main problem with this solution to the new climbing trip puzzle is that there are 
strong reasons for rejecting (KKK). One such reason is that, if (KKK) is true, then 
possession of knowledge is restricted to those who have the concept of knowledge. 
Another is that, if (KKK) is true, then one cannot know a proposition without 
knowing an infinite number of other propositions, many of which are propositions 
that none of us have ever entertained.4 Objections of this kind suggest that, if we 
want to apply the implication solution to the new climbing trip puzzle, then we 
should appeal to a weaker principle that (KKK). One natural way of weakening 
(KKK) is to rewrite it as follows: 
It is common knowledge that, if one knows that p, then one is 
in a position to know that one knows that p. 
If the notion of being in a position to know is understood in an appropriate way, then 
this new principle will be invulnerable to the objections that are usually levelled 
against principles like (KKK). One appropriate way of understanding it is as a 
counterfactual notion, on which S is in a position to know that p ifT something like 
the following counterfactual is true: 
4For a statement of these and other problems for (KKK) see Sorensen 1988:242. 
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(CF) IfS had the concept of knowledge, and S was to reflect about whether 
p, then S would come to know that p. 
If we understand it in this way, then we can reasonably endorse the following 
principle: 
(PKK) It is common knowledge that, if S is in a position to know that p, then 
S does not know that S does not know whether p. 
And, if we conjoin this principle with (AK), (AI) and (KKPK), then we can generate 
another solution to the new climbing trip puzzle. 
To see this, note first of all that, when (KKPK) is conjoined with (AK) and (AI), it 
entails the following principle about assertion: 
(AKKP) When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he is in a 
position to know that he knows that p. 
Next: note that, when this principle is conjoined with (AI) and (PKK), it entails 
another principle about assertion: 
(AKKK) When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he does not 
know that (he does not know whether he knows that p). 
Finally: note (i) that, if (AKKK) is true, then when B asserts that it is going to snow, 
he implies that he does not know that (he does not know whether he knows that it is 
going to snow), and (ii) that, if (AK) is true, then when B asserts that he does not 
know whether he knows that it is going to snow, he implies that he does know that 
(he does not know whether he knows that it is going to snow). By noting this, we 
can see that, if (AKKK) and (AK) are both true, then they will explain why B's 
second assertion seems to contradict his first. And once we have seen this, it is 
natural to think that the best way of applying the implication solution to the new 
climbing trip puzzle is to endorse (KKPK)' 
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3.5 The other puzzles 
If the best way of applying the implication solution to the new climbing trip puzzle 
is to endorse (KKPK), then we have reason to believe (KKPK)' In this section, I will 
argue that we have similar reason to believe the conjunction of (KKPK) and (CPK). I 
will argue for this by focusing on the other two puzzles that we outlined in section 
3.3. In what follows, I will argue that (KKPK) and (CPK) jointly provide us with an 
attractive way of applying the implication solution to these puzzles. 
In the last section, we saw that, when (KKPK) is conjoined with (AK) and (AI), it 
entails the following principle about assertion: 
(AKKP) When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he is in a 
position to know that he knows that p. 
In what follows, I will argue that, by conjoining this principle about assertion with 
(CPK), and with some other plausible principles, we can generate an attractive 
solution to the puzzles that we outlined in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
The first step in my argument is to draw out some consequences of (CPK). 
According to (CPK), it is common knowledge that, if one is in a position to know 
that p, and one is in a position to know that if p then q, then one is in a position to 
know that q. If this really is common knowledge, then we have reason to accept the 
following principles: 
It is common knowledge that, if one is in a position to know 
that one knows that p, then one is in a position to know that 
one thinks that p. 
It is common knowledge that, if one is in a position to know 
that one knows that p, then one is in a position to know that 
one is certain that p. 
For, as we saw earlier, the following principles are both very plausible: 
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It is common knowledge that, if one knows that p, then one 
thinks that p. 
It is common knowledge that, if one knows that p, then one is 
certain that p. 
And, if these principles and (CPK) are all true, then it is natural to think that (KKT K) 
and (KKCK) are also true. 
When (KKT K) and (KKCK) are conjoined with (AKKP) and (AI), they entail the 
following principles about assertion: 
(AKTP) 
(AKCP) 
When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he is in a 
position to know that he thinks that p. 
When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he is in a 
position to know that he is certain that p. 
And, when these principles are conjoined with (AI) and with the following principle 
(which we defended earlier): 
It is common knowledge that, if S is in a position to know that 
p, then S does not know that he does not know whether p. 
they entail these two principles, which can be used to solve the puzzles that were 
outlined in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3: 
(AKTK) 
(AKCK) 
When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he does not 
know that (he does not know whether he thinks that p). 
When a subject, S, asserts that p, S implies that he does not 
know that (he does not know whether he is certain that p). 
To see that these principles can be used for this purpose, we need only recap on the 
details ofthe two puzzles. In the puzzle of section 3.3.2, B asserts first of all, that C's 
party has been cancelled, and then, that he does not know whether he thinks that C's 
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party has been cancelled If (AKTK) is true, then, by making his first assertion, B 
implies that he does not know that (he does not know whether he thinks that C's 
party has been cancel1ed)~ and, if (AK) is true, then, by making his second assertion, 
B implies that he does know that (he does not know whether he thinks that C's party 
has been cancelled); so, if (AKTK) and (AK) are both true, then it is not surprising 
that B's second assertion seems to contradict his first. 
In the puzzle of section 3.3.3, B asserts first of all, that the tank isfull, and then, that 
he does not know whether he is certain that the tank is full. If (AKCK) is true, then, 
by making his first assertion, B implies that he does not know that (he does not 
know whether he is certain that the tank is fll)~ and, if (AK) is true, then, by making 
his second assertion, B implies that he does know that (he does not know whether he 
is certain that the tank is fl1)~ so, if (AKCK) and (AK) are both true, then it is again 
unsurprising that B's second assertion seems to contradict his first. 
The upshot of the last two sections is that (KKPK) and (CPK) jointly provide us with 
an attractive way of applying the implication solution to the puzzles that were 
outlined in section 3.3. If the arguments of these sections succeed, then they give us 
a reason to believe (KKPK) and (CPK). Some may claim that this reason is 
outweighed by certain objections to (KKPK) and (CPK). In the next two sections, I 
will attack this claim, by attacking what I take to be the best objections to (KKPK) 
and (CPK). 
4. An objection to (CPK) 
In this section, I will outline and evaluate what I take to be the best objection to the 
following principle: 
(CPK) We all know that, if a subject, S, is in a position to know that p, and S 
is also in a position to know that (if p, then q), then S is in a position 
to know that q. 
The objection that I will discuss is closely based on an objection to the closure 
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principle that Fred Dretske gives in his paper 'Epistemic Operators,.5 One good way 
of stating this objection is to appeal to an example that Dretske describes in this 
paper.6 In section 4.1, I will use this example to state the objection, and in section 
4.2, I will argue that the objection fails. 
4.1 A Dretskean objection 
During a visit to my local zoo, I stop outside the zebra enclosure. Inside the 
enclosure are several zebras, and a sign which says that these animals are zebras. Do 
I know that the animals in the enclosure are zebras? If circumstances are normal, 
then it seems clear that I do. 
Now consider the (admittedly bizarre) claim that the animals in the zebra enclosure 
are mules that have been cleverly disguised to look like zebras (henceforth: cleverly 
disguised mules). It seems clear that this claim is very implausible, and that I know 
it to be very implausible. But, in spite of this, it does not seem right to say that I 
know this claim to be false. To know that this claim was false, I would have to 
investigate whether the animals in the zebra enclosure have been disguised; and, if 
circumstances are normal, then I will not have conducted any investigation of this 
kind. Consequently, it is natural to say that, if circumstances are normal, then I do 
not know - and am not in a position to know - that the animals in the enclosure are 
not cleverly disguised mules. But, if this is so, then (CPK) is surely false - for, as we 
have already seen, I do seem to know that the animals in the enclosure are zebras, 
and also seem to be in a position to know that, if they are zebras, then they are not 
cleverly disguised mules. 
4.2 A response to this objection 
The objection of section 4.1 trades on the fact that, in the Dretskean example that we 
have just described, each of the following claims is plausible: 
(DJ) I know that the animals in the zebra enclosure are zebras. 
, Dretske 1970. 
6 Dretske 1970: 10 15-6. 
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(D2) I am in a position to know that, if the animals in the zebra enclosure 
are zebras, then they are not cleverly disguised mules. 
(D3) I do not know, and am not in a position to know that the animals in 
the zebra enclosure are not cleverly disguised mules. 
If these three claims are all true, then (CPK) is false. The objection of section 4.1 
makes each claim seem true, and so makes it seem likely that (CPK) is false. 
However: the objection loses some of its force when we focus on the following 
claim, which is generated by conjoining (D I ) and (03): 
(D I&3) I know that the animals in the enclosure are zebras, but I do not 
know, and am not in a position to know that they are not cleverly 
disguised mules. 
Although advocates of section 4.1 's objection make (D)) and (D3) both seem 
plausible, they do not make (D I &3) seem plausible. When we reflect on whether 
(01&3) is true in the example of section 4.1, our inclination is to say that it is not. 
Advocates of section 4.1 's objection are committed to saying that (D I &3) is true in 
this example; so, the implausibility of this claim presents such advocates with a 
problem. In what follows, I will develop this problem into a rebuttal of section 4.1 's 
objection. I will do so by arguing that the best way of explaining the difference in 
plausibility between the individual claims (01) and (03) and the conjunctive claim 
(0)&3) is to endorse a form of epistemic contextual ism. 
According to epistemic contextualists, the truth-conditions of our knowledge 
attributions vary with the context in which those attributions are made. By endorsing 
a certain form of epistemic contextual ism, we can explain why (D I) and (D3) are 
plausible when considered individually, but implausible when considered in 
conjunction. The contextualist theory that I have in mind is a theory that is due to 
Keith DeRose.7 The core claim of this theory is that the truth-conditions of our 
knowledge attributions are governed by the following rule of sensitivity (where S's 
belief that p is said to be sensitive iff S would not have believed that p, if it had not 
7 This theory is defended in DeRose 1995. 
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been the case that p): 
(ROS) When it is asserted that some subject, S, knows (or doesn't know) 
some proposition, P, the standards for knowledge tend to be raised in 
such a way as to require S's belief in that particular P to be sensitive 
for it to count as knowledge.8 
By appealing to (ROS), we can construct an explanation of why (0 1) and (03) seem 
true individually, but false in conjunction. According to this explanation - which we 
will call the con textualist explanation - (01) and (03) seem true individually because 
each is evaluated under different standards for knowledge. More exactly: the 
contextualist explanation says (a) that, when (01) is asserted, at the start of section 
4.1, the standards for knowledge are such as to make (01) true, and (D3) false, and 
(b) that, when (D3) is asserted, at the end of section 4.1, the standards for knowledge 
are raised in such a way as to make (01) false, and (D3) true. 
To see that (ROS) supports the contextualist explanation, we need to focus on the 
following pair of counterfactuals: 
(Cz) If the animals in the enclosure had not been zebras, then I would not 
have believed that they were zebras. 
(Cm) If the animals in the enclosure had been cleverly disguised mules, 
then I would not have believed that they were not cleverly disguised 
mules. 
It seems clear that, in the situation described in section 4.1, (Cz) is true, and (Cm) 
false. Consequently, it seems clear that, in this situation, I sensitively believe that the 
animals in the enclosure are zebras, but do not sensitively believe that they are not 
cleverly disguised mules. Because of this, (ROS) entails that, when (D3) is asserted, 
at the end of section 4.1, the standards for knowledge are raised in such a way as to 
make (D3) true. If the standards for knowledge are raised in this way, then it is 
natural to suppose that the contextualist explanation is correct. 
8 er DeRose 1995:36. 
127 
If the contextualist explanation is correct, then the objection of section 4.1 fails. But, 
it is not yet clear that the contextualist explanation is correct. In the remainder of this 
section, I will give three reasons for believing this explanation. Once these reasons 
have been outlined, it should be clear that the objection of section 4.1 fails. 
If the contextualist explanation is correct, then (D l ) should cease to seem plausible, 
after (D3) has been asserted. On reflection, it seems clear that (D l ) does cease to 
seem plausible, after this assertion has been made. Once it has been asserted that I 
do not know that the animals in the =ebra enclosure are not cleverly painted mules, 
it no longer seems right to say that I do know that these animals are not zebras. The 
fact that this no longer seems right is a reason to endorse the contextualist 
explanation. 
Another reason for endorsing the contextualist explanation is that (ROS), which 
supports this explanation, is independently plausible. In his 1995, DeRose shows 
that, by appealing to (ROS), we can generate attractive solutions to a range of 
sceptical paradoes~ and, in his 1996, he shows that this rule can also help us to 
understand certain puzzling intuitions about lotteries. The explanatory utility of 
(ROS) gives us reason to believe that (ROS) is true. By doing this, it gives us reason 
to endorse the contextualist explanation, which is supported by (ROS). 
A third reason for endorsing the contextualist explanation is generated by the 
arguments for epistemic contextual ism that we gave in section 4.3 of chapter two. If 
these arguments succeed, then they provide further support for (ROS). For, if they 
succeed, then they show that the following contextualist claim is true: 
(CCK) When it is asserted (or implied) that an instance of (B) is true and that 
the corresponding instance of (K) is true, the standards for knowledge 
tend to be raised in such a way as to ensure that, if those instances of 
(B) and (K) are true then the corresponding instance of (C) is true.9 
9 Here, (B), (K) and (C) refer to the following schematic sentences: 
(B) (S believes that p) because q. 
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And, if this claim is true, then it is very likely that (ROS) is also true - for, 
corresponding instances of (B) and (K) tend to be true when, and only when, the 
relevant instance of(8) refers to a belief that is sensitive. 
5. An objection to (KKPK) 
The last section rebutted the best objection to (CPK). This section will rebut the best 
objection to the following claim: 
We all know that, if a subject, S, knows that p, then S is in a 
position to know that S knows that p. 
The objection that I will discuss is closely based on an objection to the KK principle 
that Timothy Williamson gives in his paper 'Inexact Knowledge'. 10 One good way of 
stating this objection is to appeal to an example that Williamson describes in this 
paper.ll In sections 5.1 and 5.2, I will describe this example, and will explain how it 
threatens (KKPK)' Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will then argue that this objection fails. 
5.1 The distant tree 
As I look out of my window, I can see a distant tree. Wondering how tall it is, I try 
to judge the height of the tree. I am not able to judge its height to the nearest inch; 
so, although the tree is 600 inches tall, I do not come to know that it is 600 inches 
tall. However: I do seem to learn some things about the height of the tree. One thing 
that I seem to learn is that the tree is not 60 inches tall. Another is that it is not 6000 
inches tall. And, a third is that its height is somewhere between 60 and 6000 inches. 
As I am in a philosophical mood, I start to reflect about my knowledge of the tree. 
My reflections can be set down in the following way: 
(K) S knows that p. 
(C) Ifit was not the case that p, then it would not be the case that q. 
10 WilIiamson 1992. 
11 WilIiamson 1992: 21 7-9. 
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My eyesight and my ability to judge heights are limited. Consequently, there are certain 
things that I cannot come to know about the height of the tree by just looking at it from my 
window. If the tree is m inches tall, then I cannot come to know, by just looking at it from 
my window, that it is m inches tall. And, if the tree is m+ I inches tall, or m-I inches tall, 
then I cannot come to know, by just looking at it from my window, that it is not m inches 
tall. Everything that I now know about the height of the tree is something that I have come to 
know by just looking at the tree from my window. So, if the tree is m inches tall, then I do 
not know that it is m inches tall; and, if it is m+ 1 inches tall, or m-I inches tall, then I do not 
know that it is not m inches tall. 
As a result of these reflections, I come to believe that the following principle is true: 
(M) For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ 1 inches tall, then I do not 
know that it is not m inches tall. 
I then start to make some inferences. The first thing that I do is to deduce, from (M), 
that the following principle is true: 
(M') For any natural number m: if I know that the tree is not m inches tall, 
then it is not m+ 1 inches tall. 
I then deduce, from (M'), that the following conditional is true: 
(~o) If I know that the tree is not 60 inches tall, then the tree is not 61 
inches talL 
After this, I deduce, from (M'), that this conditional is true: 
(~l) If I know that the tree is not 61 inches tall, then the tree is not 62 
inches tall. 
and that this conditional is true: 
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(K<;2) If I know that the tree is not 62 inches tall, then the tree is not 63 
inches tall. 
and so on, until I have deduced that the following conditional is true: 
(KS99) If I know that the tree is not 599 inches tall, then the tree is not 600 
inches tall. 
I then reflect upon whether the antecedent of (K60) is true. After concluding that it is 
true, I deduce, from this conclusion, and from (K<;o), that the consequent of (K60) is 
also true. Having deduced this, I then ask myself whether the antecedent of (K<;I) is 
true. After concluding that it is true, I deduce, from this conclusion, and from (KC,I), 
that the consequent of (K<;I) is also true, and then go on to consider the antecedent of 
(K<;2). After repeating this process many times, I finally come to reflect upon whether 
the antecedent of (KS99) is true. I conclude that it is true, and then deduce that the 
consequent of (KS99) is also true - i.e. that the tree is not 600 inches tall. It seems 
clear that, by deducing this, I cannot come to know that the tree is not 600 inches tall 
- for, as we stipulated at the start of this subsection, the tree is 600 inches tall. 
However, it can be argued that, if (KKPK) is true, then, by deducing that the 
consequent of (KS99) is true, I do come to know that the tree is not 600 inches tall. In 
section 5.2, I will outline an argument for this claim. 12 If this argument succeeds, 
then it shows that (KKPK) is not true. In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I will show that the 
argument does not succeed. 
5.2 The argument 
In the example of the distant tree, some reflections on the limitations of my eyesight, 
and my height-judging abilities, lead me to believe that the following principle is 
true: 
(M) For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ 1 inches tall, then I do not 
know that it is not m inches tall. 
12 This argument is derived from the argument in sec 5.1 ofWilliamson 2000. 
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It seems clear that, as a result of these reflections, I come to know that principle (M) 
is true. It also seems clear that, ifl come to know this principle, then I come to know 
every proposition that I properly deduce from this principle. In the example of the 
distant tree, I properly deduce, from (M), every instance of the following conditional 
in which 'm' is replaced by a numeral between '60' and '599' : 
(Km) If I know that the tree is not m inches tall, then the tree is not m+ 1 
inches tall. 
Consequently, we can conclude that, in the example of the distant tree, I come to 
know every instance of (Km) in which 'm' is replaced by a numeral in this range. 
One instance of (Km) that I come to know, in the example of the distant tree, is the 
following: 
(~o) If I know that the tree is not 60 inches tall, then the tree is not 61 
inches tall. 
After I have come to know (~o), I reflect upon whether its antecedent is true, and 
conclude that it is true. Do I thereby come to know that the antecedent of (~o) is 
true? If (KKPK) is true, then I do. For, it seems clear that, in the example of the 
distant tree, the antecedent of (~o) is true. And, (KKPK) entails that, if the 
antecedent of (~) is true, and I reflect upon whether it is true, then I will thereby 
come to know that it is true. 
After I have concluded that the antecedent of (~o) is true, I deduce from this, and 
from (~o), that the consequent of (~o) is true. If (KKPK) is true, then, by doing this, 
I properly deduce, from propositions that I know, that the consequent of (~o) is true. 
Proper deduction of this kind seems to preserve knowledge; so, if (KKPK) is true, 
then, by making this deduction, I come to know that the consequent of (~o) is true. 
Once I have deduced that the consequent of (~o) is true, I reflect upon whether the 
antecedent of the following claim is true, and conclude that it is true: 
132 
(~1) If I know that the tree is not 61 inches tall, then the tree is not 62 
inches tall. 
Do I thereby come to know that the antecedent of (~1) is true? If (KKPK) is true 
then I do. For, if (KKPK) is true, then, by deducing that the consequent of (K60) is 
true, I have come to know that the consequent of (~) is true, and have thus made 
the antecedent of (~1) true. (KKPK) entails that, if the antecedent of (~1) is true, 
and I reflect upon whether it is true, then I will thereby come to know that it is true. 
So, if (KKPK) is true, then, by reflecting on whether the antecedent of (K61 ) is true, I 
come to know that the antecedent of (~1) is true. 
After I have concluded that the antecedent of (~1) is true, I deduce, from this and 
from (~1), that the consequent of (~l) is true. I then reflect upon whether the 
antecedent of (~2) is true, and, after concluding that it is true, deduce that the 
consequent of (~2) is also true. After repeating this process many times, I am finally 
led to deduce that the consequent of (K599) is true - i.e. that the tree is not 600 inches 
tall. If (KKPK) is true, then, by deducing this, I come to know that the tree is not 600 
inches tall. But, it seems clear that, by deducing this, I do not come to know that the 
tree is not 600 inches tall~ and, consequently, we can conclude that (KKPK) is not 
true. 
5.3 Evaluating the argument 
The argument of section 5.2 seems to have four premises. The first premise is that, in 
the case of the distant tree, I come to know that the following principle is true: 
(M) For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ 1 inches tall, then I do not 
know that it is not m inches tall. 
The second premise is that, in the case of the distant tree, I come to know everything 
that I deduce, properly, from propositions that I know. The third premise is that, in 
the case of the distant tree, I know that the tree is not 60 inches tall. And, the fourth 
premise is that, in the case of the distant tree, I do not come to know that the tree is 
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not 600 inches tall. 
It seems clear that, if these premises are all true, then the argument of section 5.2 
succeeds. Consequently, we can evaluate the argument by evaluating each of these 
premises. The fourth premise of the argument is very hard to deny; for, it seems clear 
(a) that, in the case of the distant tree, the tree is 600 inches tall, and (b) that the case 
ofthe distant tree is a possible case - and hence, not a case in which the tree both is, 
and is not 600 inches tall. The third premise is also hard to deny; for, it seems clear 
that, if the tree is 600 inches tall, then I will learn, by looking at the tree, that it is not 
60 inches tall. Some may try to attack the second premise by appealing to Dretskean 
objections to deductive closure; but, as we have already seen, there is good reason to 
think that such objections fail. So, the only premise of the argument that we seem to 
have a chance of rebutting is the first premise, which says that, in the case of the 
distant tree, I come to know that the following principle is true: 
(M) For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ 1 inches tall, then I do not 
know that it is not m inches tall. 
One good way of attacking this premise is to ask why it is that I come to believe CM), 
in the case of the distant tree. It is natural to say that, in the case of the distant tree, I 
come to believe (M) because I recognise that (M) is entailed by the following pair of 
principles: 
(M l ) For any natural number m: if the tree is m+l inches tall, then I cannot 
come to know, by just looking at the tree, that the tree is not m inches 
tall. 
(M2) Everything that I know about the height of the tree is something that I 
have come to know by just looking at the tree. 
But, it is not clear why I believe these principles, in the case of the distant tree. In 
particular: it is not clear why I believe (Ml), in this case. In the remainder of this 
subsection, I will argue that, in the case of the distant tree, I believe (M l ) because I 
believe the following principle: 
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(Ml*) For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ 1 inches tall, and I come to 
believe, by just looking at the tree, that the tree is not m inches tall, 
then my belief that the tree is not m inches tall is based on insensitive 
evidence. 
Section 5.4 will then argue that, if my belief in (M,) is explained by a belief in 
(M, *), then the argument of section 5.2 fails. 
Before we can argue that my belief in (M,) is explained by a belief in (M,*), we 
need to explain what it is for a belief to be based on insensitive eVidence. One good 
way of clarifying the meaning of this phrase is to focus on the following schematic 
sentences: 
(Bt) I believe that the tree is not m inches tall because q. 
(Ct) If it had not been the case that the tree is not m inches tall, then it 
would not have been the case that q. 
When I say that my belief that the tree is not m inches tall is based on insensitive 
evidence, what I mean is that an instance of (BJ is true, and the corre.'ponding 
instance of (CJ is false. Once this is clarified, it becomes fairly clear that, in the 
example of the distant tree, (Ml *) is true. To see this, note first of all that, if! come 
to believe, by just looking at the tree, that the tree is not m inches tall, then 
something like the following instance of (B t) will be true: 
(Btl) I believe that the tree is not m inches tall because it looks to me as if 
the tree is not m inches tall. 
Next, note that, if, in the example of the distant tree, it looks to me as if the tree is 
not m inches tall when the tree is in fact m+ 1 inches tall, then the following claim 
will surely be true: 
(-etl) If the tree had been m inches tall, then it might still have looked to me 
as if the tree was not m inches tall. 
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If (-et!) is true, then the instance of (Ct ) which corresponds to (Btl) will be false. 
Because of this, it is plausible to suppose that, in the example of the distant tree, 
CMI *) is true. 
Although it is plausible to suppose that, in the example of the distant tree, (M 1*) is 
true, it is not yet clear that, in the example of the distant tree, my belief in CM1) is 
explained by my belief in CMI *). In what follows, I will try to make this clear. I will 
do so in two stages. First of all, I will use a psychological generalisation that I 
defended in chapter two to argue that, ifCMI*) seems true, then (MI) will also seem 
true. Then, I will argue that alterations to the distant tree case which make (M1) seem 
false also make CMI *) seem false. 
In chapter two, I defended a psychological generalisation about knowledge. If we 
appeal to the following schematic sentences: 
(B) (S believes that p) because q. 
(C) If it was not the case that p, then it would not be the case that q. 
CK) S knows that p. 
then we can state this generalisation in the following way: 
(BCKj) When we judge that an instance of (B) is true, and that the 
corresponding instance of (C) is untrue, we tend also to judge that the 
corresponding instance of (K) is untrue. 
If this generalisation is true, and (MI*) seems true, then (MI) will also seem true. To 
see this, note first of all that CMI*) can be restated in the following way (where '(BS 
and '(CS are defined as before): 
(MI*') For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ I inches tall, and I come to 
believe, by just looking at the tree, that the tree is not m inches tall, 
then an instance of (Bt) is true, and the corresponding instance of (Ct ) 
is untrue. 
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Next, note that, if (BCKj) is true, and the consequent of (MI*') seems true, then the 
following claim will seem untrue: 
(Kt) I know that the tree is not m inches tall. 
From this, it follows that, if (BCKj) is true, and (M I *) seems true, then the following 
claim will also seem true: 
(MI') For any natural number m: if the tree is m+ 1 inches tall, and I come to 
believe, by just looking at the tree, that the tree is not m inches tall, 
then I do not know that the tree is not m inches tall. 
If (MI') seems true, then (MI) will also seem tre~ so, by appealing to chapter one's 
arguments for (BCKj), we can argue that, if (MI *) seems true, then (MI) will also 
seem true. 
The above considerations show that, in the case of the distant tree, my belief in (MI) 
could be explained by a belief in (MI*). But, they do not show that, in this case, my 
belief in (MI) is in fact explained in this way. To argue for this stronger conclusion, 
we need to modify the case of the distant tree. One good way of modifying it is to 
imagine that, in this case, I am able visually to judge the height of distant trees to the 
nearest inch. When the case is modified in this way, we cease to be inclined to say 
that, in this case, (MI) is true. Interestingly, though, we also cease to be inclined to 
say that, in this case, (MI*) is true. To see this, recall that the plausibility of(M\*) is 
due to the fact that, in the example of the distant tree, the antecedent of (MI*)'s 
conditional seems to imply both of the following claims: 
(Btl) I believe that the tree is not m inches tall because it looks to me as if 
the tree is not m inches tall. 
(-Ctl) If it had not been the case that the tree is not m inches tall (i.e. if the 
tree had been m inches tall), then it might still have been the case that 
it looks to me as if the tree is not m inches tall (i.e. it might still have 
looked to me as if the tree was not m inches tall). 
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When the case of the distant tree is altered in the way that we just described, it no 
longer seems right to say that the antecedent of (MI*)'s conditional implies both of 
these claims. For, when the case is altered in this way, it no longer seems right to say 
that, if it looks to me as if the tree is not m inches tall when the tree is in fact m+ 1 
inches tall, then (--et!) is true. 
The above considerations give us reason to believe that, in the example of the distant 
tree, my belief in (M1) is infact explained by my belief in (MI*). In the next section, 
I will argue that, if my belief in (M1) is explained in this way, then the argument of 
section 5.2 fails. 
5.4 Con textualism and knowledge of (MJ 
Suppose that, in the example of the distant tree, my belief in (M I) is explained by 
my belief in (MI *). From this supposition, it clearly follows that, in the example of 
the distant tree, my belief in (M1) constitutes knowledge only if (M1) is implied by 
(MI*)' Is (M1) implied by (MI*)? That depends on whether the following claim is 
true (where '(BS, '(CS and '(KS are used in the same way as before) : 
(BCKt) If an instance of (Bt) is true, and the corresponding instance of (Ct) is 
not true, then the corresponding instance of (Kt) is not true. 
In section 4.3 of chapter two, we discussed whether claims like (BCKt) are true. The 
upshot of that section was that, although such claims are not invariably true, the 
standards for knowledge can be raised in such a way as to make them true. 
Consequently, we should now conclude that, although (M 1·) does not invariably 
imply (MI), the standards for knowledge can sometimes be raised in such a way as to 
make (MI*) imply (M}). And, this should lead us to conclude that, although the 
following claim is not invariably true, the standards for knowledge can sometimes be 
raised in such a way as to make it true: 
(MK) In the example of the distant tree, my belief in (M1) constitutes 
knowledge. 
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The first premise of the argument of section 5.2 says that, in the example of the 
distant tree, my belief in principle (M) constitutes knowledge. In the example of the 
distant tree, I believe (M) because I believe (Ml)~ so, it seems clear that, if (MK) is 
not true, then the first premise of the argument of section 5.2 also is not true. We 
have just argued that (MK) is not invariably true; so, we can now conclude that the 
first premise of the argument of section 5.2 also is not invariably true. However: we 
have also argued that the standards for knowledge can sometimes be raised in such a 
way as to make (MK) true. So, we should conclude that the same may be true with 
respect to the first premise of the argument in section 5.2. 
The above remarks show that the first premise of the argument of section 5.2 is true 
only in contexts in which the standards for knowledge have been raised. By doing so, 
they provide advocates of (KKPd with a way of responding to the argument of 
section 5.2. To state this response, we need to focus on the third premise of this 
argument, which says that, in the example of the distant tree, I know that the tree is 
not 60 inches tall. The gist of the response is that there may be no context in which 
the first premise and the third premise of section 5.2's argument are both true. 
Advocates of this response do not need to show that there is no context in which the 
first and third premises of section 5.2's argument are both true. All that they need to 
do is to point out that there may be no context of this kind. If there is no context of 
this kind, then the argument of section 5.2 fails. So, by pointing out that there may be 
no such context, they present advocates of this argument with a serious challenge. 
In order to respond to this challenge, advocates of section 5.2's argument must show 
that there is some context in which the first and third premises of this argument are 
both true. It is not easy to see how they could accomplish this goal. Of course, it may 
turn out that the goal can be accomplished. But, until there is some positive reason 
for thinking that this is so, it seems fair to conclude that the argument of section 5.2 
fails. 
5.5 Summary 
The aim of this section, and of the previous two, has been to defend the following 
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pair of claims: 
We all know that, if a subject, S, knows that p, then S is in a 
position to know that S knows that p. 
We all know that, if a subject, S, is in a position to know that 
p, and S is also in a position to know that (ifp, then q), then S 
is in a position to know that q. 
In section 3, we gave an argument for this pair of claims, and in this section, and the 
last section, we showed that the force of this argument is not diminished by the best 
objections to these claims. 
In section 2, we argued that, by defending (KKPK) and (CPK), we can also defend a 
certain explanation, which we called the extended LOK explanation. If the arguments 
of sections 2-5 all succeed, then they give us good reason to endorse the extended 
LOK explanation. In section 6, we will use the extended LOK explanation to 
generate a problem for the second anti-sceptical objection (which we are calling 
AS02). The gist of this problem is that the second stage of AS02 fails. 
6. The extended LOK explanation and AS02 
Before we can show that the extended LOK explanation generates a problem for 
AS02, we must trace out some of the consequences of this explanation. In sections 
6.1 and 6.2, we will argue that, if the extended LOK explanation is correct, then we 
are all in a position to know the following doctrine: 
(EEP) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S is not in a position to know that his belief in 
P is explained by establishing evidence, then S's belief in P does not 
constitute knowledge. 
Section 6.3 will argue that this doctrine is a form of evidential ism, and section 6.4 
will argue that, by appealing to this form of evidential ism, we can generate a 
problem for AS02. 
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6.1 Generalising the extended LOK explanation 
If the extended LOK explanation is correct, then another, more general explanation 
is also correct. To see this, recall the case of the film director, on which the extended 
LOK explanation is focused. The case of the film director conforms to the following 
pattern (which we will call the beta pattern): 
(i) First, person A tells person B that p. 
(ii) Then, B asks A why he believes that p. 
(iii) A responds by saying, sincerely, that he does not know why he 
believes that p. 
(iv) B then points out (a) that, for all A knows, he believes that p because 
q, and (b) that the fact that q does not show, or establish that p. 
In virtually every case that conforms to this pattern, B's questions and comments 
seem to give A a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that p. 
Why is it that, in virtually every beta-pattern case, 8's questions and comments 
undermine A's active belief that p? If the extended LOK explanation is correct, then 
we should surely explain this fact in the following way: 
In virtually every beta-pattern case, B's questions and comments make A aware of the fact 
that he is not in a position to know that the following claims are not both true with respect to 
him: 
(Bp) (I believe that p) because q. 
(~Ep) The fact that q does not establish that p. 
And, in virtually every case of this kind, A is already aware of the fact that, if he is not in a 
position to know that (Bp) and (~Ep) are not both true with respect to him, then the following 
claim is true with respect to him: 
(~Kp) I do not know that p. 
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So, in virtually every beta-pattern case, B makes A aware of the fact that he does not know 
that p. Because of this, virtually every beta-pattern case is a case in which B gives A a 
conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing that p. 
In what follows, we will refer to this as the generalised extended LOK explanation-
or, for short, as the g-extended LOK explanation. The arguments of sections 1-5 
make it clear that this explanation is one that we ought to endorse. In section 6.2, I 
will use the g-extended LOK explanation to argue that we are all in a position to 
know the following doctrine: 
(EEP) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S is not in a position to know that his belief in 
P is explained by establishing evidence, then S's belief in P does not 
constitute knowledge. 
Section 6.3 will argue that this doctrine is a form of evidential ism, and section 6.4 
will argue that, by appealing to this form of evidentialism, we can generate a 
problem for AS02. 
6.2 (EEP) and the g-extended LOK explanation 
If the g-extended LOK explanation is true, then the following claim about beta-
pattern cases is also true: 
(BPC) In virtually every beta-pattern case, A is aware of the fact that, 
if he is not in a position to know that (Bp) and (-'Ep) are not 
both true with respect to him, then (-'Kp) is true with respect to 
him. 
The fact about beta-pattern cases itself stands in need of explanation. For, there are 
many different kinds of beta-pattern case, involving subjects with very different 
kinds of background knowledge. How is it that, in virtually all of these cases, person 
A is aware of the truth of the conditional to which (BPC) refers? 
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One natural way of explaining this fact is to endorse the following claim: 
In virtually every beta-pattern case, it is a conceptual trufh 
that, if A is not in a position to know that (Bp) and (--'Ep) are 
not both true with respect to him, then (--'Kp) is true with 
respect to him. 
It is hard to see how one could explain the truth of (BPC) without endorsing 
something like this claim. Because of this, we have good reason to believe (BPC2). 
But, the truth of (BPC2) is itself something that stands in need of explanation. 
The most natural way of explaining the truth of this claim is to say that there is a 
broad conceptual truth that entails all of the conceptual truths to which (BPC2) refers. 
One simple claim which entails all of the conceptual truths to which (BPC2) refers is 
the following (where S's belief that p is explained by establishing evidence iff there 
is some q such that (i) (S believes that p) because q, and (ii) the fact that q 
establishes that p): 
(E) For any subject, S, and proposition P: if S believes P, and S is not in a 
position to know that his belief in P is explained by establishing 
evidence, then S does not know P. 
There are a few propositions for which (E) may not hold. These propositions are all 
simple necessary truths, like the proposition that everything is self-identical, and the 
proposition that 2 + 2 = 4. Although it is clear that we know these propositions, it is 
by no means clear that we believe them in the way that (E) requires. Because of this, 
it seems best to explain the truth of (BPC2) by appealing to the following qualified 
version of (E): 
(EEP) With few exceptions: every proposition P, is such that, for any 
subject, S: if S believes P, and S is not in a position to know that his 
belief in P is explained by establishing evidence, then S does not 
knowP. 
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It is hard to see how we could explain the truth of (BPC2) without saying that (EEP) is 
a conceptual truth. Because of this, we have good reason to believe that (EEP) is a 
conceptual truth. But, if (EEP) is a conceptual truth, then, surely, we are all in a 
position to know (EEP). In the next subsection, I will argue that (EEP) is a form of 
evidential ism, and in section 6.4, I will use this form of evidential ism to generate a 
problem for AS02. 
6.3 From (EJ 10 (EEP) 
A doctrine, D, is a form of evidentialism iff D is either identical to the following 
doctrine, or can be generated by making an admissible amendment to this doctrine: 
(El) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
S's belief in P is epistemically irrational. 
In what follows, we will show that there is an admissible amendment to (El) which 
generates (EEP). By showing this, we will show that (EEP) is a form of evidential ism. 
One way of amending (El) is to amend the doxastic defect to which it refers. 
Amendments of this kind are admissible iff the defect to which they appeal is 
suitable - where a doxastic defect is said to be suitable iff it satisfies the following 
constraint: 
(SDD) For any subject, S, and proposition P: ifS believes P, and S's belief in 
P has defect D, then the fact that S's belief has this defect is a 
conclusive epistemic reason for S to abandon her belief in P. 
The arguments of section 5 of chapter two show that the defect of nol const it ut ing 
knowledge satisfies (SDD). By showing this, they show that the following doctrine is 
a form of evidential ism: 
(E2) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S does not have enough evidence for P, then 
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S's belief in P does not constitute knowledge. 
Another way of amending (El) is to amend the evidential requirement that it imposes 
on our beliefs. One admissible amendment of this kind is the amendment which 
generates the following doctrine: 
(El') With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S is not in a position to know that his belief in 
P is based on sufficient evidence, then S's belief in P is epistemically 
irrational. 
Any amendment to (El) which can be brought about by making a senes of 
admissible amendments to this doctrine is itself admissible. So, by combining the 
amendment which generates (E2) with the amendment that generates (EI'), we can 
generate the following form of evidential ism: 
(E3) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S is not in a position to know that his belief in 
P is based on sufficient evidence, then S's belief in P does not 
constitute knowledge. 
A third admissible way of amending (El) is to replace its constituent terms with 
terms that can reasonably be believed to be their synonyms. Any amendment to (El) 
which can be brought about by making a series of admissible amendments to this 
doctrine is itself admissible; so, any amendment to (El) which can be brought about 
by first of all replacing (El) with (El')' and then replacing terms in (El') with terms 
that can reasonably be believed to be their synonyms, is an admissible amendment to 
(El). It is reasonable to believe that the following schematic sentence: 
(BE) S's belief in P is based on sufficient evidence. 
is synonymous with this sentence: 
(EEE) S's belief in P is explained by establishing evidence. 
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Because it is reasonable to believe this, it is possible to generate the following 
doctrine by making an admissible amendment to (El): 
(EEP) With few exceptions: every proposition P is such that, for any subject 
S: if S believes P, and S is not in a position to know that his belief in 
P is explained by establishing evidence, then S's belief in P does not 
constitute knowledge. 
Consequently, we can infer that (EEP) is a form of evidentialism. In what follows, we 
will refer to it as epistemic evidentialism. 
6.4 Epistemic evidentialism and the second anti-sceptical objection 
In the last two subsections, we have shown that we are all in a position to know a 
certain form of evidentialism, which we are calling epistemic eVidentialism. In this 
section, we will use the results of these subsections to generate a problem for the 
second anti-sceptical objection. The problem that we will generate is a problem for 
the second stage of the objection, which is an argument for the following claim: 
(2') If explanatory evidential ism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then 
there is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
In what follows, we will use the results of sections 6.2 and 6.3 to argue that claim 
(2') is false. 
The first step in our attack on (2') is to argue that, if explanatory evidentialism 
discredits all deity belief .. , then epistemic evidentialism also discredits all deity 
beliefs. To see that this claim is true, note first of all that a form of evidentialism, E, 
discredits all deity beliefs iff it is the case that, for every subject, S, who has deity 
beliefs, the following claims all hold: 
(D 1) S is in a position to know E, and is in a position to know that 
her deity beliefs are not exceptions to it. 
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(D2) If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that E imposes, then we can make 
S aware of this fact. 
(D3) (Dl) and (D2) are true regardless of whether S's metaphysical 
deity beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic 
deity beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. They are 
also true regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and 
regardless of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation 
have been raised. 
Next, note that, if explanatory evidentialism discredits all deity beliefs, then the 
following pair of claims hold: 
If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs are not 
explained by evidence that establishes their truth, then we can 
make S aware of this fact. 
(D2EE) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. It is also true 
regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and regardless 
of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation have been 
raised. 
Thirdly: note that, if (D2EE) and (D3EE) hold, then the following claims also hold 
(since it is common knowledge that one cannot be in a position to know a 
proposition that is false): 
If S is not aware of the fact that she is not in a position to 
know that her deity beliefs are explained by evidence that 
establishes their truth, then we can make S aware of this fact. 
(D2EEP) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. It is also true 
regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and regardless 
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of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation have been 
raised. 
Finally: note that, if (D2EEP) and (D3EEP)are true, then epistemic evidentialism 
discredits all deity beliefs (since, as section 6.2 argued, we are all in a position to 
know epistemic evidentialism). 
The above reasoning shows that, if explanatory evidentialism discredits all deity 
beliefs, then epistemic evidentialism also discredits such beliefs. It can also be used 
to show that the reverse implication does not hold. For, it seems clear that (D2E1~) 
does not imply (D2EE). Consequently, we can conclude that epistemic evidentialism 
may discredit all deity beliefs even if explanatory evidential ism does not. 
Stage two of the second anti-sceptical objection argues that, if explanatory 
evidential ism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then there is no form of 
evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. We are now in a position to see that this 
stage of the second anti-sceptical objection fails. The failure of this stage of the 
second anti-sceptical objection poses a problem for advocates of this objection. In 
chapter five, I will show that we can solve this problem by constructing another 
version of the ASO. 
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Chapter Five 
The third anti-sceptical objection 
In chapter four, I argued that advocates of the second anti-sceptical objection face a 
serious problem. In this chapter, I will construct a new version of the anti-sceptical 
objection, which is invulnerable to this problem. Before I can start to construct this 
new objection, I need to argue for the following claim: 
(M2) If there is a subject, S, who has a self-supporting set of metaphysical 
deity beliefs, then epistemic evidentialism does not discredit all deity 
beliefs. 
Section 1 clarifies this claim, sections 2~ argue for it, and section 5 uses it to 
construct an improved version of the anti-sceptical objection, which I call the third 
anti-sceptical objection. 
1. Clarifying (M2) 
Before we can defend claim (M2), we must clarify the tenninology that it employs. 
In particular: we need to say something about what it is for a set of metaphysical 
deity beliefs (henceforth: MDBs) to be self-supporting. When I say that a subject, S, 
has a self-supporting set of MDBs, what I mean is that S has a set of MDBs, Ms, for 
which the following claim holds: 
(SS) Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that, if S were to reflect 
about whether M is explained by sensitive evidence!, then S would 
properly infer, from members of Ms and knowledge-constituting 
beliefs, that M is explained by sensitive evidence. 
IS'S belief that p is explained by sensitive evidence iffthere is some q such that (i) (S believes that p) 
because q, and (ii) if it hadn't been the case that p, then it wouldn't have been the case that q. 
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Consequently, we can rewrite (M2) in the following way: 
(M2') If there is a subject, S, who has a set of MDBs, Ms, for which (SS) 
holds, then epistemic evidentialism does not discredit all deity 
beliefs. 
In the next three sections, I will give a three-step argument for (M2'). Section 2 will 
argue that, if the antecedent of (M2') is true, then, under ordinary standards for 
establishment, the following claim is also true: 
(M2ae') There is a subject, S, who has a set of MDBs, Ms, for which the 
following claim holds: 
(SSe) Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that, if S were to 
reflect about whether M is explained by establishing 
evidence, then S would properly infer, from members of Ms 
and knowledge-constituting beliefs, that M is explained by 
establishing evidence. 
Section 3 will argue that (M2ae') implies another, more complex claim which we will 
call (M2ae++'). And, section 4 will argue that, if (M2ae++') is true under ordinary 
standards for establishment, then the consequent of (M2') is true. If the arguments of 
section 2-4 all succeed, then they will show that the antecedent of (M2') implies the 
consequent of (M2'). And, if they show this, then they will show that (M2') is true. 
2. From (M2.') to (M2ae') 
In section 2 of chapter 3, we argued that, under ordinary standards for establishment, 
instances of the following claim: 
(C) If it had not been the case that p, then it would not have been the case 
that q. 
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obviously imply corresponding instances of this claim: 
(E) The fact that q establishes that p. 
By appealing to this claim about obvious implication, we can now show that, if the 
following claim is true: 
(M2a') There is a subject, S, who has a set of MOBs, Ms, for which the 
following claim holds: 
(SS) Each MOB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that, if S were to 
reflect about whether M is explained by sensitive evidence, 
then S would properly infer, from members of Ms and 
knowledge-constituting beliefs, that M is explained by 
sensitive evidence. 
then, under ordinary standards for establishment, the following claim is also true: 
(M2ae') There is a subject, S, who has a set of MDBs, Ms, for which the 
following claim holds: 
(SSe) Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that, if S were to 
reflect about whether M is explained by establishing 
evidence, then S would properly infer, from members of Ms 
and knowledge-constituting beliefs, that M is explained by 
establishing evidence. 
To see this, note first of all that to reflect about whether S's belief that p is explained 
by sensitive evidence is to reflect about whether there is a true instance of the 
following claim: 
(ESE) (S believes that p) because q, and if it hadn't been the case that p, then 
it wouldn't have been the case that q. 
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Next, note that to reflect about whether S's belief that p is explained by establishing 
evidence is to reflect about whether there is a true instance of this claim: 
(EEE) (S believes that p) because q, and the fact that q establishes that p. 
Finally: note that, if, under ordinary standards for establishment, instances of (C) 
obviously imply corresponding instances of (E), then, under ordinary standards for 
establishment, instances of (ESE) obviously imply corresponding instances of 
(EEE). From these three points, it follows that, if (M2a') is true, then, under ordinary 
standards for establishment, (M2ae') is also true. 
In the next section, we will argue that (M2ae') implies another, more complex claim, 
which we will call (M2ae++'). During this section, and following sections, we will 
use the term 'is EEE' to abbreviate the term 'is explained by establishing evidence'. 
3. From (M2ae') to (M2ae++') 
Suppose that, as (M2ae') claims, there is a subject, S, who has a set of MOBs, Ms, for 
which the following claim holds: 
(SSe) Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that, if S were to reflect 
about whether M is EEE, then S would properly infer, from members 
of Ms and knowledge-constituting beliefs, that M is EEE. 
And, suppose that this subject, S, has just properly inferred a belief, B, from 
members of Ms and knowledge-constituting beliefs, and is now reflecting about 
whether B is EEE. Since S has just inferred B from members of Ms and knowledge-
constituting beliefs, it seems likely that, by introspection, S will come to know that 
an instance of the following claim is true (where 'B\', 'B2' etc. refer either to 
members of Ms or to knowledge-constituting beliefs): 
(i) B has been properly inferred from B1, 8 2, 8 3 ... and Bn. 
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And, once S has come to know that an instance of this claim is true, it seems likely 
that S will reflect on whether the corresponding instance ofthis claim is true: 
(ii) Blis EEE, and B2 is EEE ... and Bn is EEE. 
Because BI - Bn are either members of Ms, or knowledge-constituting beliefs, S is 
likely to conclude that the corresponding instance of (ii) is true. For, (SSe) entails 
that, when S reflects about whether members of Ms are EEE, he will properly infer, 
from members of Ms and knowledge constituting beliefs, that they are EEE. And, 
epistemic evidential ism commits us to saying that, when S reflects about whether his 
knowledge-constituting beliefs are EEE, he will properly infer, from other 
knowledge-constituting beliefs, that they are EEE. It seems likely that, once S has 
come to believe corresponding instances of (i) and (ii), he will properly infer, from 
these instances of (i) and (ii), that B is EEE. Consequently, it seems likely that, if 
there is a subject, S, who has a set of MDBs, Ms, for which (SSe) holds, then the 
following claim also holds with respect to S: 
(I) If S was properly to infer a belief, B, from members of Ms and 
knowledge-constituting beliefs, and S was then to reflect about 
whether B is EEE, then S would properly infer, from members of Ms 
and knowledge-constituting beliefs, that B is EEE. 
When (SSe) is conjoined with (I), it entails the following claim (where 'EM' refers to 
S's belief that M is EEE, 'EEM' to S's belief that EM is EEE, and so on): 
(SSe+) Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that the following infinite 
series of claims is true: 
(RI) If S was to reflect about whether M is EEE, then S would 
properly infer, from members of Ms and knowledge-
constituting beliefs, that M is EEE. 
(R2) If, after reflecting about whether M is EEE, S was to reflect 
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about whether EM is EEE, then S would properly infer, from 
members of Ms and knowledge-constituting beliefs, that EM 
isEEE. 
(R3) If, after reflecting about whether M and EM are EEE, S was to 
reflect about whether EEM is EEE, then S would properly 
infer, from members of Ms and knowledge-constituting 
beliefs, that EEM is EEE . 
... etc. 
And, when this claim is conjoined with the following plausible claims about proper 
inference: 
(PI l ) If a belief, B, is properly inferred from true beliefs, then B 
will itself be true. 
(Ph) If a belief, B, is properly inferred from beliefs that are EEE, 
then B will itself be EEE. 
it entails the following claim: 
Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that the following 
infinite series of claims is true: 
(Rle) If S were to reflect about whether M is EEE, then S 
would come to believe that M is EEE, and would 
thereby make it the case that EM is EEE. 
(R2e) If, after reflecting about whether M is EEE, S was to 
reflect about whether EM is EEE, then S would come 
to believe that EM is EEE, and would thereby make it 
the case that EEM is EEE. 
(R3e) If, after reflecting about whether M and EM are EEE, 
S was to reflect about whether EEM is EEE, then S 
would come to believe that EEM is EEE, and would 
thereby make it the case that EEEM is EEE. 
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... etc. 
Consequently, we can infer that, if there is a subject, S, who has a set of MDBs, Ms, 
for which (SSe) holds, then (SSe++) also holds with respect to Ms. And, from this, it 
follows that, if (M2ae') is true, then the following claim is also true: 
There is a subject, S, who has a set of MOBs, Ms, for which 
(SSe++) holds. 
In the last section, we showed that, if the antecedent of (M2') is true, then, under 
ordinary standards for establishment, (M2ae') is also true. In this section, we have 
shown that, if (M2ae') is true, then (M2ae++') is also true. Consequently, we can now 
conclude that, if the antecedent of (M2') is true, then, under ordinary standards for 
establishment, (M2ae++') is true. In the next section, we will argue that, if (M2ac++') 
is true under ordinary standards for establishment, then the following claim is true: 
(M2c') Epistemic evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
By showing this, we will show that the antecedent of (M2') implies the consequent 
of (M2'), and will thus show that (M2') is true. 
4. From (M2ae++') to (M2c') 
If, under ordinary standards for establishment, (M2ae++') is true, then (M2c') is also 
true. To see this, we need to recap, briefly, on the definition of discrediting that we 
gave in chapter one. According to this definition, a form of evidentialism, E, 
discredits all deity beliefs iff it is the case that, for every subject, S, who has deity 
beliefs, the following three claims are all true: 
(D 1) S is in a position to know E, and is in a position to know that 
her deity beliefs are not exceptions to it. 
(02) If S is not aware of the fact that her deity beliefs do not satisfy 
the evidential requirement that E imposes, then we can make 
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S aware of this fact. 
(D3) (D2) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity 
beliefs are true, and regardless of whether S's epistemic deity 
beliefs can be rebutted in a non-evidential way. It is also true 
regardless of whether global scepticism is true, and regardless 
of whether the standards for epistemic evaluation have been 
raised. 
From this definition, we can infer that, if epistemic evidentialism discredits all deity 
beliefs, then, for every subject, S, who has deity beliefs, the following pair of claims 
is true: 
(Cl) If S is not aware of the fact that none of her deity beliefs satisfy the 
evidential requirement that epistemic evidentialism imposes, then we 
can make S aware of this fact. 
(C2) (Cl) is true regardless of whether S's metaphysical deity beliefs are 
true, and regardless of whether the standards for establishment have 
been raised. 
If (Cl) and (C2) are true, for every subject S, then, for every S, the following claim is 
true, and is true under ordinary standards for establishment: 
(C3) If S's MDBs are all true, and S is not aware of the fact that, for each 
deity belief, D, that she holds, she is not in a position to know that D 
is EEE, then we can make S aware of this fact. 
But, if the following claim is true, under ordinary standards for establishment: 
(M2ae++') There is a subject, S, who has a set of MDBs, Ms, for which 
(SSe++) holds. 
then there is some subject for whom (C3) is not true. To see this, note first of all that, 
if some subject, S, is in a position to know that one of her MDBs is EEE, then the 
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following infinite series of claims is true: 
(Rle) If S were to reflect about whether M is EEE, then S would come to 
believe that M is EEE, and would make it the case that EM is EEE. 
(R2e) If, after reflecting about whether M is EEE, S was to reflect about 
whether EM is EEE, then S would come to believe that EM is EEE, 
and would make it the case that EEM is EEE. 
(R3e) If, after reflecting about whether M and EM are EEE, S was to reflect 
about whether EEM is EEE, then S would come to believe that EEM 
is EEE, and would make it the case that EEEM is EEE . 
... etc. 
Next, note that the most promising way of making a subject, S, aware of the fact that 
she is not in a position to know that an MDB, M, is EEE, is to make S aware of the 
fact that one of the claims in the series (R'e), (R2e), (R3e) ... is false. These two points 
strongly suggest that, if, for every subject S, (C3) is true under ordinary standards for 
establishment, then, for every S, the following claim is true under ordinary standards 
for establishment: 
(C3') If S's MDBs are all true, then, for each MDB, M, that she holds, one 
of the claims in the series (R1e), (R2e), (R3e) ... is false. 
But, if (M2ae++') is true, under ordinary standards for establishment, then there is 
some subject for whom (C3') is not true, under ordinary standards for establishment. 
The upshot of this section is that, if, under ordinary standards for establishment, 
(M2ae++') is true, then the following claim is also true: 
(M2c') Epistemic evidentialism does not discredit all deity beliefs. 
When the conclusion of this section is conjoined with the conclusions of the last two 
sections, it entails that the following claim is true: 
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(M2) If there is a subject, S, who has a self-supporting set of metaphysical 
deity beliefs, then epistemic evidentialism does not discredit all deity 
beliefs. 
In the next section, I will show that, by appealing to this claim, we can construct an 
improved version of the second anti-sceptical objection. 
5. The third anti-sceptical objection 
In this section, I will describe an improved version of the second anti-sceptical 
objection (henceforth: AS02). I will refer to this objection as the third anti-sceptical 
objection - or, for short, as AS03. AS03 is a four-stage argument which aims to give 
people a conclusive epistemic reason to stop actively believing EBG. In what 
follows, I will describe each stage of this argument. 
The first stage of AS03 is the argument that we gave in chapter one for the following 
claim: 
(1) If EBG is true, then there is a form of evidentialism that discredits all 
deity beliefs. 
Nothing that we have said in chapters 2-4 threatens the argument that we gave for 
(1)~ so, we can safely retain this argument as a part of AS03. 
The second stage of AS03 is an argument for a qualified version of this claim: 
(2) There is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
We can generate this argument by focusing on the second stage of the original ASO. 
According to this stage of the objection, virtually every form of evidentialism either 
leads to scepticism, or is too weak to discredit all deity beliefs. In chapter two, we 
showed that explanatory evidentialism does not succumb to this stage of the 
objection~ and, in chapter four, we showed that the same is true with respect to 
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epistemic evidentialism. But, the arguments of chapter four strongly suggest that 
there are no other forms of evidentialism that are invulnerable to this stage of the 
objection. Because of this, the second stage of the original ASO gives us reason to 
believe the following, qualified version of claim (2): 
(2") If neither explanatory evidential ism nor epistemic evidentialism 
discredit all deity beliefs, then there is no form of evidentialism that 
discredits all deity beliefs. 
And since any deity belief that is discredited by explanatory evidential ism is also 
discredited by epistemic evidential ism, we can simplify this claim in the following 
way: 
(2"') If epistemic evidential ism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then 
there is no form of evidentialism that discredits all deity beliefs. 
The third stage of AS03 is a three-part argument for the following claim: 
(3") If there is some subject, S, who has a self-supporting set of MOBs, 
then EBG is not true. 
The first part of this argument points out that claims (1) and (2"') jointly entail the 
following claim: 
(3a") If epistemic evidential ism does not discredit all deity beliefs, then 
EBG is not true. 
The second part uses the arguments of sections 1-3 to defend this claim: 
(M2) If there is a subject, S, who has a self-supporting set of metaphysical 
deity beliefs, then epistemic evidential ism does not discredit all deity 
beliefs. 
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And, the third part points out that (3a") and (M2) jointly entail (3"). 
The fourth and final stage of AS03 is an argument for this claim: 
(4") Under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG is not known to be 
true. 
To state this argument, we need to focus on the following claim: 
(D*) There is a community of people who all believe in a certain deity 
(who we will call D*). Many of the things that the members of this 
community believe about D'" are believed by them because they are 
written in a certain book (which we will call the D*-book). According 
to this community ofD*-believers, the D*-book is, in a certain sense, 
a book that was written by D* himself. The D*-believers also think 
that D* would never write a book which said something untrue, and 
they think this for the sense of 'write' which they use when they say 
that the D*-book was written by D*. The claim that the D* book was 
written by D*, and the claim that D* would never write something 
untrue are both written in the D*-book. And, both claims are believed 
by the D*-believers because they are written in this book. 
The fourth stage of AS03 argues for claim (4") by arguing for the following pair of 
claims: 
C 4a") If CD*) is true, then EBG is not true. 
C 4b") If (D*) is not true, then, under ordinary standards for knowledge, 
EBG is not known to be true. 
In the next four subsections, I will state the fourth stage of AS03 by stating the 
arguments from which it is composed. 
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5.1 Arguing/or (-la'') 
If (D*) is true, then there are people who have MDBs with the following content: 
The D*-book is a book that was, in a certain sense, written by 
D* himself. 
D* would never write a book which said something untrue. 
Let us focus on one of these people, who we can call S. In what follows, I will argue 
that S has a set of MDBs which is self-supporting - i.e. a set of MOBs, Ms, for 
which the following claim is true: 
(SS) Each MDB, M, that belongs to Ms is such that, if S were to reflect 
about whether M is explained by sensitive evidence, then S would 
properly infer, from members of Ms and knowledge-constituting 
beliefs, that M is explained by sensitive evidence. 
Consider the set of MDBs that contains just S's belief in (MDB!), and S's belief in 
(MDB2). This set of beliefs, which we will call Ms·, is self-supporting. To see that it 
is self-supporting, consider S's belief in (MOB!). (D*) tells us that S believes 
(MDB}) because (MDB l ) is written in the D-book. Consequently, it is natural to say 
that, if S were to reflect about whether his belief in (MOB!) is explained by sensitive 
evidence, then S would, by introspection, come to know that the following claim is 
true with respect to him: 
(Bsm) I believe (MDB l ) because (MDB l ) is written in the D*-book. 
It is also natural to say that, under these circumstances, S would properly infer, from 
(MDB!) and (MDB2)' that the following claim is true: 
(Csm) If (MDB l ) had not been true, then (MDB l ) wouldn't have been 
written in the D·-book. 
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For, it is clear that this claim can properly be inferred from (MOB1) and (MOB2). 
And, since S is reflecting about whether his belief in (MOB1) is explained by 
sensitive evidence, it seems likely that he would notice that this inference is 
available to him. 
After S had come to believe (Bsm) and (Csm), he would properly infer, from these 
two claims, that his belief in MDBl is explained by sensitive evidence. So, if S were 
to reflect about whether his belief in (MOB I ) is explained by sensitive evidence, 
then S would properly infer, from members of Ms· and knowledge-constituting 
beliefs, that his belief in (MOB1) is explained by sensitive evidence. The above 
reasoning can be duplicated with respect to S's belief in (MOB2). So, since Ms· 
contains just S's belief in (MOB1) and S's belief in (MDB2), we can conclude that 
Ms· is self-supporting. 
The above reasoning shows that, if (0*) is true, then there are subjects who make 
the antecedent of the following claim true: 
(3") If there is some subject, S, who has a self-supporting set of MOBs, 
then EBG is not true. 
The third stage of ASOJ shows that claim (3") is tre~ so, we can now conclude that, 
if (0*) is true, then the consequent of (3") is tre~ or, equivalently, that the following 
claim is true: 
(4a") If (0*) is true, then EBG is not true. 
5.2 Arguingfor (4b") 
Before arguing for (4b"), we must argue for another claim. This claim can be stated 
in the following way: 
(EP I *) IfO· is not true, then it could easily have been true. 
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In the next section, I will argue for this claim. Section 5.4 will then use this claim, 
and the following claim (which was defended in section 4.4 of chapter 3), to argue 
for (4b'): 
(EP2) If it could easily have been the case that p, then, under ordinary 
standards for establishment, instances of the following claim: 
(---C) If it had not been the case that p, then it would stilt have been 
the case that q. 
imply corresponding instances of this claim: 
(-E) The fact that q does not establish that p. 
5.3 Arguing/or (EPl) 
There are certain actual communities which closely resemble the community 
described in claim (D*). One such is the community of Christians. Many of the 
things that Christians believe about God are such that Christians believe them 
because (or at least: partly because) the Bible says that they are true. And, many 
Christians seem to think (a) that the Bible was, in a certain sense, written by God, 
(b) that God would never write a book which said something untrue, and (c) that 
claims (a) and (b) can be properly inferred from claims that are written in the Bible. 
It may turn out that the community of Christians does not conform exactly to our 
description of the D*-believers. And, it may turn out that there is no other 
community which conforms exactly to this description. But, it seems clear that there 
are a number of communities that come close to conforming to this description. And, 
for this reason, it is natural to endorse the following claim: 
(EP1) If(D*) is not true, then it could easily have been true. 
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5.4 From (EPJ to (4b1 
Now that we have defended (EP}), we can start to argue for (4b'). The first step in 
our argument is to point out that, if (D*) is not true, then the following, 
counterfactual claim will surely hold: 
(i) Even if (D*) was true, advocates of EBG would believe EBG, and 
their reasons for believing it would be exactly the same as they 
actually are. 
This counterfactual claim implies the following claim (where 'R' refers to the reason 
for which advocates ofEBG believe EBG, whatever that reason is): 
(i') If(D*) was true, then advocates ofEBG would still believe EBG, and 
would believe it because R. 
The next step in our argument is to point out that (i') entails this claim: 
(ii) If(D*) was true, then it would be the case that R. 
And, the third step is to point out that, when (ii) is conjoined with (EP}) and (EP2), it 
entails the following claim: 
(iii) Under ordinary standards for establishment, the fact that R does not 
establish that (D*) is not true. 
The fourth step in our argument points out that, since we can infer the falsity of(D*) 
from the truth ofEBG, the following claim is true: 
(iv) If R doesn't establish that (D*) is not true, then R does not establish 
that EBG is true. 
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From (iii) and (iv), it follows that, under ordinary standards for establishment, R 
does not establish that EBG is true. So, when (iii) and (iv) are conjoined with 
explanatory evidentialism, they entail that, under ordinary standards for knowledge, 
EBG is not known to be true. Because of this, we can conclude that the following 
claim is true: 
(4b") If (D*) is not true, then, under ordinary standards for knowledge, 
EBG is not known to be true. 
5.5 Summary 
If the arguments of the last five subsections succeed, then they show that the 
following claims are both true: 
(4 a") If (D*) is true, then EBG is not true. 
(4b") If (D*) is not true, then, under ordinary standards for knowledge, 
EBG is not known to be true. 
From this pair of claims, we can infer this claim, which AS03 aims to establish: 
(4") Under ordinary standards for knowledge, EBG is not known to be 
true. 
If AS03 does establish this claim, then it can be used to give people a conclusive 
reason to stop actively believing EBG. Consequently, it is worth investigating 
whether AS03 establishes this claim. I cannot embark on this investigation here. 
But, I suspect that it will yield positive results for advocates of AS03. 
6. Summary of thesis 
In this thesis, I have developed three anti-sceptical objections to the following claim: 
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(EBG) It is possible to undennine belief in God by arguing that the evidence 
for this belief is insufficient. 
The first of these objections was outlined in chapter one~ the second was outlined in 
chapter three~ and the third has been outlined in this chapter. It is clear that the third 
anti-sceptical objection is superior to its predecessors, but it is not yet clear that this 
objection succeeds. In future work, I hope to show that it does succeed. If this work 
is successful, then it will show that all of us have, or can be given, a conclusive 
epistemic reason to refrain from endorsing EBG. 
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